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This thesis presents a new theory: the Operator 
Hierarchy. The theory offers an original approach 
to understanding evolution; it uses cyclical self-
organization patterns to characterize all ‘parti-
cles’ in nature from hadrons and atoms to living 
organisms. In practice, the Operator Hierarchy 
allows novel solutions to fundamental questions, 
such as the deﬁ nition of life and the next step in 
evolution.
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Abstract 
Jagers op Akkerhuis, G.A.J.M., (2010). The operator hierarchy: a chain of 
closures linking matter, life and artificial intelligence 
PhD thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen. 
 
Science suffers from a knowledge explosion that is associated with 
overspecialisation and compartmentalisation. To overcome this crisis, scientists 
face the challenge of constructing comprehensive and integrating theory. In 
relation to this challenge, this thesis presents a general theory for recognising 
hierarchy in the organisation of nature. Novel about this theory is that it unifies in 
a single, strict ranking the two system types that traditionally are regarded as 
‘physical particles’ and as ‘organisms’. This ranking is made possible by 
focusing on situations in which systems that show cyclical self-organisation 
create a next system type with this property as the first possibility nature allows. 
Due to this focus the result is not just a classification but a chain of systems 
types resulting from and linked by process steps. This chain includes 
fundamental particles, hadrons, atoms, molecules, prokaryote cells, eukaryote 
cells, prokaryote and eukaryote multicellulars, and animals. The proposed theory 
refers, in a general way, to the latter systems as ‘operators’ and to their 
hierarchical ranking as the ‘operator hierarchy’.  
After discussing in detail the construction of the operator hierarchy, it is shown 
how the operator theory contributes to fundamental unification topics in science. 
Applications in this field include the definitions of life, the organism and death, 
the prediction of future operators, a periodic table for periodic tables, the 
supplementation of evolutionary theory with the opportunity to focus on structural 
development, and a discussion of the need to redefine the meme concept. In the 
discussion section the theory’s strengths and weaknesses are discussed. It is 
concluded that the operator theory represents a fundamental contribution to 
science that offers new roads towards solving integration problems.  
 
Keywords: evolution, operator hierarchy, natural philosophy, major evolutionary 
transitions, particle hierarchy, closure, memes, arrow of complexity, hierarchy 
theory, system theory, exobiology, artificial intelligence, periodic table, definition 
of life, Big History. 
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General Introduction 
 
 
Now, in order to work hard on something, you have to get yourself believing that 
the answer’s over there, so you’ll dig hard there, right? So you temporarily 
prejudice or predispose yourself – but all the time, in the back of your mind, 
you’re laughing. 
(Richard Feynman)  
 
 
 
Read, every day, something no one else is reading.  
Think, every day, something no one else is thinking.  
Do, every day, something no one else would be silly enough to do.  
It is bad for the mind to continually be part of unanimity.  
(Christopher Morley)  
 
 
 
To all those who have inspired me 
Omnia lusus naturae 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
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1 General introduction 
Science suffers from a knowledge explosion (e.g., Sagasti, 1999). In the last 30 
years more discoveries have been made than ever before (Linowes, 1990). In 
what could be regarded as a centrifugal vortex of scientific discovery, we have 
created tools that have helped us to investigate the world we live in, which has 
increased our understanding of the world, which has been used to create better 
tools that have helped us to expand our understanding further still. These 
developments have given us insight into the miniscule and the enormous, as 
well as the functioning of our own body, brain and behaviour. As a result, 
science has pervaded every aspect of our existence while the number of 
scientific disciplines and the knowledge they represent have exploded (Zwart 
2010). The rapidly growing amount of information has made communication 
between disciplines increasingly difficult. Consequently, there is an urgent need 
for integrating theory that can assist in reconciling scientific knowledge (Gilbert 
1983). 
 
The search for theories offering integrating frameworks can be regarded as 
‘centripetal’ science. The search for centripetal concepts is not a new 
phenomenon in science. There are quite a few examples of early attempts to 
bring order into the chaos of phenomena observed in the world. A well-known 
example is the Scala Naturae (natural ladder) in which the Greek philosopher 
and naturalist Aristotle ranked natural phenomena by decreasing perfection, 
from spiritual and divine beings to man, animals, plants and finally rocks and 
formless matter. The Scala Naturae inspired the medieval ‘Great Chain of 
Being’, at the top of which Christians placed angels and God. More recent 
examples of centripetal approaches are Mendeleev’s periodic table of the 
elements and the tree of life that represents an evolutionary viewpoint on the 
formation of species. Mendeleev’s periodic table of the elements logically 
arranged atoms and their reactive properties and allowed new elements to be 
predicted where gaps occurred in the scheme. Darwin’s Theory of Evolution 
offered a logical mechanism for the processes that cause global biodiversity. 
Both Mendeleev’s and Darwin’s theories have unified the separate domains of 
atoms and organisms, respectively. However, an overarching theory that 
connects domains as different as fundamental particles, atoms, molecules, cell-
based organisms and technical ‘organisms’ is still lacking. From the point of view 
of scientific integration, the absence of such an overarching theory must be 
considered a gap at the heart of science.  
 
To fill this gap, a theory is needed that explains the hierarchical emergence of 
increasingly complex system types. The suggestion that system hierarchy 
represents a knowledge gap may seem strange because the subject has been 
discussed in literature for decades and there appears to be a fair degree of 
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consensus about how to rank system types from the small to the large. A typical 
example of a ranking in the literature is the ‘ecological hierarchy’. This hierarchy 
includes quarks, hadrons, atom nuclei, atoms, molecules, organelles, cells, 
organs, organisms, populations, colonies, communities, ecosystems, planets, 
solar systems, galaxies, clusters of galaxies and the universe. The simplicity of 
this sequence is alluring but camouflages many serious problems concerning 
both hierarchy rules and the selection of the elements. What makes the problem 
more complicated is that the above kind of hierarchy is used in different forms as 
the basis for other studies and this leads to inconsistent reasoning and, thus, 
sloppy science.  
 
The problem of how to create a strict ranking may be solved by applying 
evolutionary principles. In evolution, certain things are constructed first and other 
things later. It is questionable, however, whether invoking evolution will help 
because Gould’s replayed tape metaphor (Gould, 1989) suggests that every 
hypothetical re-run of the evolutionary process must produce a different 
outcome. Consequently, it is highly uncertain whether a particular species could 
emerge twice. Using the same reasoning and broadening it to all systems, it can 
be stated that every re-run of the universal evolutionary tape could result in a 
differently organised universe. The idea that re-running the evolutionary tape 
results in unpredictable new situations seems to be inspired by chaos theory. 
Chaos theory states that certain dynamic processes cannot be predicted in 
advance because the nonlinear development of their future states critically 
depends on initial conditions. Lorenz popularised this critical dependence as the 
butterfly-effect: a wing beat of a butterfly on one continent may create a 
thunderstorm on another.  
 
If the butterfly-effect were the only rule shaping the universe’s evolution, the 
process would be utterly unpredictable. But, if it is true, how can we explain hat 
spectral analyses of remote stars show that these stars harbour the same 
physical particles, e.g., atoms and molecules, as the earth? And how can we 
explain that the cell holds such a central position as the basal building block of 
all organisms on Earth? The general existence of atoms, molecules and cells -- 
at least on earth -- is intriguing because it hints at the existence of a fundamental 
and universal structuring process.  
 
The major question of this thesis is whether it is possible to find rules guiding the 
above mentioned universal structuring process. To answer this question, the 
work focuses on circular self-organisation processes because such processes 
clearly stand out from their environment as individual entities. A cycle of 
interactions in a system is also regarded as a ‘closure’. Of special interest for 
this thesis are closures based on thermodynamic-driven self-organisation. A 
system based on this type of closure may show a next closure and in this way 
produce the next closed system. By repeating this process a long sequence of 
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closure-based systems can be built. Using a specific type of closure, a long 
series of closure steps can now be recognised in the emergence of increasingly 
complex particles and organisms in the universe. The proton, the atom, the 
molecule, the cell (prokaryotic and eukaryotic), the multicellular organism and 
the animal are examples of increasingly complex closed systems. Every one of 
these systems can be considered an individual entity showing its own system 
dynamics in the environment in which it ‘operates’ (i.e., functions). For this 
reason, these systems are labelled ‘operators’ in this thesis. 
 
The search for hierarchic order described in this thesis originated in an 
ecotoxicology study aimed at integrating toxicant effects on terrestrial organisms 
and ecosystem functioning. To properly integrate these effects, all targets for 
change in ecosystems needed to be arranged strictly and hierarchically. This 
action initiated the quest for a strict hierarchy of levels of complexity in nature. In 
turn, this quest for levels led to a search for a general particle hierarchy, as this 
was considered the backbone for all other hierarchies. As is described in the 
next paragraph, the major ideas that were developed during this ecotoxicology 
study became the starting point of the present theory.  
 
As an introduction to particle hierarchy, this thesis will present an overview of the 
field of system studies and the role of particle hierarchy therein. The introduction 
is divided into two parts: a summary of system science and a synopsis of 
particle-related discoveries in physics and biology. After this general 
introduction, the work of Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) is discussed. Teilhard 
de Chardin was one of the first scientists to develop the idea of a general 
particle hierarchy that included physical particles and organisms. The 
introduction is followed by a process-based analysis of all the individual closure 
steps in the operator hierarchy. Finally, two topics are discussed that are of 
general importance to this study’s context. The first topic examines whether the 
operator hierarchy can be regarded as a falsifiable methodology. The second 
discusses thermodynamics as a necessary basis for all systems. The 
introduction ends with an outline of the subjects discussed in chapters 2 to 9 of 
this thesis. 
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Problems with hierarchy 
The realisation that quite a few things were wrong with existing system 
hierarchies came in 1992. In that year I was involved in an ecotoxicology study 
aimed at integrating the findings of roughly two dozen PhD projects dealing with 
separate aspects of the Netherlands Integrated Soil Research Programme 
(NISRP). The PhD candidates had investigated different aspects of soil 
ecotoxicology. Their topics ranged from the availability of toxicants in the soil, 
through absorption-desorption balances between soil and the surface of roots, 
cuticle or skin, to toxicant uptake with food and the complex dynamic balance of 
the internal concentration in organisms, followed by the effects on targets in 
organisms and the impacts on individuals and their functioning in ecosystems. 
The integration study covered many levels of ecological organisation and 
needed a framework for ecological hierarchy that could act as a backbone for 
the integration process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. A system hierarchy 
that rests on the intuition of lower 
level elements taking part in the 
organisation of higher level 
elements 
 
A literature search produced a fascinating plethora of ecological hierarchies, 
most of which were variations on the following themes: atom, molecule, 
organelle, cell, organ, organism, population, community, ecosystem, planet, etc 
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(e.g., Miller, 1978; Koestler, 1978; Sheehan, 1984; Naveh and Lieberman, 1994; 
Laszlo, 1996; Newman and Jagoe, 1996; Nederbragt, 1997; Hœgh-Jensen, 
1998; Korn, 2002) (Fig. 1.1). The logic behind these rankings seemed to rest on 
the intuitive notion that lower level objects are ‘taking part’ in the organisation of 
higher level objects; that is, atoms take part in the organisation of molecules, 
which take part in organelles, which take part in cells, and so forth.  
 
Upon closer look, however, the latter examples of rankings were generally found 
to be inconsistent. To begin with, their hierarchy seemed in many aspects to be 
constructed specifically from the point of view of multicellular organisms because 
unicellular organisms do not consist of cells and do not have organs. In fact, 
some hierarchies seemed to ignore that organisms may differ in complexity, 
from bacteria and eukaryotic cells, through bacterial and eukaryotic 
multicellulars to animals. Another interesting observation was that the 
hierarchies generally could not be considered as representing a historical 
sequence. For example, while atoms integrate to create molecules, molecules 
do not first integrate to create organelles, which then integrate to form cells. The 
reason for this is that as long as nature has not constructed a cell, neither the 
context nor the means exist for organelle evolution. The same reasoning applies 
to organs in multicellular organisms. Furthermore, it may seem confusing that 
the ranking was based on two different types of transitions. The first transition 
type involved particles creating next particles, for example, the step from the 
atom to the molecule and from the unicellular organism to the multicellular 
organism. The second transition type involved the interaction of particles in 
systems that were not particles themselves. With respect to the latter transition it 
is suggested that organisms take part in populations, which take part in 
communities, which take part in ecosystems. Yet it is hard to imagine how 
organisms are first integrated into populations, then into communities and then 
into the ecosystem. As Schultz (1967) has indicated, a community, for example, 
is not a subsystem but a conceptual part of an ecosystem. Consequently, 
organisms directly contribute to the ecosystem while a focus on one specific 
interaction can be used to group the organisms without such grouping 
representing a physical object. For example, focusing on reproduction leads to 
recognising clones or populations, focusing on feeding relationships leads to 
food chains, focusing on engineering relationships leads to a ‘who-uses-the-
construction-of-who’ chain and focusing on interactions between organisms of 
different species leads to a community viewpoint. 
 
Based on the above considerations, it was decided that the generally used 
ecological hierarchies did not offer a strict enough basis for the integration study 
because their logic needed to be improved. Consequently, a stricter analysis of 
ecological hierarchy had to be developed. To keep things as simple as possible, 
the individual organism was used as the foundation of the new hierarchy. A 
focus on individuals would allow the association of toxicant effects with: 
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• interactions between individuals in ecosystems (e.g., populations, food 
chains) 
• complexity levels of individuals (e.g., bacteria, protozoa, plants and animals) 
• targets in the internal organisation of individuals (e.g., atoms, molecules, 
organelles, cells, organs) 
 
These three aspects can be regarded as separate ‘directions’ for discussing 
hierarchy. If hierarchy is discussed in one of these directions, then the aspects 
of other directions cannot be included without developing mixed reasoning and 
an inconsistent hierarchy. For example, transitions from bacteria to eukaryotes, 
and from eukaryotes to multicellulars, can be discussed, but this ranking cannot 
be continued with populations as the next step because multicellulars are not the 
only organisms that form populations. Prokaryote cells, eukaryote cells and 
multicellulars also form populations. Similarly, prokaryote cells have an internal 
organisation, eukaryote cells have an internal organisation and multicellulars 
have an internal organisation. Because all three directions for analysing 
hierarchy are accessible from every organism, these directions involve 
independent hierarchies and should not be mixed. Moreover, because of their 
independence, these directions can be considered separate dimensions for 
analysing hierarchy (Fig. 1.2).  
 
The search for a strict hierarchy in ecotoxicology started with the ranking of 
organisms of different complexity levels, from bacteria to eukaryote unicellulars 
to multicellular organisms. These levels were subsequently applied when 
analysing the internal organisation of multicellular organisms because the cell 
level is again found in a multicellular organism. To further extend this logic to the 
cell’s interior, the levels of abiotic particles also had to be included because the 
cell’s interior harbours many elements smaller than cells, such as molecules, 
atoms, etc.  
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Figure 1.2. Hierarchy dimensions in nature’s organisation: (1) hierarchy of how 
organisms form complex systems of interacting particles and/or organisms, (2) hierarchy 
of how organisms self-organise to form higher level physical particles and organisms, (3) 
hierarchy of the internal organisation of organisms. The same logic can be extended to 
physical particles as well as multicellular organisms. 
 
It was decided to analyse the complexity of organisms as if this complexity 
resulted from a range of construction steps, for example, from prokaryotic to 
eukaryotic and from unicellular to multicellular. After every step, a new system 
emerged that showed new properties typical for its complexity level. Every new 
property represented a new target for stressors. Consequently, the ranking of 
new organism properties also offered a ranking of targets in an organism. The 
following example illustrates this target ranking.  
 
When looking at a unicellular life form, such as a bacterium, its membrane and 
internal autocatalytic chemistry are the main system properties. These 
properties simultaneously represent the major targets for stressors. New targets 
arise as soon as a bacterium gains internal membranes and becomes 
eukaryotic. The nuclear membrane, the processes in both compartments, and 
the exchange of information between nucleus and cytoplasm form new targets 
for stress. Going from eukaryotic cells to eukaryotic multicellulars, new stressor 
targets develop in the structural binding of the cells and in the chemical 
communication between the cells that make it a multicellular life form.  
 
While analysing complexity levels of stressor targets in organisms, the question 
emerged whether the ranking method that was developed could be applied to 
non-living systems as well. In other words, would it, for example, be possible to 
distinguish between atoms and molecules in the same way as between 
unicellular and multicellular organisms? If this were possible, a general 
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framework for complexity levels of both organisms and particles could be 
created that would implicitly offer a rationale for organising all targets for toxicant 
action. This promising vista was the reason that the major subject of study 
turned towards developing a uniform method to rank all complexity levels 
including both the non-living particles (e.g., atoms, molecules) and the 
organisms (e.g., bacteria/archaea, eukaryotes, multicellulars). 
 
Before examining the construction of a strict ranking for the complexity of abiotic 
and biotic particles, the next paragraph presents an overview of hierarchy 
theoretic ideas and the discovery of complexity levels of particles and 
organisms. This information establishes a context for the general ‘particle’-
hierarchy developed in this study. 
Hierarchy theory: a selection of major ideas 
In the mid-20th century, Von Bertalanffy (1950, 1968) envisioned a kind of 
general systems theory that would one day connect a broad range of scientific 
disciplines. A strict approach to hierarchy can be regarded as a prerequisite for 
any general systems theory. An early review by Feibleman (1954) shows that 
many general hierarchy rules had already been identified in the 1950s, including: 
• Each level organises the level or levels below it plus one emergent quality. 
• Complexity of levels increases upward. 
• In any organisation the higher level depends on the lower. 
• For an organisation at any given level, its mechanism lies at the level below 
and its purpose at the level above. 
• Time required for a change in organisation shortens as we ascend the levels. 
• The higher the level, the smaller its population of instances. 
• It is impossible to reduce the higher level to the lower. 
 
But what exactly is hierarchy? Hierarchy is generally regarded as a relationship 
that follows two simple rules: transitivity and irreflexivity (Bunge, 1969; Simon, 
1973; Webster, 1979): 
• Transitivity implies that as long as A has a lower hierarchical position than B, 
which, in turn, has a lower position than C, the hierarchical position of A is 
automatically lower than C.  
• Irreflexivity means that A can never hold a hierarchical position below or 
above itself.  
From these rules antisymmetry follows because if we suppose a symmetrical 
relationship in which A is lower than B, and B lower than A, then, by transitivity, 
A would be lower than A, which is forbidden because of irreflexivity. 
Examples of hierarchical relations are ‘is larger than’, ‘is older than’ and ‘is a part 
of’.  
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The simplicity of the above definition does not mean that applying hierarchy to 
real world systems is always straightforward. First of all, problems arise if levels 
depend on different hierarchy rules, resulting in what can be considered a mixed 
hierarchy. Secondly, the demand of transitivity (if A is hierarchically below B and 
B is below C, then A is below C) creates a hierarchy, but does not forbid 
inserting an element into a hierarchy or taking an element from it. For example, 
for any situation where a system A is hierarchically lower than B, a system A* 
may be inserted into the hierarchy as long as A* is hierarchically above A and 
below B. Yet, such ‘flexibility’ or ‘generality’ precludes constructing a strict 
hierarchy in which the elements remain at fixed levels. To solve this problem, the 
elements must show a non-transitive hierarchical relationship. This implies that 
when A is hierarchically below B, and B is hierarchically below C than A is not 
hierarchically below C. The difference between a transitive and non-transitive 
relationship is comparable to the difference between using ancestry or 
parenthood as a ranking rule. Using ancestry, both the grandparent C and the 
parent B are ancestors of A. Using parenthood (and excluding the possibility of 
incest), the situation is different because when A is child of B, and B is child of 
C, then A cannot be a child of C. 
 
Finally, there is the question of how to deal hierarchically with a circular 
relationship? In fact, a circular relationship no longer represents a hierarchy 
because it has lost transitivity, non-transitivity and irreflexivity. Consequently, 
there is no way of determining which interaction is first or last. Heylighen (2010) 
used this aspect to indicate that a circular system must also be regarded as a 
new unit for defining time. Therefore, when circularity occurs, a refocusing of 
hierarchy analysis is implied. Before circularity, the analysis of hierarchy focused 
on relationships between the elements that create the circularity. When the 
circularity is present, a new focus is required that ranks the holistic properties of 
the circularity in comparison to the holistic properties of other circularities.  
 
The above peculiarities may well be the reason that a generally accepted 
analysis for hierarchy in natural systems has not been found. Yet, Von 
Bertalanffy (1968) has indicated that when it is found, a ‘…general theory of 
hierarchic order obviously will be a mainstay of general systems theory’.  
 
Not everyone considers the subject of hierarchy equally important (e.g., 
Guttman, 1976). One reason for this may be that the early theories suffer from 
an overly general attitude. They consider everything a system that is based on 
lower level elements and that is affected by its environment. Given this 
viewpoint, the theory becomes so abstract that all contact with specific real world 
examples is lost. Another reason may be that general system theorists have 
sometimes considered one-dimensional representations a sufficient basis for 
generalisation. An instructive example is the idea that energy is the aspect that 
rules an ecosystem’s organisation (e.g., Odun’s systems ecology, 1994). 
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Despite the advantage of simplicity, any low-dimensional representation always 
neglects aspects. For example, an energy-based approach to the ecosystem 
neglects the structural effects of ecosystem engineers, the genetic effects of 
selection and the role of dispersal, which according to the DICE approach 
(Dispersal, Information, Construction and Energy, see Jagers op Akkerhuis, 
2008) are the required inputs for minimal models of ecosystems. 
 
Another reason why everyone does not consider hierarchy equally important 
may be that the reductionism-versus-holism debate has troubled the objective 
hierarchical analysis of systems. This debate started with Aristotle, who in his 
Metaphysics (Book, H, 1045: 8-10), coined the phrase: "The whole is something 
over and above its parts, and not just the sum of them all".  
 
Reductionists generally disagree with Aristotle’s statement because they 
consider that a system with all its properties, including emergent properties, can 
be completely explained as the result of the interactions between the constituent 
parts. According to their viewpoint, a thorough understanding of a system’s 
parts, their properties and interactions allows a full understanding of a system’s 
functioning, at least in principle. Consequently, a system cannot be more than its 
interacting parts. This reductionist viewpoint has led to a search in systems for 
constituting parts and their functional properties, the parts of the parts and their 
properties, etc. For this reason reductionist theory shows a close link with a 
hierarchical analysis of a system’s construction. Examples of hierarchical 
approaches are the ‘worlds within worlds’ approach and abstract simplifications 
of it represented by Chinese boxes or Russian babushkas (e.g., Simon, 1962; 
Koestler, 1967; Lazslo, 1972, 1996).  
 
In comparison to the reductionist viewpoint, a holistic viewpoint strongly 
emphasizes the system’s emergent properties and the way these affect the 
functioning of its parts. Illustrative examples of how a whole system affects its 
parts are the presence of genes and organelles in the cell, the presence of 
castes in social insect colonies, and the presence of organs and the brain in 
multicellular animals. These and similar phenomena are fully explained by 
physical laws (reductionist point of view) while at the same time their typical 
realisation cannot be explained in a purely ‘bottom up’ way; they can only 
develop in an environment where the higher level of organisation (cell, colony, 
animal) is exposed to selection (e.g. Turchin 1977, Witting 1997, Wilson & 
Wilson 2007). In addition, the holists stress that the cooperating parts may show 
emergent properties that, in their typical realisation, are extremely hard to 
predict. For example, the thought of a muffin may give a person a hungry feeling 
and even make his mouth water. However, it is virtually impossible to predict 
deterministically, from the level of the interacting nerves, why that person 
thought of a muffin and not a slice of ham. What makes predicting a thought 
even more difficult is that the thought may be guided by a continuous flow of 
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internal and external causes, such as reading a story in a cooking magazine and 
the way the reader’s eyes process the magazine’s perception. 
 
Another aspect of emergent properties that reductionists sometimes question is 
the acclaimed discontinuity between two system states at the moment of 
emergence. The idea is that emergence can be regarded as a gradual trajectory 
(in time and/or space) along which it is not possible to say exactly when an 
emergent property is present. This idea is sometimes used to argue that it is 
useless to focus on emergent properties in relation to the analysis of 
organisational transitions. Indeed, if we look closely at the moment of its 
occurrence, the presence of an emergent property, such as a closure, may not 
be easily recognizable; during the transition phase, a closure may switch 
between being present and being lost. This switching can be compared with a 
person who walks between two rooms. When going through the door, the person 
is not entirely in the first room and not entirely in the second room. Yet, such 
presence/absence dynamics during a transition state offer no arguments for 
denying a transition. At a certain point a person has fully passed the door and 
has entered the second room. What may trouble this discussion is that in non-
closed self-organised systems, such as a tornado, the transition is indeed 
absent because the emergent property, the whirl, is based on a gradient and 
does not involve a closed topology acting as a system limit. In the case of a 
tornado, there is no ‘door’ to walk through; there are only two parts of the same 
room directly connected by a long winding hallway.  
 
The above discussion shows that both the deterministic and the holistic 
viewpoints have their virtues and that they supplement each other when it 
comes to understanding the functioning of a system.  
 
In addition to holism and determinism, another relevant viewpoint for particle 
hierarchy is the evolutionary viewpoint. The evolutionary viewpoint focuses on 
the way in which small particles create more complex particles, which, in turn, 
create even more complex particles, etc. in a long hierarchy of particle 
complexity. Because this viewpoint considers the construction of increasingly 
complex particles, it would be logical to call it constructivism. The concept of 
constructivism, however, already has various scientific uses two of which are 
particularly relevant to particle hierarchy. One use relates to constructivist 
epistemology. Constructivist epistemology is an epistemological perspective in 
philosophy asserting that scientific knowledge is constructed by scientists and 
not discovered from the world. The other use relates to a constructivist viewpoint 
in mathematics that originated in a 1938 paper by Gödel (Gödel, 1938). In this 
paper, Gödel states that only those mathematical objects that can be 
constructed from certain primitive objects in a finite number of steps can exist.  
Gödel’s mathematical constructivism offers a useful analogy to real world 
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systems, if it is assumed that reality emerges as a large hierarchy from primitive 
elements constructing more complex elements. 
 
Whether it is wise to call it a constructivist viewpoint or not, the emergence of 
higher level particles on the basis of lower level ones is considered in this thesis 
the most logical perspective for analysing particle evolution. Two general 
observations support this assumption. The first is that scientific measurements 
solidly support that the universe shows a long history of more or less globular 
expansion. When looking back in time, any globular expansion implies some sort 
of origin at its centre. The second is that the concentration in a small origin of all 
matter in the universe implies that material is heated. Heating generally 
decomposes complex structures to lower level elements. The combination of 
these two points strongly suggests that the universe once started as a small 
volume with a high energy density (high temperature) in which only low 
complexity particles existed. The latter shows that evolutionary particle hierarchy 
is a likely candidate for a major organising principle in science. The following 
historical overview presents a selection of authors that have substantially 
contributed to a hierarchical construction theory of particles.  
 
Whitehead (1929) presents a system of process metaphysics that defines the 
world as a process of becoming of actual entities. These entities are both 
process and outcome because they are both the subject (as the process of 
becoming) and the superject (as the result of the process). Whitehead reasons 
that processes are the basis of all entities: ‘… we are faced with the question as 
to whether there are not primary organisms which are incapable of further 
analysis. It seems very unlikely that there should be any infinite regress in 
nature. Accordingly, a theory of science which discards materialism must answer 
the question as to the character of these primary entities. There can be only one 
answer on this basis. We must start with the events as the ultimate unit of 
natural occurrence.’ (Whitehead, 1925). Whitehead refers to the events 
representing the ultimate units of occurrence (the lowest possible level) as 
actual entities or actual occasions, while “whatever things there are in any sense 
of ‘existence’, are derived by abstraction from actual occasions” (Whitehead, 
1929). When actual occasions interact and integrate into macroscopic objects, 
they form a nexus (plural: nexũs). All macroscopic things we see are nexũs: a 
tree, a table, a human being, a star, etc. The composition of the actual entities 
contributing to a nexus can change. Whitehead also refers to individual actual 
entities as creatures because they are the product of self-creation. He uses the 
concept of the organism for actual entities as well as for nexũs of actual entities.   
 
The work of Teilhard de Chardin (1959, 1969) focuses on physical and biological 
particles. He identifies particles on the basis of organisational properties that he 
describes as formedness and centeredness. He ranks the identified particles in 
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order of emergence. His hierarchy includes abiotic particles, single-celled and 
multicellular organisms and a future holistic state for society, Point Omega. 
Because his ideas about the organisation of systems are still relevant, his work 
will be discussed in more detail later in this introductory chapter. 
 
Simon (1962) focuses on the role of modularity in the evolution of complexity. He 
convincingly argues that it is much more efficient for nature to work with 
assembled modules than to start every assembly process from scratch. In a 
quantitative example, he introduces the watchmakers Hora and Tempus, 
assembling watches consisting of 100 parts. Hora and Tempus are regularly 
disturbed in their work. Each time they are disturbed, they lose the unit they are 
working on. Hora then starts to assemble units in pieces of 10 and then puts 
these modules together in a final assembly. When disturbed, he only loses the 
last 10-piece module. Tempus continues to build his watches from 100 individual 
elements. Every time he is disturbed, he has to start again. Simon shows that it 
is easy to calculate how unsuccessful Tempus will be and demonstrates the 
advantage of modularity in the evolution of system types. 
 
Koestler (1967, p.301) introduces the holon for the elements at the nodes of 
hierarchical relations and states that ‘The holons which constitute an organismic 
or social hierarchy are Janus-faced entities: facing upward, toward the apex, 
they function as dependent parts of a larger whole; facing downwards, as 
autonomous wholes in their own right’.  
 
Turchin (1977) introduces the concept of the metasystem transition (MST) to 
describe structural and functional aspects of evolutionary steps from one level to 
the next, from system S1 to system S2, that occur when, given two or more 
systems S1 (S11 to S1N) that may or may not show variations, the highest control 
level of the individual systems S11 to S1N becomes itself controlled. Turchin also 
considers every metasystem transition a quantum of evolution and furthermore 
introduces the law of the branching growth of the penultimate level. The law 
states that only after the formation of a control system S will it become possible 
for the subsystems Si to multiply and differentiate.  
 
Varela (1979) introduces the concept of autopoiesis (Greek for “self-making”) for 
a system in which the parts, including a boundary, support dynamics that 
recreate every aspect of the system. He defines autopoiesis as follows: “An 
autopoietic machine is a machine organised (defined as a unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: 
(i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and 
realise the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) 
constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realisation as such 
a network.” Including the concepts of ‘regeneration’, ‘production’ and the 
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‘concrete unity in space’ in the definition creates a natural association with the 
dissipative catalytic processes and membrane as a subset of the cell’s 
properties but makes autopoiesis unfit for describing the brain. 
 
Eigen and Schuster (1979) introduce the hypercycle theory. A hypercyclic 
process is created when catalysts that can individually perform a cyclic catalytic 
process interact. Their interaction results in a second-order cyclic process: a 
hypercycle. Eigen and Schuster (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979) and Kauffman 
(1993) have worked out in detail aspects of the catalytic hypercycle.  
Gánti (1971, 2003a, 2003b) has developed the chemoton theory. Gánti takes the 
cell as the building block of life. The chemoton is constructed as a minimum 
complexity representation of the cell, and thus ‘minimal life’. The chemoton 
theory is based on networks of chemical reactions in which cyclic reactions 
fluidly represent the information required to produce the system. RNA or DNA 
are not required at this level of simplicity. The chemoton theory is supported by 
cycle stochiometry, a theoretical framework. Stochiometry refers to quantitative 
calculations for describing the number of reactants and products before and 
after a reaction. A chemoton consists of three compartments: (1) a chemical 
motor system, (2) a chemical boundary system and (3) a chemical information 
system. Chemotons have been suggested as an appropriate model for the cell 
and, as such, for the origin of life. Gánti recognises absolute and potential 
criteria for living organisms. The absolute criteria are (1) individuality, (2) 
metabolism, (3) inherent stability, (4) the presence of a subsystem that carries 
information for the system, and (5) the regulation and control of processes. The 
potential criteria are (1) growth and reproduction, (2) hereditary change, and (3) 
mortality. According to Gánti’s definition, any technical intelligence (e.g., an 
intelligent robot) cannot be regarded as life. Moreover, too narrow a focus on 
minimal life does not allow the definition of life, in general, because even the 
most excellent definition of a least complex cell has little to say about the rules 
that define multicellularity. 
 
Jaros and Cloete (1987) propose a biomatrix of interacting doublets. They 
regard these as comparable to Koestler’s holons. Every doublet combines an 
endopole, representing its internal organisation, and an exopole, representing 
interactions with the environment. As an example of three levels of interacting 
doublets, Jaros and Cloete choose the cellular level, the organism level and the 
societal level.  
 
Heylighen is one of the advocates of the importance of closure in system 
science. Closure has a long history. Early references to closure can be found, 
for example, in Wilson (1969). Wilson points out that natural boundaries may 
result from minimum interactions or ‘some form of closure, either topological or 
temporal’. In its most general form, closure indicates the invariance of a set 
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under an algebra of transformation. Thus, when an operation is performed on 
the elements of a set, the operation’s products are still elements of the set. 
Closure thus indicates “the internal invariance of a distinction (or distinction 
system) defining the system” (Heylighen, 1989a). As a variation on this theme, in 
cybernetics a system is said to be organisationally closed if its internal 
processes produce its own organization (Heylighen 1990). A well known 
example of such organisational closure is autopoiesis (Varela 1979). Heylighen 
proposed relational closure as a means to deal with systems that do not show a 
primitive level because every element is defined relative to other elements 
(Heylighen, 1990). Circular closure relationships break a system from any pre-
existing temporal hierarchy; all relationships loose temporal order and must be 
considered as occurring simultaneously (Heylighen 2010).  Heylighen also 
analyzed the role of a manager as an agent causing organisational closure in 
mediator evolution (Heylighen, 2006). Heylighen (1989a, 1989b) furthermore 
discusses how a broad range of closed structures can be defined by differently 
combining four basic closure types: (1) transitive closure (or recursivity), (2) 
cyclic closure, (3) surjective closure, and (4) inverse surjective closure. 
Transitivity implies that if A is lower than B and B is lower than C, then A is lower 
than C. Cyclicity implies the existence of inverse transformations. Surjectivity 
implies the many-to-one relationships, while inverse-surjectivity implies one-to-
many relationships. In addition, any of the relationships in the four classes can 
be negated e.g., non-transitive or non-cyclic. 
 
Alvarez de Lorenzana (in Salthe, 1993) sketches a straightforward application of 
a construction sequence to describe the development of the universe. He states 
that the universe (U) can be understood and explained assuming that ‘…variety 
and complexity can be obtained only by processes of manipulation and 
combination, operated on and by the initial, given, U’. Using this reasoning, he 
describes a general hierarchical model in which ‘the elements of each new level 
are made out of combinations of elements of the previous level’. Alvarez de 
Lorenzana further states that “Evolution of and within U takes the form of a 
constructible “metahierarchy” (Alvarez de Lorenzana and Ward, 1987) – a chain 
of evolutionary cycles with, ideally, no missing links’. That a construction 
sequence should not have missing links was recognised earlier by Guttman 
(1976). Although de Lorenzana’s approach leads to a strict series of construction 
steps (no missing links), the requirement that interactions between preceding 
level elements have to form the next level is too rigid to accept, for example, the 
eukaryote nucleus or the brain as a next level. 
 
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995, 1999) propose another constructivist 
example in the sense of lower level systems constructing higher level systems. 
They focus on major evolutionary transitions, including the following examples: 
A.  From replicating molecules to populations of molecules in protocells 
B.  From independent replicators to chromosomes 
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C.  From RNA as gene-and-enzyme to DNA genes and protein enzymes 
D.  From bacterial cells (prokaryote) to cells with nuclei and organelles 
E.  From asexual clones to sexual populations 
F.  From single-celled organisms to animals, plants and fungi 
G.  From solitary individuals to colonies with non-reproductive castes (e.g., ants, 
bees and termites) 
H.  From primate societies to human societies and language 
The rules for identifying and ranking the latter major evolutionary transitions still 
need to be discussed. This need becomes clear if we analyse the points A to H 
with help of the three dimensions for hierarchy that were introduced in the first 
paragraph of this introduction (interactive complexity, individual complexity and 
internal complexity). These three dimensions show that the ranking of the major 
evolutionary transitions is based on different types of hierarchy. For example, 
the transition from RNA to DNA in cells relates to the internal hierarchy, the 
transition from unicellular to multicellular relates to the formation of a new 
operator, and the transition from asexual to sexual and from individuals to 
colonies relate to interactions in ecosystems.  
 
So far, the above and other theoretical developments have not resulted in a 
detailed, strict, evolutionary particle theory. Going back to basics, the following 
paragraphs, therefore, review historical developments that have helped to give 
insight into the evolutionary construction of ‘particles’, both in physics and 
biology. The aim is to offer the reader these insights as a context for discussing 
a comprehensive particle hierarchy in later chapters. 
Hierarchy in particle physics 
Particle physics has generally followed a reductionist approach because it 
explains the functioning of a higher level -- for example, molecules -- from the 
properties of smaller components, which in the case of molecules are the atoms 
(for historical overviews, see, for example, Close 1983; Perl 1987; Walker 2009). 
This methodology has strongly increased our understanding of the construction 
of matter and has resulted in a long sequence of increasingly small particles, 
down to the level of the quarks.  
 
Although particles have shown a disquieting tendency not to be fundamental, a 
consistent application of the reductionist approach may eventually lead to the 
discovery of the smallest, truly fundamental kinds of particles, i.e., ‘the building 
blocks of the cosmos’. If truly fundamental particles exist and a single logical 
theory can describe the laws determining their properties and interactions, 
science will then have found a ‘Theory of Everything’ (TOE) or ‘Grand Unifying 
Theory’ (GUT). These labels were originally used as ironic connotations of 
overgeneralised theories, but they have gained some acceptance in writing 
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about particle physics (e.g., Wilczeck, 1998). As Laszlo (1994) has emphasised, 
a little prudence with naming such theories may be wise because the 
mechanisms described by the TOE or GUT do not reach further than particle 
physics and, for this reason, will fail to explain the emergence and functioning of 
more complex entities, for example, atoms, molecules and organisms. ‘t Hooft 
(1992) has also pointed this out when he stated that ‘We are not at all capable of 
deducing the properties of a saw-bug from the standard model, and this will 
never happen, too’. 
 
The history of particle physics dates back to the Greek philosopher Democritus 
(585 BC), who proposed that every kind of matter is constructed of small, 
indivisible particles, or atoms (‘that which cannot be cut’ is called ατομοσ in 
Greek). According to Democritus, many types of atoms exist and they make up 
all forms of matter. This atomist point of view goes back to Leucippus, 
Democritus’s master. In 1808, the ideas of Leucippus and Democritus were 
revived by the English chemist, John Dalton. Dalton proposed a theory in which 
different chemicals were assumed to consist of indivisible particles, the atoms.  
 
The idea of the indivisibility of atoms lasted until 1902 when Rutherford and 
Soddy discovered that some large atoms could disintegrate spontaneously into 
smaller atoms. About this time, Pierre Curie and his wife Marie Sklodowska 
discovered that the disintegration of uranium also formed new, smaller atoms, 
namely radium and polonium. In both cases, the disintegration of large atoms 
into smaller ones indicated that atoms were not indivisible. Yet, the divisibility of 
atoms did not immediately give further information about a precise substructure.  
 
A few years later, in 1909, Ernest Marsden carried out experiments in which he 
bombarded a thin layer of gold with alpha particles (consisting, as we now know, 
of two protons and two neutrons) (Geiger and Marsden, 1913). His finding that 
only 1 particle in 10000 bounced back suggested that atoms mostly consisted of 
empty space, and that their mass was concentrated in a minute sub-volume. In 
1911, Marsden’s work and other experiments led Rutherford to conclude that the 
positive charge and the mass of atoms were located at the centre of an atom in 
a compact nucleus orbited at a large distance by electrons.  
 
At the same time several factors indicated that nuclei were composed of still 
smaller elements. One was the regularity of Mendeleev’s periodic table of the 
elements (1896). Another was Rutherford and Chadwick’s observation that the 
bombardment of nitrogen nuclei with alpha particles formed hydrogen nuclei. In 
1932, Chadwick discovered the neutron, and in 1935, Yukawa postulated that 
the proton(s) and neutron(s) in the nucleus were held together by the exchange 
of a small particle, which he called a pion. This particle was discovered in 1947 
by Powel (Occhialini and Powel, 1947).  
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Later, it was demonstrated that every pion consists of two minute particles, and 
protons and neutrons consist of three. Gell-Mann named these particles quarks. 
Quarks were never found alone but always in pairs or triplets. That quarks were 
never found alone was explained by a theoretical model. The model states that 
the force that holds quarks together becomes stronger when the distance 
between the quarks increases. When the distance becomes large enough, 
sufficient energy is accumulated to form a pair of new quarks in the middle. 
Accordingly, separating a pair of quarks always results in two pairs of quarks. 
The grouping of quarks in pairs or triplets was explained by assuming that every 
quark carries a kind of charge, called its ‘color’, and that nature allows only 
neutral combinations of color charge, represented either by a color and an anti-
color or by the combination of three different colors. 
 
Current theoretical studies try to describe quarks, leptons and bosons as special 
configurations of hypothetical objects called ‘superstrings’. Alternative, 
descriptions of fundamental particles explore dressed or undressed 
manifestations of bare quarks (Greben 2010) or relationships with bifurcation 
dynamics of self-organising dissipating force fields (Manasson, 2008). So far, no 
evidence has been found for particles smaller than quarks. 
Hierarchy in the construction of organisms 
One of the most exciting events in early biology was the discovery of the cell 
(e.g., Wolpert, 1995; Mazzarello, 1999). Until Antony van Leeuwenhoek (1632-
1723) had invented the microscope, the cellular world was closed to 
investigation. With access to this new tool, van Leeuwenhoek made many 
observations that revealed the wonderful diversity of the small creatures that he 
described as ‘animalcules’. His discoveries included many unicellular organisms, 
such as protozoa in water drops, his own semen and bacteria in dental plaque. 
 
In 1665, Hooke described structures in cork as ‘cellular’ and concluded that 
these were channels for conducting fluid. However, he did not suggest that such 
cells could be the basal units of life. It took many more observations and some 
200 years before Schleiden (1838) and Schwann (1839) coined the idea that all 
life was based on cells as the basal modules. Schleiden (1838) wrote that ‘Each 
cell leads a double life; an independent one, pertaining to its own development 
alone; and another incidental, as far as it has become an integral part of a plant’. 
Compared to plant cells, animal cells have much thinner membranes. This was 
probably the reason why it took until 1895 before Overton showed that the 
animal tissue also consists of cells with a proper membrane. 
Around this time, scientists also started to investigate the cell’s interior. 
Important cellular discoveries in this respect were those of the internal ’vesicles’ 
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represented by the chloroplasts and mitochondria. Because they are large and 
green, chloroplasts in plant cells were observed by early microscopists, including 
Anthony van Leeuwenhoek. In 1682, Nehemiah Grew described green 
precipitates in leaves. His description is considered the first report of 
chloroplasts. Although the earliest descriptions of mitochondria date back to 
1840, Richard Altmann was the first to specifically address these organelles, 
calling them bioblasts. When studying spermatogenesis in 1898, Carl-Benda 
introduced the name mitochondrion from the Greek words mitos, which means 
thread, and chondros, which means granule. 
Meanwhile, Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) had shown that a culture medium 
remained sterile after heating. Pasteur’s observations indicated two things. 
Firstly, a sterile culture medium had to be exposed to air currents before 
organisms present on dust particles could colonise the medium and propagate. 
Secondly, the chance that the chemicals in a given culture medium would 
spontaneously combine to form living cells (’generatio spontanae’) was 
apparently small or non-existent. In relation to these types of experiments, 
Virchow (1855) stated that all cellular life is derived from parental cellular life 
(‘omnis cellula e cellula’). 
 
The cell became a basic concept in biology, and in 1892, Wilson (Wilson, 1892) 
wrote that ‘no other biological generalisation, save only the theory of organic 
evolution, has brought so many new points of view or has accomplished more 
for the unification of knowledge’.  
 
However important the cell had become, the idea that all cells originated from 
cells did not last. Regardless of how small the chance, when thinking about the 
emergence of life on earth, two possible explanations arise: one is forced either 
to accept a chemical origin for life on earth or to speculate that extraterrestrial 
life colonised the planet. Since the latter speculation contains the question of 
how these earth-colonising organisms came to be, both lines of explanation 
imply that a solution is required for the emergence of living cells from a chemical 
environment.  
 
A range of theories has been proposed that have helped to understand the 
conditions that may be required for the emergence of life and to understand 
what constructions may be typical for the first cell (Oparin, 1957; 
Wächtershäuser, 2000; Eigen, 1977; Kauffman, 1993). In order not to invoke 
Dennett’s ‘skyhooks’ (Dennett, 1995), his metaphor for the impossibility of top 
down constructions, scaffolding is required by which simple elements can pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps while creating the cell’s complex ensemble, 
including the maintenance of its individuality on the basis of catalytic chemistry 
and a membrane (Conrad, 1982; Martin and Müller, 1998; Gánti, 1971; 
Hengeveld and Fedonkin, 2007). Although no approach has yet led to a de novo 
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construction of cells, the first cells must have had autocatalytic chemistry and a 
rather simple construction, while more complex structures, such as DNA and 
organelles, gradually evolved afterwards.  
 
To define the cell’s basic properties, the artificial life community frequently uses 
the concept of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980). Interestingly, problems 
have arisen because the original definition of autopoiesis refers to a network of 
component production processes that continuously constitute the system as a 
concrete unity in space. Yet, the cell is an open system that depends on a 
continuous influx of substrates and efflux of waste. Some scholars now reason 
that, for example, in the case of spider venom, bacterial excretes and intestinal 
digestion fluids, the external digestion enzymes actually form part of the network 
of processes reconstructing the cell and that, for this reason, the membrane of 
the cell is not the limit for the autopoietic dynamics. This controversy indicates 
that autopoiesis should perhaps be more strictly interpreted, namely that the 
membrane should be considered a closed interface only for its mediating role in 
maintaining sufficient internal concentrations of those catalytic molecules that 
are directly involved in the cyclic basis of the autocatalytic process. This 
restricted interpretation of autopoiesis would sharpen Maturana and Varela’s 
definition; it would more clearly explain that only the placing of the basic catalytic 
molecules outside the membrane would break up the cells catalytic closure and 
place it outside the autopoietic domain.  
 
Just as van Leeuwenhoek’s invention of the microscope caused a revolution in 
biology because it made cells visible, the invention of the electron microscope in 
1931 (Knoll and Ruska, 1932a, 1932b, Ruska, 1986) greatly enhanced our 
vision of the much smaller world hidden in the cell’s interior. By 1935, an 
electron microscope had been built that had twice the resolution of a light 
microscope. In later years, electron microscopes would allow detailed study of 
the cell’s broad range of structures, including the endoplasmatic reticulum 
(named by Garnier in 1897), the Golgi apparatus (discovered by Golgi in 1898), 
mitochondria (named by Benda in 1898), and spindles and the nuclear 
envelope.  
 
An exciting development with respect to mitochondria and chloroplasts was 
Margulis’ hypothesis(1970, 1981) that these organelles evolved from bacteria 
that had invaded host bacteria and continued to live in it as endosymbiont (see 
also Schwartz and Dayhoff, 1978; Gray, 1992; Knoll, 1992). There is currently 
broad support for this theory, based on evidence that the endosymbionts have 
their own genetic material, produce their own cell membranes and multiply by 
cell fissure. Nevertheless, questions still remain about how the symbiosis was 
established. In a recent publication Blackstone (1995) has asked attention for a 
units-of-evolution approach that simultaneously accounts for the gains and 
losses that the interacting cell types experience when living together compared 
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to when living separately in the environment. The approach also focuses on the 
difficulties both partners may encounter to communicate and, to a certain extent, 
to control the other. Recent discussions on an anoxibiontic origin of mitochondria 
can be found in Martin and Müller (1998), Doolittle (1998), Martin et al. (2001) 
and Martin and Russel (2003). These publications propose that a strictly 
anaerobic archaebacterial host, that initially was not capable of digesting larger 
organic molecules, and a facultative anaerobic α-proteobacterium, that could 
digest organic molecules, may have been the first to establish endosymbiosis on 
the basis of H2 and CO2 production by the α-proteobacterium. The Archaean 
host then metabolised the H2 and CO2 to methane. The latter theory also 
assumes that the development of a karyos took place after transfer of genes for 
the production of eubacterial membrane lipids to the Archaean host. 
 
Forms of endosymbiosis have recently been discovered that are even more 
complex than the mitochondria and chloroplasts in eukaryote cells. The 
complexity of such cell-in-a-cell relationships can be understood by focusing on 
the number of internal membrane layers. For example, all compartments in the 
eukaryote cell are surrounded by a single membrane whilst mitochondria show 
two internal membrane layers and chloroplast even have three. This method can 
also be used to analyse other remarkable endosymbiontic relationships. For 
example, in phototrophic cryptophytes, a red alga is contained in the rough 
endoplasmatic reticulum of the host. This means that four additional internal 
membrane layers can be found within the membrane of the endoplasmatic 
reticulum of the host. The first is the outer membrane of the endosymbiontic red 
algae. The second and third originate from the double membrane of the endo-
endosymbiontic phototrophic bacteria, the thylakoid membranes of which form 
the fourth internal membrane layer. Another example is the alga Peridinium 
balticum. This heterotrophic dinoflagellate contains a phototrophic 
chrysoflagellate. A total of six membrane layers of the endosymbiont can be 
found within the host cell. The first is the cell membrane of the endosymbiont, 
and the second and third are from an extension of the nuclear envelope that 
surrounds the chloroplast. The fourth and fifth are the outer and inner membrane 
of the chloroplast, and the sixth is the membrane of the thylakoid vesicles. 
(Bardele, 1997). 
 
According to the evolutionary viewpoint, the organisational complexity of 
organisms can be arranged in a large tree. The branching pattern of this ‘tree of 
life’ generally offers no explicit information about the structural complexity of the 
species involved, such as the presence of endosymbionts, a nucleus or the 
development of multicellularity. However, this problem can be solved by 
specifically highlighting the various complexity levels. Figure 1.3 (Alberts et al,. 
1989) shows how the ‘tree of life’ can be enriched with information about 
important levels of structural organisation. The figure shows the following levels: 
the cell, the eukaryote cell and the multicellular organism. The figure also 
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illustrates that the brain is regarded as an organ and not as a separate level of 
organisation.  
 
 
Figure 1.3. Representation of the ‘tree of life’ showing the historical speciation processes, 
the occurrence of endosymbiosis and the closure levels of the first cells, the eukaryote 
cells and the multicellular life forms (modified from Alberts et al., 1989). 
 
A pioneer of particle hierarchy: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
Teilhard de Chardin was one of the first scientists to combine a construction 
viewpoint with a focus on particles to create a worldview that incorporated 
physical particles as well as organisms in one large evolutionary hierarchy.  
 
As a palaeontologist, Teilhard de Chardin studied the evolutionary processes of 
organisms, including the human race. His studies in China included early work 
on the Peking man, Sinanthropus pekinensis (presently classified as Homo 
erectus pekinensis). Teilhard de Chardin would probably be less known if he had 
not broadened his paleontological viewpoint to incorporate major aspects of the 
evolution of abiotic systems. Using his ‘law’ of complexity-consciousness as a 
central heuristic principle, Teilhard de Chardin created a unique all-embracing 
representation of the evolution of complexity in the universe. His extrapolations 
of evolution’s course beyond the present allowed him to speculate about 
humanity’s future. His approach was unique because it was predominantly 
based on particles, which he described as systems that were both ‘formed’ and 
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‘centered’. Due to this focus on particles, he could integrate evolutionary 
transitions between physical and biological particles into one large sequence. He 
thought this sequence showed a direct link with the chronology of the 
emergence of complexity and, therefore, with the genesis of the universe (ES 
VIII, p. 36; 1949). 
 
Teilhard de Chardin called the core of his theory ‘complexification intériorisante’, 
or inward complexification, defining complexity as the result of relationships of 
elements amongst themselves. Following this reasoning, he arrived at two 
insights that are still relevant for particle–based evolution: 
 
First, in the multitude of things comprising the world, an examination of their 
degree of complexity enables us to distinguish and separate those which may be 
called ‘true natural units’, the ones that really matter, from the accidental 
pseudo-units, which are unimportant. The atom, the molecule, the cell and the 
living being are true units because they are both formed and centered, whereas 
a drop of water, a heap of sand, the earth, the sun, the stars in general, 
whatever their multiplicity or elaborateness of their structure, seem to possess 
no organisation, no ‘centricity’. However imposing their extent they are false 
units, aggregates arranged more or less in order of density. 
 
Secondly, the coefficient of complexity further enables us to establish, among 
the natural units which it has helped us to ‘identify’ and isolate, a system of 
classification that is no less natural and universal (ES V, p. 137; 1946). 
 
These two points have remained relevant because they highlight some 
fundamental principles for identifying particles, distinguishing them from other 
systems and ranking them in a general hierarchy. Teilhard de Chardin’s work 
includes some personal points of view, of which the following are presumably 
the most relevant in the context of particle hierarchy. Firstly, he assumed a full 
correspondence between complexity and consciousness. For this reason, it 
made no difference to him to discuss the complexity or the consciousness of an 
atom. Next, he regarded evolution as ascending to consciousness and thus 
assumed that evolution would reach its zenith in some sort of highest 
consciousness (Teilhard de Chardin 1959). Subsequently, he predicted that all 
individuals in society would evolve to an integrated organisation/consciousness, 
which he called Omega.  
 
The use of consciousness as a synonym for complexity merges a constructional 
and a functional property of multicellular animals. Unless we assume that 
consciousness is an esoteric phenomenon requiring no physical basis, 
consciousness is a mental process that is caused by interactions between brain 
cells, and, for this reason, functionally depends on a multicellular construction. 
Consequently, Teilhard de Chardin’s equating complexity with consciousness 
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implies the presence of multicellularity at all complexity levels, including, for 
example, the levels of unicellular organisms and atoms. The latter example 
shows that Teilhard de Chardin’s viewpoint suffers from overextending the term 
consciousness, as Ulrich (1972) has also indicated  
 
In principle, when extrapolating his particle hierarchy, Teilhard de Chardin used 
a scientifically acceptable heuristic procedure. The integration of multiple 
personalities into a single organism would be analogous in this context to the 
integration of atoms that create molecules, or cells that create a multicellular. 
However, as will be made clear in this thesis, there are serious problems with 
using the human phenotype as the basis for such integration. Furthermore, it is 
hard to defend Teilhard de Chardin’s suggestion that Point Omega represents 
some final evolutionary unity because every historical step in the evolution of 
particle hierarchy has been succeeded by a next step. As a result, the claim that 
Omega suddenly would represent a final situation must be considered illogical 
and hence improbable, even though, strictly speaking, the successful 
occurrence of past steps does not guarantee the possibility of future steps. 
 
Even though certain aspects of Teilhard de Chardin’s philosophy can be 
improved, his ideas of inward complexification and true and false units as well as 
his comprehensive hierarchical ranking, including abiotic and biotic particles, are 
demonstrations of his visionary insight into the abstract nature of system 
hierarchy and into the universality of the evolutionary process. 
 
Introducing first-next possible closure 
The concept of closure, in particular that of first-next possible structuro-
functional closure, is essential to the operator hierarchy. The next paragraphs 
introduce this concept. 
 
What is closure? One of the oldest visualisations of closure is perhaps the 
ancient symbol of the Ouroboros, the snake that swallows its own tail and by 
doing so creates a closed structure: a circle. In more general terms, closure 
relates to the situation in which a set is closed for the performance of an 
operation on its elements. This leaves room for different closure types. For 
example, the set of integers {....-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3,...} is said to be closed under the 
operation of subtraction because the outcome of every subtraction is a member 
of the set. The set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3,…}, however, is not closed for 
subtraction because 2 minus 7 is -5, which is not a natural number.  
 
The application of closure to system dynamics plays a major role in Heylighen’s 
work (e.g., Heylighen, 1989a, 1989b, 1990). Closure adds a special property to 
a system because the state space of a closed system has become invariant (i.e., 
it does not change) under the internal dynamics (e.g., Heylighen, 1990). 
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Moreover, closed dynamics allow one to distinguish between the system and its 
surrounding world. 
 
In the context of the operator theory, closure refers both to the closing process 
and to the closed (dynamic) state that results from it. Consequently, a closure is 
intimately linked to underlying mechanisms through the functionalities of the 
elements causing the closure. Once present, the closed system with its 
emergent dynamics gains mechanistic importance because it allows for 
discussion about the system’s accountability as a unity, about novel dimensions 
for entropy production and about the sensitivity to novel selective forces. If there 
is no closure, there is no new unit that can simultaneously be the object and the 
subject in interactions. 
 
In line with other publications (e.g., Heylighen, 1995), the operator theory 
distinguishes between functional and structural closure. Functional closure is 
defined as a group of elements that show a closed cycle of interactions that do 
not involve a physical mediating layer. Examples of functional closure are the 
autocatalytic set, the pion exchange between protons and neutrons in the atom 
nucleus, and the plasma strands connecting the cells of multicellulars. In 
contrast, the definition of structural closure demands that interactions create a 
physically closed topology. In the operator hierarchy, the focus is on a special 
form of structural closure, namely the structural closure that creates a physical 
boundary mediating a contained, first-next possible, hypercyclic process. 
Specific examples of structural closure in the operator hierarchy are the electron 
shell around the atom nucleus, the cell membrane of a single cell, and the 
connected cell membranes of multicellular organisms. Structural closure is 
important because the presence of a physical mediating layer is essential to 
defining a system as a ‘unit’ or as an ‘individual’. For example, without the 
structural closure of a cell membrane, the catalytic molecules of an autocatalytic 
set would float freely in their chemical soup. They would drift apart, dilute or mix 
with other sets. As long as they can mix, it is impossible to identify the catalytic 
molecules as members of any autocatalytic set in particular.  
 
While constructing the operator hierarchy, I aimed at a strict ranking of all 
elements involved because only a strict hierarchy can be used as a reference or 
‘yardstick’ for complexity. Here strictness indicates situations in which it is 
impossible to include an element in a hierarchy or exclude an element from it 
without disrupting the ranking’s logic. A consequence of a strict construction 
sequence is that all elements build directly upon each other (Fig. 1.4). Thus, all 
system types in a strict construction hierarchy can be seen as belonging to one 
large family tree.  
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Figure 1.4. This figure illustrates closures creating 
a strict hierarchy of levels. The levels are only strict 
as long as every closure represents the shortest 
route to the next level system type. 
 
Given the demand for strictness, the operator hierarchy has to be based on a 
rule that always produces the next particle -- nothing more and nothing less. To 
deal with the latter demand, the notion of closure has become the basic principle 
in all publications about the operator hierarchy. As seen from the publications in 
this thesis, the closure concept has been more precisely defined over the years. 
In the first publication on this subject (Jagers op Akkerhuis and Van Straalen, 
1999), the rules defining the transitions were described as ‘hypercycle formation’ 
and ‘compartmentation’. In the next paper (Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001), the 
focus was on major and minor transitions. Major transitions were described as 
always relating to an emergent hypercyclic dynamic and an interface, while 
minor transitions ‘reflect the emergent properties of major transitions occurring 
earlier’. Still later, the aspect of first-next possible closure was introduced. In 
Jagers op Akkerhuis (2007), first-next possible closure is defined as follows: 
‘According to the operator viewpoint, an operator of type x creates a next 
operator of type x+1 by means of a first-next possible closure. … The adjective 
‘first-next possible’ refers to the demand that the closure must be the first 
possibility for a new type of closure in system x+1 after the preceding closure 
created the operator of type x.’ 
 
First-next possible closure always indicates a new type of structural and/or 
functional closure. Using the combination of these closures as a means for 
identifying complexity levels has worked well for constructing the operator 
hierarchy. First of all, many steps in the operator hierarchy involve closures that 
leave little room for discussion, such as the construction of the hadron, the atom, 
the molecule and the cell. Concerning these closures, no relevant alternative 
closure states exist that could be inserted between the atom and the molecule or 
between the molecule and the cell. In addition, the use of structuro-functional 
closure also offers a simple and robust rule for recognising higher level closure 
steps. There is hardly a chance that the transition from unicellular to multicellular 
will not be identified because the cells show recurrent physical bonds (structural 
closure) and physiologically depend on each other (functional closure). The 
same holds for the transition from a prokaryotic to a eukaryotic cell, where the 
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endosymbionts/nucleus form internal compartments (structural closure) allowing 
for recurrent interactions between the new internal levels (functional closure).   
 
First-next possible closure is not just a structural state and the operator 
hierarchy is not just a ranking of states. As stated earlier, closure stands for the 
closed states as well as for the self-organisation processes causing closure. 
This implies that for every transition in the operator hierarchy, the closure/closing 
process is intimately linked to underlying mechanisms. However, because every 
operator resides at a specific level in the operator hierarchy, it is an illusion to 
expect that a single underlying mechanism could explain all these transitions. 
Instead, the new properties created by the closure of an operator at level X have 
to allow for the dynamics that enable the closure of the operator at level X+1. 
Because every closure, in principle, is based on its proper mechanisms, an 
overarching mechanism can only be recognised at a higher level of abstraction. 
A good candidate for such an overarching ‘mechanism’ would be the process of 
first-next possible closure. 
 
As a practical rationale that identifies the lowest complexity boundary of every 
closure type, first-next possible closure has allowed identifying the operators 
without major problems.  
Processes, closures and operators 
This chapter discusses the functional and structural aspects of all the individual 
transitions that formed all the different operators and/or intermediate closure 
states that were required for their formation. The individual transitions are 
discussed as part of the introductory chapter because the other thesis chapters 
mainly discuss the higher-order logic of the operator hierarchy and focus on the 
properties that certain types of operators have in common.  
 
Because the operator hierarchy results from a construction process, a low level 
of organisation is required as a start. At this moment, the fundamental particles 
(the particles included in the standard model) represent the most fundamental 
level of organisation known. For this reason, fundamental particles are used in 
the following text as the starting point for analysing how closures create 
operators. This choice, however, implies no a priori assumptions about whether 
fundamental particles represent the lowest level in an absolute sense. 
 
The sequence of first-next possible closures listed below includes situations in 
which the emergence of a next-level operator is analysed as consisting of two 
seemingly separate closures: one functional and one structural. The theoretical 
‘addition’ of these closures must, in practice, be seen as functionally unifying 
both closures into one emergent process. For example, the formation of a 
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prokaryotic unicellular operator represents not just the addition of an interface to 
an autocatalytic set, but implies a functional merger as well, making both 
aspects fully dependent on each other. 
 
As the following paragraphs focus on the construction of a type-hierarchy, the 
examples deliberately represent the simplest representations of their kind.  
Consequently, any real examples of these systems will generally involve more 
complex hypercycles and/or interfaces. 
 
Fundamental particles: a first-order cycle  
Fundamental particles split off and reabsorb virtual particles, such as virtual 
photons, in a process called self-interaction. Likewise, quarks show a continuous 
emission and re-absorption of gluons. In a Feynman diagram, the emission and 
re-absorption of a virtual photon by an electron or a gluon by a quark results in a 
straight line for the electron or quark, with the virtual photon or gluon line splitting 
off and curving back to it. The splitting-off and reabsorbing process can also be 
considered a life cycle from the quark state before emission to the next quark 
state, that is, after emission. Such a first-order life cycle is shown in Fig. 1.5.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5.  An example of a first-order interaction 
cycle based on quark-gluon exchange 
 
Fundamental particles: a second-order cycle 
At high energies, (e.g., in the extremely hot, minute, early universe) the weights 
of fundamental particles are enormous, their distances minute and the forces 
between them relatively small.  
 
For this reason all fundamental particles, including quarks, are supposed to have 
moved around in a relatively unbound state in a kind of ‘soup’. In this soup, the 
exchange of virtual photons caused two electrons to repulse each other, while 
the exchange of gluons between quarks led to mutual attraction. Attraction 
based on gluon exchange can also be depicted as two first-order interaction 
cycles that combine into a second-order interaction cycle (Fig. 1.6).  
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A construction rule of the operator hierarchy states that the highest complexity 
mechanism, which in this case is represented by gluon exchange, is the most 
likely candidate for integrating the first-order cycles. The quark-gluon exchange 
is complex because, unlike other force-conveying particles, gluons can split and 
reunite.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6.  A second-order interaction cycle 
based on quark-gluon exchange 
 
The emergence of the hadrons (in the cooling plasma) 
The expansion of the universe cooled the quark-gluon plasma. This reduced the 
energy density to below the level where quarks and gluons condensate into 
small bundles of two or three quarks. This bundling is called confinement.  
 
Responsible for quark confinement is the color force. This strong force originates 
in the color charge and is responsible for quark confinement. Color charge is 
conveyed by gluon exchange. As the result of the color force, single quarks do 
not exist because, like the stretching of a rubber band, the color force increases 
when two quarks are pulled away from each other. At a certain point, the energy 
in the stretched ‘rubber band’ becomes equal to the energy required to create 
new quarks. At that moment, the color force-field snaps and two new quarks are 
formed at the loose ends. The separation of two quarks always results in two 
pairs of bound quarks and never in two separate quarks.  
 
The color charge comes in three colors: red, green and blue and three anti-
colors: anti-red, anti-green and anti-blue. Quarks carry a single color: red, green 
or blue. Anti-quarks carry a single anti-color: anti-red, anti-green or anti-blue. 
Gluons are color neutral because they carry a combination of a color and an 
anti-color (for example, red/anti-green). Observations have shown that the color 
charge of a system of interacting particles must always be neutral and that the 
color charge must always be conserved in interactions between systems. It is 
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quite special that gluons carry color charge because other force-carrying 
fundamental particles, such as the photons that convey the electromagnetic 
force, do not carry charge themselves.  
 
The emission of a gluon changes a quark’s color because the gluon takes a 
color/anti-color combination when emitted. Thus, when a blue quark emits a 
blue/anti-red gluon, the quark changes color to become red (blue=red + [blue + 
anti-red]).  
 
The color force is considered the mechanism causing the confinement of exactly 
two quarks in mesons and exactly three quarks in baryons. Mesons are 
relatively unstable because a quark and an anti-quark quite easily annihilate 
each other. A baryon is relatively stable. From all baryons, the proton is the most 
stable because it is based on the perfect combination of three quarks with 
different colors: red, green and blue.  
 
From the perspective of the operator theory, particles consisting of two or three 
quarks are called hadrons. Hadrons combine two closures: the hypercyclic 
interactions resulting from second-order production-absorption cycles based on 
gluons, and the closure resulting from the confining influence of the color 
charge. The latter closure occurs if temperatures are low enough (Fig. 1.7). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7. Formation of a hadron resulting from 
the combination of a second-order quark-gluon 
cycle and quark confinement 
 
Hadrons: a first-order cycle 
After creating hadrons, adding more quarks (assuming this will yield a stable 
system type) does not create a new system complexity. Higher complexity would 
be possible, however, if a hadron could support a cyclic process that could be 
used for higher order interactions. In the context of the operator theory, we 
should now look for the most complex mechanism allowing the simplest, new, 
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first-order cycle. The latter is represented by the emission and absorption of 
small hadrons. In this process, pions, which consist of a quark and an anti-
quark, are the most important unit for two reasons. Firstly, pions are the lightest 
and therefore 'cheapest' to produce. Secondly, pions are the most stable of all 
mesons and can bridge a relatively large distance before they disintegrate. In 
fact, the swarm of pions surrounding a hadron is so dense that it represents the 
main part of a hadron’s mass (Fig. 1.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8.  A first-order interaction cycle based on 
hadron-pion exchange 
 
Atom nuclei: a second-order cycle 
From the viewpoint of the operator hierarchy, the pion exchange between 
hadrons represents a second-order interaction cycle (Fig. 1.9). The exchange is 
an important mechanism for two reasons. Firstly, the force of the pion exchange 
is strong at small distances. It is so strong, in fact, that it overpowers the 
repelling forces between positively charged protons and, for this reason, can 
make protons and neutrons lump in small units, each called a nucleus. 
Secondly, without pion exchange, the universe would be devoid of neutrons 
because any separate neutron has a 15-minute half-life. At this decay rate, and 
without new neutrons being formed, the universe would have lost virtually all its 
neutrons within a few hours. By continuously exchanging pions, the protons in 
the nucleus change state to become neutrons and the neutrons change to 
protons. Thus, the neutrons are never ‘pure neutrons’ and cannot easily decay.  
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Figure 1.9. A second-order interaction cycle based 
on hadron-pion exchange 
 
The electron shell 
Nuclei were never alone in space. In the early universe they were surrounded by 
a dense ‘soup’ of quickly moving particles, including many other multi-hadron 
particles with which they could interact/mix. As long as the kinetic energies were 
high enough to overcome the repelling force of the positive charge of the 
protons, the ‘identity’ of the multi-hadron particles could change. The system 
changed when temperatures in the universe lowered because of expansion. At 
temperatures below 3000 oK, electrons became slow enough to be captured by 
the positive charge of the protons. After that moment, an environment that 
contained free electrons and bare nuclei condensed into the current state where 
the nuclei are surrounded by a number of electrons that fits closely to the 
number of protons in the nucleus. The result is a zero or close to zero net 
charge and the ‘interfacing’ of the nucleus by the electron shell inhibiting 
interactions between nuclei. 
 
The atom 
The atom results from combining the preceding two closures: the closure 
creating the hypercyclic interaction of the nucleus and the closure creating the 
interfacing by the electron shell (Fig. 1.10). These two closures together allow 
atoms to emerge.  
 
Interestingly, because the operator theory demands a second-order interaction 
cycle as the hallmark of a nucleus, the system consisting of a proton and an 
electron, which is generally regarded as a hydrogen atom, is not considered an 
atom, but an atom-like interaction system. 
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Figure 1.10. Formation of an atom resulting from 
the combination of a second-order hadron-pion 
cycle and an electron shell 
 
The multi-atom (or ‘molecule’) 
After the atom, the next most direct step in system complexity must come either 
from a closure in the internal structure of the atom, which the laws of nature do 
not allow, or from physical connections between atoms, e.g., a transition from a 
single-atom state to a multi-atom state. Multi-atom systems show a recurrent 
interaction between atoms due to their electron shell: they exchange electrons 
between their shells in what are considered ‘covalent bonds’ (Fig. 1.11). This 
exchange can result in grids (e.g., in metals) or in complex three-dimensionally 
organised structures (e.g., molecules).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.11. Formation of a multi-atom resulting 
from covalent bonds between atoms 
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The first-order catalytic reaction cycle 
Adding atoms to any multi-atom system may create more complex molecules, 
but these will always be multi-atomary. For a next closure type, the operator 
theory suggests that one should look for the most complex emergent property. 
This is offered by the three-dimensional structure of connected atoms and the 
catalytic reactions which a three-dimensional structure allows for.  
 
If we take an enzyme as an example of catalytic molecules, we can analyse its 
reactions as a reaction cycle. The catalyst (C) binds to a substrate (S) and 
modifies it. The result is that the substrate molecule (S) is changed into a 
product (P) and the original catalyst is regained. This process represents a first-
order reaction cycle (Fig. 1.12).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.12. A first-order interaction cycle based 
on a catalyst that binds to a substrate and that is 
released after the formation of a product 
 
The second-order catalytic reaction cycle: autocatalysis 
In its least complex form, a second-order reaction cycle emerges when the 
product of a given catalytic reaction A equals the enzyme of cycle B and vice 
versa (Fig. 1.13). Such a reaction cycle is catalytically closed, which in principle 
allows it to catalyse itself as a set. This process has been named 'autocatalysis'.  
Various authors, notably Eigen and Schuster (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979) and 
Kauffman (1993) have proposed theories about catalytic hypercycles. Dittrich 
and Speroni di Fenizio (2007) have named a set of self-maintaining molecules 
an ‘organisation’. 
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Figure 1.13. A second-order interaction cycle 
based on two catalytic reaction cycles that produce 
each other’s catalysts 
 
The cell membrane 
The autocatalytic set can reach a spatial limit when the molecules form a kind of 
lumped aggregate or when a mediating membrane surrounds the hypercyclic 
reactions. A simple lumping of molecules creates a unit, but would still allow the 
mixing of such lumps and would not protect the autocatalytic set from 
disturbance of reactions by molecules from outside the lump. A surrounding 
layer that mediates the passage of molecules to and from the interior allows a 
system that does not show such problems. This advantage may explain why 
selective forces have favoured a membrane that surrounds the autocatalytic set.  
 
From a chemical point of view, it is rather easy to form membranes from fatty 
acids in pro-biotic chemical environments. Various suggestions for such 
processes can be found in Oparin (1957), Claessens et al. (2007), Fanelli (2008) 
and Hernández-Zapata et al. (2009), among others. 
 
The cell 
As long as the reactions of an autocatalytic set float in a larger chemical solution 
and show no structural system limit, the set cannot be considered an individual 
entity. A lack of individuality is problematic in recognising when an autocatalytic 
set produces enough material to have made one or more copies of all its 
constituents. After a full round of catalysis, an autocatalytic set has, in principle, 
reproduced in some way, but what about the offspring? It -- or they -- float in 
between the parent’s molecules and cannot be separated from them. As diffuse 
entities, the offspring cannot be recognised as units, and they cannot go their 
own way or experience individual selection.  
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Only a system limit that acts as an interface for the autocatalytic set (which does 
not imply that it acts as an interface for all atoms and molecules inside it) and 
that would at least result from the catalytic process but may also participate in it, 
would give the word ‘autocatalytic’ a structural meaning. Once surrounded by a 
membrane, every autocatalytic reaction cycle has become part of a structural 
unit, a cell, that can reproduce by forming new structural units or cells and that is 
recognised as an individual because of its unique autocatalytic set and 
membrane as system limit. The cell results from a merger of the closure creating 
hypercyclic interactions based on catalytic molecules and the closure 
surrounding the autocatalytic set with a membrane (Fig. 1.14). The two closures 
together define the prokaryotic/bacterial cell.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.14. Formation of a cell resulting from the 
combination of a second-order cycle based on 
molecular catalysis and a membrane 
 
As a consequence of cell-based autocatalysis, the cell’s functioning goes hand 
in hand with the degradation of environmental energy. Any system that 
maintains or even increases its dynamic organisation by degrading energy from 
the environment is considered a dissipative system. This does not mean that all 
dissipative systems are cells. The structure of a tornado, for example, is created 
by a dissipating air-pressure gradient. Yet, a tornado does not conform to the 
first-next possible closures defining the cell. 
 
Another consequence of cell-based autocatalysis is that the system must 
'struggle' to stay alive because an autocatalytic set of molecules represents a 
dynamic equilibrium state between degradation of the set, on the one hand, and 
maintenance, growth and/or reproduction, on the other. This equilibrium shows a 
minimum complexity boundary. If more molecules are lost from the set than are 
required for autocatalysis, the circular chain-reaction breaks down and the 
system sinks below its lowest complexity boundary. In short, it ‘dies’. To prevent 
death, or in other words, to stay alive, the cell must balance the production and 
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losses of the minimally required set of reaction-cycle molecules and membrane 
molecules to maintain itself. If no buffers are available the minimum requirement 
for survival/living is maintenance.  
 
Cell-based autocatalysis may also lead to more than just survival. Under 
favourable conditions, the production rates of catalytic molecules and other 
products will exceed their degradation rates and this will increase the quantities 
of all cell constituents. With a doubling of all constituents, the cell can split in two 
without losing functionality. In principle, such an event marks the cell’s 
reproduction.  
 
Producing offspring represents an energy barrier. This situation is comparable to 
energy barriers in enzyme reactions. Analogous to enzyme reactions, passing 
the barrier represents a thermodynamically-favourable dynamic condition. 
Reproduction strongly increases the chance that the gradient dissipation 
processes will persist, while mortality will eventually block the process in all non-
reproducing entities. When two or more cells reproduce and create dissimilar 
offspring that are individually selected for their viability in a given environment, 
one can start talking about Darwinian evolution.  
 
The cell with endosymbiont/karyos 
With respect to a first-next possible closure creating an internal compartment in 
the cell (Fig 1.15) one may consider two possibilities: the endosymbiont and the 
nucleus. As both possibilities involve structural and functional closure and 
uncertainty exists with respect to the events that have led to their formation, it is 
difficult to decide which of the two represents the first-next possible closure. 
 
Support that an endosymbiont preceded the nucleus comes from genetic 
analyses (Rivera, 1998) and observations of traces of endosymbionts in so 
called ‘primitive eukaryotes’, the eukaryote cells that do not harbour 
endosymbionts (Clark, 1995). The presence of traces suggests that the studied 
cells have lost their endosymbionts in a process of evolutionary specialisation. 
Additionally, recent theories about the origin of the nucleus make plausible that 
genetic material coding for membrane lipids was transferred from an 
endosymbiont to the host cell. This transfer allowed the host cell to create a rich 
internal membrane structure that supported the development of a nuclear 
membrane (Martin and Russell, 2003). Functional dependence supposedly 
started with a strictly anaerobic archaebacterium hosting a facultative anaerobic 
α-proteobacterium. Endosymbiosis was established on the basis of H2 and CO2 
production by the α-proteobacterium. The Archaean host then metabolised the 
H2 and CO2 to methane (Martin and Russell, 2003). Further support that the 
endosymbiont represents the first-next possible closure comes from the non-
nucleate phase the eukaryote cell passes during cell-division. This periodic loss 
of the nucleus is a strong indication that the nucleus never was an 
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endosymbiont, because an endosymbiont cannot easily ‘abandon’ its 
membrane.  
 
Depending on the criteria applied, the endosymbiont and the nucleus can both 
be regarded as the first-next possible closure. Starting with a bacterial/archaean 
cell, the property of engulfment of an endosymbiont may be regarded as the 
high complexity state that allows transition to the endosymbiontic state. In this 
case, the hypercycle of the endosymbiont causes the structural closure in 
relation to a hypercycle, and the recurrent interactions with the hypercycle of the 
host cell represent the recurrent functional relationship. However, after having 
transferred control over its metabolism to the host cell, one may also consider 
the endosymbiont as an organelle. The endosymbiontic organelle now allows for 
a high complexity cell, while the nucleus and its mediating role between two 
functional levels in the cell represent structural and functional closure. As the 
repeating of internal closure levels is not accepted by the operator theory, the 
choice for either one of these situations makes the other obsolete and will not 
affect the overall structure of the operator hierarchy. 
 
In practice the coupling between the endosymbiontic relationship and nucleus 
formation is so strong that cells with endosymbionts that lack a nucleus play no 
role in existing phylogenies. On this basis, this thesis refers to endosymbiontic 
cells as ‘endosymbiontic/eukaryotic’ or as ‘eukaryotic’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.15. Formation of an endosym-
biontic/eukaryotic cell resulting from the 
combination of a mediating membrane and a 
second-order catalytic set of molecules 
 
The bacterial or archaean multicellular 
The literature offers various examples of non-endosymbiontic ‘multicellularity’ 
(Fig. 1.16) including Myxobacteria, Actinomycetes and Cyanobacteria (the blue-
green algae) (e.g. Bonner, 1998). When considering multicellularity in the 
context of the operator theory, we should search for a new mechanism 
supported by the cell, because this mechanism will allow for a new closure type. 
The most complex state of a bacterial/archaean cell shows internal 
compartments surrounded by membranes and can interact with other cells by 
means of plasma strands. Based on these complexity criteria, the operator 
theory regards functional differentiation of colonial cells not a sufficient criterion 
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for multicellularity. In other aspects, the discussion of prokaryote multicellularity 
does not differ much from the discussion of eukaryote multicellularity. For this 
reason prokaryote multicellularity is not addressed in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.16. Formation of a multicellular operator 
resulting from recurrent bonds between cells and 
recurrent catalytic dependence 
 
The eukaryote multicellular 
Starting from eukaryote cells, the first-next possibility for closure is that in which 
interacting cells create a multicellular organism (Fig. 1.17). Independent 
development of multicellularity in many branches of the phylogenetic tree 
indicates the existence of powerful evolutionary forces in the direction of cell 
cooperation. A basic reason for this lies in intrinsic advantages, such as higher 
enzyme concentrations for digesting food, larger size and the three-dimensional 
use of space. Once multicellularity has developed, forces between interacting 
multicellular units will represent the dominating selective factors. 
 
What exactly defines a multicellular organism? To be recognised by the operator 
theory as a unit system, the interactions between the cells in any multicellular 
should create a new emergent property that unifies the interacting cells both 
functionally and structurally. To become a structural whole requires structural 
closure, which means that recurrent structural bonds have to be created 
between the cells. Functional closure, then, requires recurrent interactions. This 
is fulfilled by mutual autocatalytic dependence of the cells. Based on this 
reasoning, I propose that multicellular operators can be defined as a group of 
cells that show a combination of structural linkage and functional interaction 
causing at least one recurrent process that, under ambient conditions, is 
obligatory for the autocatalytic functioning of the contributing cells. In cases 
where cells interact structurally and functionally but do not have to interact 
recurrently for their autocatalytic functioning, the cellular unit must be considered 
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a multicellular colony. Many multicellular systems, including mammals, pass 
through a single-celled stage (the zygote) and multicellular colonial stage (for 
example, the two-, four- and eight-celled stage of a human embryo) before they 
develop into a multicellular organism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.17. Formation of an endosymbiontic/ 
eukaryotic multicellular operator resulting from 
recurrent bonds between eukaryotic cells and their 
recurrent catalytic dependence 
 
Several reasons explain why the above general definition of multicellular 
operators allows many different system types. Firstly, cells can be connected in 
several ways. Secondly, cells may functionally interact in several ways. Thirdly, 
interactions between cells may be based on different combinations of structural 
and functional possibilities. Finally, as soon as organisms consist of many cells, 
the interactions between the cells may create hierarchies of internal processes 
that may range from local to general.  
 
An aspect that is still not covered by the above definition is that interactions 
between cells may lead to different ‘cooperation intensities’ that lay between the 
following extremes: ‘brittle’ interactions and intense communication.  
 
Relatively 'brittle' interactions are formed when the cells are bound in the least 
forceful way by membrane proteins and when the diffusion of proteins conveys 
the intercellular communication. In this case, the overall system is hardly more 
than a colony. The slug-like structure plasmodium illustrates this. A plasmodium 
is formed when many individually dwelling and genetically different cells of slime 
mould come together. The cells in the plasmodium are kept together by 
membrane proteins and communicate with each other through chemical signals. 
Together the cells produce higher concentrations of digestive enzyme, ensuring 
a better survival under low food conditions. They also reproduce together. To 
reproduce, they must depend on the multicellular stage to initiate differentiation 
and the construction of a stalk on which spores are formed.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, we find cells that intensively communicate 
through plasma strands. Such plasma connections are allowed through gap 
junctions between animal cells, through plasmodesmata between plant cells, 
and through incomplete cell walls such as in some fungi or developing insect 
eggs. Multicellularity requires, however, that only the plasma be connected, 
while the genetic material is retained in the cell.  
 
From the point of view of first-next possible closure, the operator theory expects 
a new type of structural and functional closure as the basis for multicellularity. 
Because individual cells already can show chemical communication, 
multicellularity should involve a new type of intracellular communication. The 
most likely candidate for this are the above mentioned plasma connections 
between cells. Accordingly, the use of closure dimensions in the operator theory 
suggests that cells in a multicellular organism typically must communicate by 
means of plasma connections between their cells. 
 
Several aspects in relation to the above definition of multicellularity require some 
discussion. 
 
Firstly, although the above definition does not exclude an organism consisting of 
cells with different autocatalytic sets, genetic conflicts about which genetic 
material participates in reproduction will generally select against chimeras.  
 
Secondly, the success of a multicellular organism in maintaining its organisation 
depends on its capacity to deal with prevailing environmental conditions and to 
adapt or to repair its organisation after it has been damaged, for example, the 
re-growth of a twig from a willow tree that has been stuck in the ground. If the 
weather is not too warm, too cold, or too dry, etc. and the stick has enough 
buffered resources, it may survive long enough to regenerate roots and start 
growing, and eventually become a willow tree. In extreme cases, even single 
cells of an organism can be induced to regenerate the multicellular structure. 
With a little help, for instance, by in vitro-culture, this applies to many plant cells. 
The callus that forms and the leaves and small plants that may emerge from it 
can be considered multicellular operators in the in vitro environment. Yet, they 
need roots and a certain size and strength before they have assembled all the 
tools needed for internal interactions to survive as a plant in an outdoor 
environment where they can develop towards a reproductive stage. The 
example of a twig shows that the interaction between the environmental 
conditions and the state of any particular multicellular organism determines 
whether a colony of cells can regain organism structure. The above definition of 
multicellular operators is explicit in recognising this relativity.  
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Thirdly, lichens and plants with mycorrhiza are 'multicellular organisms' 
consisting of two or more closely interwoven types of cells that belong to 
different species. As lichens frequently disperse in the interwoven form, it seems 
as if their reproduction is based on a mixture of cell types. However, lichens can 
be classified as a symbiosis because the fungi show sexual reproduction without 
the algae’s genetic involvement and can survive, at least temporarily, as 
individual multicellular organisms during this stage. 
 
Finally, a multicellular organism may produce structural material that supports its 
growth. This material is generally more persistent than the organism. For 
example, a flash of lightening may split a tree’s bark and root system into two 
separate halves. These two halves may continue to grow. Although the two tree 
halves are still connected through the wood, they show no intercellular 
communication anymore and have become separate organisms. 
 
The first-order neuron cycle 
Because adding more cells to a multicellular organism does not affect its closure 
type, multicellularity forms a serious complexity barrier. The operator theory now 
suggests a search for the most complex property that interacting cells allow and 
that represents the shortest route to a novel functionality. If chemical 
communications between cells by diffusion gradients (as already existed as the 
basis for multicellularity) is compared with communication by cell-specific 
contacts over large distances that neural extensions of cells allow, the latter 
represents a new interaction and introduces a higher complexity interaction type. 
These qualities make it the preferred choice in the context of the operator 
hierarchy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.18. The figure shows a first-order 
interaction cycle based on neuron interactions. 
These types of modules of interacting neurons 
function as the most basal neural memory and are 
Called Categorising And Learning Modules 
(CALMs). 
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Based on interactions between nerve cells, groups of cells with closed 
excitation-inhibition dynamics can be created (first-order interaction cycle) (Fig. 
1.18). Such groups of interacting nerve cells or 'modules' can exhibit special, 
novel dynamic properties. One example of such new dynamics is the 
categorising and learning function performed by the neocortical minicolumns. 
Another example is the oscillation pattern of 'interior olive' modules in the 
cerebellum, which function as neural metronomes (McCormick, 1995). Several 
authors have advocated that such first-order interactive modules are the brain’s 
basic functional units (Mountcastle, 1975; Szentagothai, 1975). In the following 
text I will refer to first-order neural modules as 'Categorising And Learning 
Modules' or CALMs, a name that Murré (1992) and Murré et al. (1989, 1992) 
introduced for computer simulations of the neocortical mini-columns. 
 
The neuron hypercycle 
A disadvantage of the single CALM is that an earlier learned task is easily 
forgotten during the training of a next task. To overcome this problem, Happel 
(1994) has examined the possibility of coupling CALMs in a recurrent way (Fig. 
1.19). Due to the circular stimulation of CALMs in a recurrent network, the 
interaction strengths of the connections between the cells in the CALM network 
adapt until they reach a stable state that supports dynamic patterns of nerve 
firing. These dynamic patterns can be periodic or chaotic. The transitions 
between periodic and chaotic behaviour are relatively abrupt. Such abruptness 
agrees with the almost discrete limits found in the state space of the neural 
network dynamics. These limits separate observations in what appears as 
distinct classes. The inclusion of a temporal aspect implies a large extension of 
state spaces compared to any first-order recurrent, non-hypercyclic network. As 
Happel (1997, PhD thesis chapter 4: ‘Modular functions’) shows, an interesting 
property of recurrent networks is that they can capture the complexity of newly 
learned tasks with little loss of earlier experiences.  
 
The emergence of the neural hypercycle is the second time that an operator 
emerges as a consequence of an internal differentiation. The first case is, of 
course, the endosymbionts in the eukaryote. The reason why this 'internal' 
closure must be preferred above potential cooperation between organisms is 
that the operator hierarchy is based on first-next possible closure steps. 
Compared to cooperation between multicellular organisms (e.g. fungi, plants, 
algae), the interactions between multicellular neural units offer a more direct 
transition than those between individual organisms. The fact that the cooperation 
between multicellular organisms represents a less direct route makes organism 
interactions inconsistent with the operator hierarchy. 
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Figure 1.19. A second-order neural interaction 
cycle based on recurrent interactions between 
CALMs 
 
The neural hypercycle probably emerged after primitive neural webs were 
formed. Several reasons explain why this sequence occurred. Firstly, the neural 
hypercycle requires a minimum amount of nerve cells to form neuronal modules 
and their interactions. Secondly, an organism needs 'knowledge' about its 
environment to survive. Plotkin (1994) defines 'knowledge' as any kind of system 
structure that enables an entity to respond to and act in its environment. Using 
this definition, there is no inherent knowledge in the CALM-modules of a newly 
born organism, because it has not yet learned anything. It is therefore necessary 
that an animal can start its life with a more or less prewired neural circuitry that 
allows for reflexes. Due to selected-for, gene-based ontogeny, these reflexes will 
provide the right responses to survive and to reproduce. In a later phase the 
supporting environment of a pre-wired brain will allow the emergence of brain 
structure that is capable of learning. As predetermined structure also strongly 
reduces the time to learn something, some predetermined structure in the brain 
is also useful for organisms that have to learn. The above discussion shows that 
learned behaviour, which is based on CALM-webs, must be considered to have 
evolved in a context of a hardwired brain that produces most of the organism’s 
behaviour that it did not have to learn. 
 
The sensory interface 
The sensory interface that surrounds all hypercyclic neural networks has never 
existed as a separate entity. It co-evolved with the neural network in multicellular 
organisms and provided the neural network with information about its 
environment.  
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The sensory interface can be divided into two parts: an observing part, the 
'perception interface', and an activating part, the 'activation interface'. The 
perception and activation interface are both integrated into the 'vehicle' in which 
the network resides. In organisms, the perception interface includes sensors 
focused on the outside world, such as eyes, ears, nose, etc., and all sorts of 
proprio-receptors within the organism such as chemo-receptors, stretch 
receptors, temperature receptors, etc. The activation interface includes nerves 
that, for example, stimulate muscles for activity directed at the outside world and 
stimulate the neuro-secretory cells for internal regulation of physiological 
processes.  
 
The memon 
The memon is created by a combination of two closures: a closure creating 
second-order recurrent interactions between neurons in a recurrent CALM 
network, and a closure creating a physical limit in the form of the sensory 
interface (Fig. 1.20). These two closures together allow the memon to emerge. 
.  
The name memon comes from Dawkins (1976) who used the word meme for 
cultural replicators that thrive in brains and for the artificially manufactured 
products of brains, such as books, computers, and so on. In the operator theory, 
however, the word meme is used in a differentiated way: it describes more 
precisely a whole range of memic entities that play a role in the functioning of 
memons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.20.  Formation of a memon resulting from 
the combination of second-order neuron inter-
actions and an interface 
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A differentiated definition of a meme is required because memons may be 
involved in replicating various memic entities (Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001): 
1. Memons may exchange ideas. We suggest using the concept 'abstract 
meme' (or a-meme) for such abstractions, for example, melodies, ideas, 
stories, theories, and jokes that may reside in functional meme networks and 
can be transmitted from memon to memon in the communication process. 
This is closest to the meme concept as introduced by Dawkins (1976).  
2. Memons will actively create physical 'traces' of their thoughts, such as books, 
houses, computers, radio waves, etc. These traces can best be designated 
as 'physical meme models' or 'physical memes' (p-memes) because these 
entities represent 'real-world/physical' representations of the abstract memes. 
A-Memes also replicate through these physical models because the 
observation of a nice model will inspire the observer to mimic it.  
3. The concept 'coding meme' (or c-meme) could be used to define any string of 
codes that contains the information to construct fully or partially the neurons 
and connections of a neural network. Only if this code is supplemented with 
the interaction strengths can it be used to copy fully the network’s knowledge. 
In fact, c-memes code for a neural network architecture and associated 
knowledge much in the same way as genes code for the chemistry playing a 
role in the survival of cellular beings.  
 
As far as I know, the above way of differentiating between various memic 
entities does not yet play a role in modern 'memology' (e.g., Wilkins, 1998; 
Blackmore 1999).  
 
In principle, memic neural networks are not necessarily bound to organisms but 
can be housed in any kind of vehicle. A memon may even be built from material 
other than organic cells. In fact, any material and any other signal transmission 
than electrical may be used. What counts is that the dynamic processes in a 
memon allow an equivalent of the neural hypercycle with interface.   
Is the operator theory a falsifiable approach?  
A good theory should be falsifiable. Because the operator hierarchy rests on 
mechanistic closure processes for every step in its construction and is not just a 
superficial description of some accidentally ranked system states, it should be 
possible to point out certain aspects of the theory that are open to falsification. 
This falsification process can be split into the following three questions that 
coincide with major aspects of the structure of the operator hierarchy: 
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1.  Can it be proven that the individual steps in the operator hierarchy are the 
first-next possibilities for the suggested closures? 
The operator hierarchy can be tested step-by-step to see whether it is based 
on existing system types and realistic pathways for their creation. This control 
method focuses on the physical existence of the system types in the operator 
hierarchy and on proof for the transitions through which they have been 
formed.  
For most of the system types in the operator hierarchy, the physical existence 
is part of generally accepted scientific knowledge. Apart from philosophical 
discussions about how to prove that anything exists, little scientific doubt 
exists about the measurability of entities such as atoms, molecules, cells, etc. 
The fact that 'there really is something out there' that corresponds with our 
mental models is supported by the increasing accuracy with which these 
systems and their individual and interactive properties can be described and 
by the fact that the use of different ways of observation yield identical results 
(Kragh, 1999).  
In this context the mechanisms have already been discovered by which 
relatively simple systems can be artificially recreated from lower level building 
blocks, for example, by creating hadrons from nuclear particles, atom nuclei 
from hadrons, atoms from nuclei and electrons, and molecules from atoms. 
Higher level systems have not yet been recreated by de novo self-
organisation. Yet, I am confident that with increasing scientific insight and 
technology, the day will soon come when the cell will also be added to the list 
of systems for which it will be possible to recreate the appropriate self-
organisation conditions.   
All minor transitions in the operator hierarchy can be tested to see whether 
they comply with the concept of first-next possible closure. Testing this 
requirement is simple. One need only to show that at any position in the 
hierarchy, the present logic is incorrect and needs to be improved by adding 
a step that currently is not part of the hierarchy or by removing a step that 
currently is included in the hierarchy. If only a single system can be added or 
removed, the structure of the operator hierarchy in its present form must be 
considered invalid. This would lead to the need either to improve the operator 
hierarchy or, when this is not feasible, to reject it.  
 
2. Can the re-arrangement of the operators be tested to see whether they follow 
a coherent logic according to closure dimensions? 
The rules for recognising closure dimensions can be tested. For example, the 
interface closure dimension should successfully apply to all operators that it 
characterises. These operators are the fundamental particle, the quark 
confinement, the electron shell, the cell membrane and the sensory interface. 
The validity of closure dimensions can furthermore be tested by their 
extrapolation and subsequent use for predictions of future system types. This 
point refers to predictions of the emergent properties of several not yet 
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existing system types with a higher complexity than the hardwired memon 
and to the prediction that the present ‘fundamental particles’ (e.g., quarks) 
are the lowest level of closed, finite structure. Of course, the prediction of a 
system type that does not yet exist is difficult to falsify. The time may soon 
come, however, when complex memic systems will be constructed. At that 
future moment, it will become possible to show that, for example, hypercyclic 
technical neural circuitry must indeed form the basis for technical intelligence. 
Similarly, it can be shown that these future memons use structural auto-
copying (the copying of the neural network) as a simple means to provide 
their offspring with the knowledge they need to live and to survive. The 
prediction that fundamental particles form the least complex, basic system 
type on which the operator hierarchy is founded would become testable with 
increasing insights into the lowest levels of matter’s organisation. If a still 
lower level of organisation of matter based on structurally closed units could 
be proven to exist, this would lead to adaptation or rejection of the current 
structure of the operator theory.  
 
3. Is it possible to falsify the operator hypothesis? In other words, can the 
suggestion be proven or disproven that nature’s possibilities for constructing 
closed system topologies are so limited that the currently identified operators 
and closures indeed represent the only options?  
Answering the latter question requires insight into the whys of all details of 
the operator hierarchy’s structure. However, the most important question that 
needs to be answered is why every primary operator introduces a new 
closure dimension. Such insight is not only needed to understand the 
operator hierarchy, but it also offers pathways to falsify the operator 
hypothesis; a fundamental understanding may indicate that there are other 
ways to create closures/operators but these are not included in the present 
theory. Currently, this subject is unknown territory and offers a major 
challenge for future research. 
 
In conclusion 
Various fundamental aspects of the operator theory can be refuted in some way 
or another. Consequently, the theory represents a refutable construction.  
Thermodynamics and stability 
It is the author’s conviction that a general approach to system hierarchy should 
fully agree with thermodynamic laws but should not be distracted by 
thermodynamic justification from its main theme: the hierarchy of organisation.  
 
No system in our universe has ever been found to violate thermodynamics on a 
large scale and for a long time, or when it does, any increase in internal 
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organisation is compensated by a bigger increase in disorder outside the 
system’s limits (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Since no deviations have ever 
been demonstrated from this rule, it is a rather theoretical exercise to demand 
proof that any existing system does not violate the laws of thermodynamics. A 
consequence of this reasoning is that self-organised system states must 
represent a thermodynamically advantageous phenomenon. Otherwise, nature 
would never have been able to repeatedly produce complex systems from less 
complex elements. In short, as long as we limit a general system hierarchy to 
systems that exist in our universe, we may take the thermodynamic justification 
for granted and focus on structural aspects of complexity instead. When 
predicting future system states, however, these states must be checked for 
consistency with thermodynamic laws. 
 
In addition to thermodynamics, stability is another factor determining the 
presence of systems. The reason is that systems will be selected away when 
they are unstable as the result of a problematic internal organisation or as the 
result of disintegrating interactions with the environment. Only those systems 
that combine an easy production with a long enough ‘shelf life’ prevail in the 
evolution of system types. This is, for example, the reason why hydrogen is so 
abundant in the universe or why the light and easily formed pions convey the 
force between hadrons in the atom nucleus. And if an operator shows 
reproduction, the production of offspring allows it to escape the limits of its 
proper existence and structural stability by creating one or more copies before it 
dies. 
 
Neither entropy production nor production of higher level particles is 
homogenously distributed in the universe. Once organised structures have 
formed, increasingly complex structures start to emerge at an increasing rate. 
Kurzweil (1999) has integrated these observations into his ‘Law of time and 
chaos’, which states that ‘In a process, the time interval between salient events 
(that is, events that change the nature of the process, or significantly affect the 
future of the process) expands or contracts along with the amount of chaos’. 
Thus, in a chaotic environment, salient events occur at a low rate, and when 
order increases, this rate increases. Assuming that first-next possible closures 
can be regarded as salient events, Kurzweil’s viewpoint fully merges with the 
operator hierarchy. 
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Outline of the thesis 
The major aim of this thesis was to search for rules that guide the development 
of structural complexity in the universe and that can be used to create unity in 
science by improving the analysis of hierarchical organisation in biology, ecology 
and other sciences.  
 
In relation to these goals, basic principles of physical and ecological hierarchies 
were studied. The need to follow a fundamental approach was based on the 
observation that these hierarchies were generally flawed by imprecise and/or 
overly general rules for selecting and ranking elements.  
 
The subsequent search for a methodology that would allow a structured analysis 
of hierarchy was based on two premises: (1) all the elements in a strict hierarchy 
must have their proper positions, such that elements can neither be removed nor 
added without corrupting the hierarchy, and (2) it is possible to find a ranking 
rule to create a strict hierarchy for all particles in nature, regardless of whether 
these particles are abiotic or biotic.  
 
It is thought that the value of the thesis lies in the fact that identifying a strict 
hierarchy is of general importance for science for two reasons. Firstly, it can 
have a restructuring influence whenever existing practice is flawed by less than 
strict hierarchical rankings. Secondly, a strict framework for the hierarchical 
ranking of operators can be used as a strong instrument to integrate different 
fields of science. The product of this thesis, therefore, must be considered of a 
qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in the sense that the final aim is to 
contribute to the structuring of scientific thought. In relation to the above goals, 
the subjects discussed in the chapters in this thesis are arranged more or less in 
order of increasing generality and from fundamental to applied topics. 
 
Chapter 2. The birth of an idea 
This chapter presents the basic principles underlying the operator hierarchy. The 
text elucidates the choices that were made to overcome major difficulties when 
deciding which elements should be included in the hierarchy and which should 
not, and the formulating of strict rules for ranking. In this chapter general rules 
for evolution are deduced. These rules can be applied to all operators, 
regardless whether they are particles or organisms. 
 
Chapter 3. The future of evolution 
Predicting is difficult, especially predicting the future. Yet, analogous to using the 
periodic table of elements to predict new atoms, the strict structure of the 
operator hierarchy can be used to predict new operators. All the operators 
predicted in the nearby future will be technical neural network organisms. The 
realisation that neural network organisms cannot use genes to copy their 
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knowledge forms the basis of a critical appraisal on the lack of parallelism 
between the concepts of genes, representing autocatalytic information, and 
memes, defined by Dawkins as cultural replicators. 
 
Chapter 4. A backbone for system science 
This chapter demonstrates how the operator hierarchy can be used to organise 
various aspects of natural organisation. It is advocated that the hierarchical 
relationships between the operators be ranked in a strict way, but that the 
situation is different within operators and in systems consisting of interaction 
operators. With respect to the latter situations, a new methodology is introduced 
that looks at hierarchical relationships from four different points of view: 
displacement, information, construction and energy (DICE).  
 
Chapter 5. On life and death 
The definition of life has long been a major puzzle in science. The difficulty of 
reaching a consensus may have various causes, including: (1) the difficulty of 
deciding on the minimum requirements that organisms must show to be 
considered living beings; (2) the fact that many definitions include facultative 
aspects, such as reproduction or metabolism; (3)  the confusion about the 
concepts of life, as a property of matter, and living, as the dynamic activity of 
systems representing life, while there is also confusion about the use of life as 
the ensemble of all life on earth in contrast to life as a property relating only to 
organisms; and (4) the confusion about whether a mechanistic explanation of 
the cell offers a sufficient basis to define both bacteria, protozoa, plants and 
animals. In relation to the latter points, the operator hierarchy has the advantage 
of offering a completely new, hierarchical context to deal with problems of 
definition, which -- mutatis mutandis -- also helps to solve definition problems 
with respect to the concepts of the organism and of death.  
 
Chapter 6. Getting the biggest part of the pie 
Although Darwin talked about selection acting against the less well endowed, 
the evolution process became known as the struggle for life and survival of the 
fittest. Fitness has become related to the number of successful offspring. For 
various reasons, this represents a limited way of measuring evolutionary 
success. First of all, this idea makes it impossible to measure the success of 
units of evolution during periods when they are not reproducing, for example, 
when they are involved in non-reproductive processes, such as competition 
through subterranean shoots or the growth of a colony. Furthermore, abundance 
is not always an accurate predictor of the impact that offspring can have on 
ecosystem processes. To contribute to this topic, it is suggested to focus on the 
control that evolutionary units have over resources in their environment. In the 
same way as dimensions for hierarchy have been used in the operator theory, 
dimensions for resource dominance have been proposed for analysing 
evolutionary success.  
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Chapter 7. Towards consistent definitions for the operator theory 
Although the operator theory represents a straightforward reasoning that 
focuses on how self-organisation steps produce a long sequence of operators, 
the reasoning behind this simplicity is quite intricate. To define as clearly as 
possible the logic of the operator hierarchy, this chapter discusses the definitions 
of the concepts used in the operator theory. 
 
Chapter 8: Centripetal science: contributions of the operator hierarchy to 
scientific integration 
The main goal of this thesis was to develop an integrating theory that can 
counteract the forces of hyperspecialisation and compartmentalisation resulting 
from the knowledge explosion. The most important result of this goal was the 
development of the operator theory. This chapter discusses the contributions of 
the operator theory to several well-known integrating theories, such as a cosmic 
timeline, ecological hierarchy, periodic tables, Darwinian evolution and also 
discusses a meta-level analysis of how unifying concepts can be linked to the 
levels of the operator hierarchy. 
 
Chapter 9: General discussion and conclusions 
This chapter places the conceptual framework of the operator hierarchy and its 
applications in a broader context. This process is guided by the search for 
answers to the following five questions: (1) what kinds of novel theoretic 
developments have accompanied the elaboration of the operator hierarchy, (2) 
what impacts may the operator theory have on science, (3) what aspects of the 
operator theory require discussion because of potential weaknesses, (4) how 
can the operator theory be evaluated, and (5) what routes are open for future 
development. 
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The birth of an idea 
Operators, the Lego-bricks of nature. Evolutionary 
transitions from fermions to neural networks 
What seems to physicists to be a hopelessly complicated process  
may have been what nature found simplest,  
because nature could only build on what was already there. 
(Francis Crick) 
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Abstract 
When Darwin wrote his ‘On the origin of species...' (1859) he focused on 
evolution as a property of living organisms in interaction with abiotic and biotic 
elements in the world. This viewpoint is still dominant amongst biologists. For 
particle physicists and cosmologists evolution refers to a larger scale, ranging 
from quarks and atoms to galaxies, stars and planets (i.e. Pagels, 1985, 
Hawking, 1988). To close the gap between such different viewpoints, a wide 
range of perspectives on an interdisciplinary understanding of system 
development has been published (i.e. Teilhard de Chardin, 1966, 1969, von 
Bertalanffy, 1968, Varela, 1979, Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, Laszlo, 1996). 
As an integrative concept, the construction of nature from a hierarchy of system 
layers forms a central tenet in general system research and the stepwise 
construction of this layered hierarchy can be regarded as an interdisciplinary 
evolution theory. Surprisingly, the literature offers no unequivocal rules to 
recognise a multilayer hierarchy in nature. This presents an obstacle for 
interdisciplinary approaches to evolution. 
Searching a solution to part of the above hierarchy problem, the present paper is 
dedicated to the analysis of a special kind of layering in natural systems, which 
is based on transitions between ‘building block' systems. To identify these 
building blocks, and the transitions from building block x at level A, to building 
block y at level B, the focus of this study is further limited to 'hypercyclic 
dynamics' and ‘containment'. On the basis of these criteria, a hierarchy is 
created which shows no possibilities for ‘bypasses'. It connects hadrons to 
atoms, atoms to cells, and cells to neural networks. Implications of this hierarchy 
for system studies and evolution are discussed. 
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Introduction 
System thinking has opened up many ways for the examination of systems, their 
internal organisation and their external relationships. This has led to general 
laws on system organisation on the one hand, and a clearer view on the 
differences that exist between system types on the other. 
 
A general aspect of all system studies is that reality is regarded as to show a 
layered structure, which is minimally represented by a system and its elements. 
Stressing the importance of hierarchy in science von Bertalanffy (1968) wrote 
that ‘A general theory of hierarchic order obviously will be a mainstay of general 
systems theory'. That hierarchy is omnipresent in science is reflected in the 
many metaphors which have been proposed for it, including the ‘worlds within 
worlds' approach, which according to Close dates back to the Japanese 
physicist Kaku (Close, 1983), the ‘cosmic onion' (Close, 1983) and the ‘Chinese 
boxes' (i.e. Simon, 1962, Koestler, 1967, Laszlo, 1972). A hierarchy based on 
unit systems, which are characterised as being ‘formed' and ‘centred', has been 
proposed by Teilhard de Chardin (1966). Still other studies have explored the 
mathematical formalism of layered structures as consisting of units composed of 
interacting elements (Goguen and Varela, 1978, Geiger, 1990) or, with respect 
to ecosystem interactions, in the form of a 'biomatrix' (Jaros and Cloete, 1987). 
 
The presence of hierarchy in different areas of system research can furthermore 
be inferred from the use of concepts such as transformation, emergent 
properties, the top-down viewpoint of reductionism, and the bottom-up 
viewpoints of holism and constructivism, the occurrence of transitions, symmetry 
breaking, bifurcation, attractor states, integrated elements building 'holons', 
autopoiesis, etc. (i.e. Feibleman, 1954, Koestler, 1978, Varela, 1979, Labson, 
1985, de Kruijff, 1991, Beloussov, 1993, Laszlo, 1994, Capra, 1996, Szathmáry 
and Smith, 2002). 
 
Interactions which cause new system layers have been regarded as ‘quanta of 
evolution' (Turchin, 1995). The quantum aspect of these transitions results from 
an all-or-nothing restriction of processes in the original system, which creates 
new structures and associated dynamic properties (Heylighen, 1995, 2000). For 
example, the cyclic restriction of enzymatic interactions and a confining cellular 
environment are required before the arisal, or ‘emergence', of reproduction is 
possible and a new layer in the hierarchy can be recognised. 
 
The analysis of hierarchy forms the main topic of the present study. As a point of 
special interest, we investigate the possibility for a general, yet strict hierarchical 
classification of special ‘building block' systems. For any hierarchy, we consider 
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the construction of sound layers a necessity to avoid that the layering is 
corrupted via ‘bypasses'. An example of what we consider a corrupt hierarchy is 
the sequence planet-stones-sand. It is perfectly possible to construct a planet 
from sand alone, and in this way bypass the ‘intermediate layer' of the stones. In 
robust hierarchies such bypasses do not exist and complexity can be ranked 
solely in a strict layer-by-layer fashion. 
 
In the present search for a rigorous hierarchy in nature we deliberately restrict 
our efforts to ‘building block systems' or ‘unit systems'. The idea is, that the use 
of a kind of natural 'Lego-bricks' allows a dissection of system complexity in 
stepwise transitions from building block x at level A to building block y at level B, 
etc. As we will explain below, the building blocks that can be identified in this 
way include the hadrons, the atoms, the molecules, the cells, the multicellular 
organisms and a special kind of neural networks. All other natural systems do 
not fulfil the present building block definition. Instead, they are regarded as 
‘interaction systems' and enter the present discussion only on special occasions, 
for example when we discuss hypercyclic interactions and their containment. 
Examples of interaction systems include stars, planets, ecosystems, society, a 
football, etc. The present focus on building block systems requires, however, 
that we define clear criteria to recognise them. 
 
As the criteria for building blocks we used hypercycle formation as the primary 
aspect, and different forms of compartmentation as the secondary aspect. 
Hypercycle formation. Elements which perform a cyclic process can interact to 
create a secondary reaction cycle. Such a ‘cycle of cycles' is called a 
‘hypercycle' (Eigen and Schuster, 1977). Hypercycles have highly special unit-
properties. The enzymatic hypercycle, for example, makes reproduction possible 
(Eigen and Schuster, 1977, Eigen, 1985, Kauffman, 1993). A schematic 
representation of an enzymatic hypercycle (Eigen and Schuster, 1977) is shown 
in Fig. 2.1.A to illustrate the close relationship between structural and functional 
aspects of such systems. A less abstract version (Kauffman, 1993) is shown in 
Fig. 2.1.B to indicate that actual physical hypercycles look rather like ‘webs' of 
interactions without that the central hypercycle can be recognised structurally. 
 
Compartmentation. Within each large group of systems based on the same type 
of hypercycle, the mechanism of compartmentation is used to recognise internal 
subsets. The most fundamental kind of compartment formation involves the 
containment of a hypercyclic set of elements by a layer, or ‘interface', which 
mediates the interactions between the elements of the hypercycle and the world. 
As such, it offers a natural system limit for thermodynamic considerations. An 
example of an interface are the electron-wave clouds which surround nuclei and 
mediate interactions with neighbouring nuclei. A different way of compartment 
formation is observed when two or more systems with a contained hypercycle 
interact to form a multiplet structure, for example when atoms interact to form 
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molecules. As we will discuss below, the mechanisms of hypercycle formation 
and subsequent compartmentation can be used to create an unambiguous 
hierarchy of building block systems. 
 
For reasons of clarity, the term ‘operator' is introduced as a common name for all 
the building block systems which consist of a contained hypercycle, and the 
systems which are multiplets hereof. Accordingly, the present approach is 
regarded as the ‘operator approach' or ‘operator framework'. The recognition of 
operators as a special group of systems has several advantages. First, it helps 
to distinguish between operators, the building blocks, and other systems, which, 
as was discussed above, consist of interacting operators without being operators 
themselves and were called ‘interaction systems'. Another advantage of using 
the operator concept is that it separates operator evolution from biological 
evolution, biology being limited to the subset of operators based on cells and the 
forces which cause diversification and selection at that level. 
 
Although this study focuses on structural aspects of systems, these are 
considered as the inseparable mirror image of the underlying dynamics. The 
mechanism for all dynamics lays in entropy increase. For discussions of the 
application of the laws of entropy to non-linear systems is referred to studies by 
Schrodinger (1944), Prigogine and Stengers (1984), Eigen and Winkler (1983), 
Schneider (1988), Schneider and Kay (1994), Swenson (1989) and others. For 
cellular and higher levels, these studies have shown that these systems can 
organise themselves and reduce their internal disorder, which creates an 
entropy decrease, as long as this is ‘paid for' by an equal amount of entropy 
export to the outside world. 
 
In the below text we start with an inventory of all operators in nature, on the 
basis of an analysis of their construction via hypercycle formation and different 
forms of containment. These operators will be ranked in a hierarchical 
sequence, which is subsequently analysed for possible internal structures. At the 
end of this study, we will discuss the present system approach in relation to an 
interdisciplinary viewpoint on evolution. 
 
68 Chapter 2 
 
E1
E2En
E3E4  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Two representations of an enzymatic hypercycle. Part A shows a more 
abstract, cycle oriented representation, which can be found in the work of Eigen (1977). 
Here E1 to En represent enzymes. Part B shows a network representation of cyclic 
enzymatic processes (after Kauffman (1993) ‘The origins of order'. With permission of 
Oxford University Press). Essential of both graphs is that the enzymatic reactions in 
themselves form cyclic events, which via their linking in an overall cycle have become 
functionally unified into a catalytic hypercycle. 
A 
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Three similar construction sequences 
To elucidate the way in which we analyse steps between operators of different 
complexity in order to create an inventory of all operators in nature, the path 
from the atom to the cell is shown as an introductory example (Fig. 2.2). In the 
first step atoms link to form atomary multiplets, the molecules. From a 
topological viewpoint the structure of molecules is special. The reason is that no 
matter how many atoms are added and no matter how complex three-
dimensional structures are built this way, any molecule remains a system of 
connected atoms showing the multiplet structure. An escape from this limitation 
requires another interaction than atomary linkage, and thus a new emergent 
property. This is allowed by catalytic interactions in which molecules, for 
example enzymes, transform substrate molecules. In special cases, the product 
of a catalytic process equals the catalyst of a next, etc., which may cause a 
cycle of catalytic reaction cycles, called a ‘hypercycle' by Eigen and Schuster 
(1977, 1978a, 1978b). The mechanistic basis hereof is explained in great detail 
by Eigen and Schuster (1979), Eigen (1985) and Kauffman (1993). The catalytic 
hypercycle performs a new dynamic property, that of 'autocatalysis', normally 
referred to as reproduction. As long as the set of autocatalytic enzymes lacks a 
boundary, or ‘interface', it can not be considered an operator. If the interface is 
formed by a molecular membrane, we can regard the resulting unit a living cell. 
The formation of the cell thus requires the simultaneous occurrence of two 
emergent properties; hypercyclicity and containment by a membrane. The 
requirement of the simultaneous occurrence of these properties favours 
explanations of contained autocatalysis from a ‘seed' instead of from a ‘soup', 
which possibilities were recently discussed in a review of theories about the 
origin of the cell by Edwards (1998). 
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Figure 2.2. Example of a basal pattern in operator evolution: interactions leading from 
atoms to cells. The steps being explained in more detail in the text, the following phases 
can be distinguished. Atoms combine to molecules, some of which can act as enzymes. 
Sets of enzymes may show catalytic closure and form an autocatalytic hypercycle. When 
this is surrounded by a membrane, the cell is ‘born'. Phases during which system types 
are not considered operators are shaded. 
 
As is shown in Fig. 2.3, two additional construction pathways, similar to that from 
atom to cell, can be recognised in the range of all operators known to science. 
The first describes the sequence from quarks to atoms, the other that from cells 
to neural networks. 
 
The mechanisms behind the first sequence are being studied by particle 
physicists. The most fundamental particles that science has experimental 
access to are the particle-like Dirac-fermions, which include the quarks and 
leptons, and the force carrying bosons, such as photons and gluons (Close, 
1983, Feynmann, 1985, Pagels, 1985, Kaku, 1987, Witten, 1988, Hawking, 
1988, `t Hooft, 1992, 1994, Wilczek, 1998). Quarks continuously emit and 
reabsorb clouds of gluons which can ‘bind' the quarks forcefully into a multiplet 
structure. Pairs of quarks are called mesons and triplets are called baryons. Well 
known baryons are the proton and neutron. All baryons posses the special 
property that they can emit and re-absorb small mesons without loosing their 
triplet structure. For energetic reasons such emission-absorption cycles involve 
predominantly the lightest possible mesons, the pions. Recurrent pion exchange 
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between baryons causes what is called the ‘strong force', binding protons and 
neutrons into lumps regarded as nuclei, representing a novel hypercyclic 
structure. When the temperature of the environment drops below 3000°K, 
electrons furthermore lack the energy to escape from the electric force of the 
protons in the nuclei. A cloud of orbit fitting electron ‘waves' now surrounds the 
nucleus as an interface. A new operator has emerged; the atom. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Inventory and ranking of all operator systems known to science. System 
types are ranked according to emergent properties as is explained in the text. Phases 
during which systems types are not considered operators are shaded. The inventory 
shows two marked regularities. Firstly, the sequence showing the formation of cells from 
atoms can be seen to recur in the way in which atoms are formed from quarks, and 
hypercyclic neural networks are formed from eukaryotic cells. Secondly, the inventory 
shows an overall pattern of increasing possibilities for compartmentation and 
differentiation in operators, which is further explained in Fig. 2.4. 
 
The other sequence, at the opposite side of the operator framework, leads from 
cells to neural networks. These systems are studied both by biology and by the 
neurosciences. The completion of the sequence from cell to neural network has 
either only been possible, or has simply developed quicker on the basis of the, 
more complex, eukaryotic cells. Some prokaryotic species, for example the 
cyanobacteria, have also reached primitive multicellular interactions, but only the 
eukaryotes developed to multicellular life forms within which neural cells evolved 
which were capable of forming units of cells showing recurrent interactions. 
Modern versions of artificial neural networks, as were pioneered by Hebb (1949,, 
1955), show that modules of cyclically interacting nerve cells can perform 
unsupervised categorisation and learning tasks. Accordingly, they have been 
called ‘Categorising And Learning Modules', or CALMs (Murre, Phaf and 
Wolters, 1989, 1992, Murre, 1992). Biotic equivalents of CALMs are present in 
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the form of so called minicolumns in the cerebral cortex in mammals 
(Mountcastle, 1975). In a number of experiments Happel (1997) has linked 
CALMs in a recurrent way and investigated the properties of hypercyclic neural 
networks. Although a series of subsequent CALMs can be compared with a 
multilayer feed-forward network, the recurrent coupling of CALMs would require 
an endless number of linearly coupled layers. As was explained by Happel 
(1997), recurrent interactions make CALM networks fundamentally different from 
feed forward networks, because a recurrent architecture creates fractal category 
boundaries, hereby allowing for infinitely more distinctions between input 
patterns than are possible when using a linear organisation (Happel, 1997, p. 
69). But an isolated hypercyclic neural network does not yet fit our operator 
definition. It still lacks an interface. In the form of the neural interface offered by 
sense organs and activation organs this has co-evolved in the multicellular body 
as efferent and afferent extensions to the hypercyclic network. It is the 
simultaneous presence of the hypercyclic neural network and the interface which 
marks the operator that we call the memon. With respect to the evolution of 
neural networks in animals, it should be noted that the hypercyclic network must 
be considered to have evolved within the context of a non-hypercyclic brain, in 
which structure and functioning had a strong genetic basis. The reason is that 
the genetic control of neural architecture, and therewith behaviour, originally had 
a direct survival value for the organism because it prevented low fitness during a 
learning phase such as is inherent to hypercyclic functioning. 
An overall pattern in system transitions 
In addition to the recurrent pattern of the three sequences discussed above, the 
operator framework also shows an overall pattern. This is most clearly visible 
after rearranging the elements of Fig. 2.3 in a staircase-like manner, as is shown 
in Fig. 2.4. Now, each new hypercycle with interface is placed at the beginning 
of a row, whilst the end of each row is formed by the multiplet configuration, this 
being the most complex system type which is possible on the basis of structural 
interactions between the operators in any row. Fig. 2.4 shows that in subsequent 
rows the number of ways in which systems can differentiate before the multiplet 
stage is reached, increases with one each layer. At the quark level, the 
possibilities are limited to quarks and hadrons. The nuclear level ranges from 
nuclei, via atoms, to molecules. The autocatalytic level includes autocatalytic 
hypercycles, prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells and multicellular life forms. The 
scientific knowledge of the last level, that of neural hypercycles, does not yet 
extend beyond the memons. 
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Figure 2.4. A ‘periodic table of operators'. The inventory of operators shown in Fig. 2.3 
has been split up into segments starting with a particular hypercycle (the grey bands in 
Fig. 2.3) and ending with multiplets of operators which contain this hypercycle. The 
vertical axis (A) indicates the occurrence of new hypercycles. The horizontal axis (B) 
indicates the different possibilities for compartmentation within each group of systems 
based on the same hypercycle. The lengths of the rows illustrates the number of different 
operator types possible within a layer. Quarks (fermions) and gluons (bosons) directly 
form hadrons. The atomary nucleus first obtains an electron shell, which may bind to form 
molecules. The autocatalytic hypercycle becomes confined by a membrane which creates 
the prokaryotic cells. These may either develop directly into a primitive multicellular stage, 
or differentiate further to obtain an internal compartment around the basis of their 
hypercycle, and then form more advanced multicellular stages. Finally, groups of neural 
cells, called CALMs, are interacting cyclically and obtain an interface of sense organs and 
activation organs. This we have called the memon. 
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In addition to the connections between the rows, the scheme shows logic along 
the diagonals. The diagonals link system types with the same emergent 
property. The most obvious emergent property is that of the multi-operator 
systems, examples of which are the hadrons, the molecules, and the 
multicellular biota. The next diagonal is formed by the systems preceding the 
multiplets. These show a more or less complex kind of informational layering. In 
atoms, it is the electron shell surrounding the nucleus which forms such a layer. 
In eukaryotic cells, the informational layering is represented by the nuclear 
envelope, which mediates the functional separation between the production of 
RNA inside, and the production of proteins outside. On the next diagonal, we 
consider the prokaryotic cell to show the emergent property of structural 
information copying, and on the most recently evolved diagonal, the ongoing 
internal interactions which continuously change the states of the CALMs, are 
used as an argument to consider the memon to show auto-evolution as 
emergent property. 
 
The scope of the present paper is limited to a study of existing system types and 
their evolutionary relationships. Although the operator framework strongly 
suggests some basal aspects of these systems, predictions about more complex 
systems than memons, which are not yet accessible to scientific analysis, fall 
outside the present scope. 
Consequences of the operator approach 
If the structural and associated functional organisation of operators is referred to 
as their complexity, the operator framework describes the steps via which 
operator evolution created complex building blocks from smaller ones. The 
requirement that smaller building blocks exist and interact before larger ones 
can be constructed, implies a direction in evolution, but does in most cases not 
imply a directionality in the sense that the interacting operators know in which 
direction they should evolve, or that they are motivated by some kind of invisible 
hand with a ‘guiding' capacity.  
 
Below the memon stage, the operators involved have never been capable of 
constructing an internal representation of their surroundings to evaluate their 
actions. In contrast, memons and higher level operators are not only aware of 
their surroundings, but can also understand the meta-evolutionary processes 
therein. These operators, therefore, may show evolution in relation to this 
insight. This renders evolution a directed process in which, however, the 
unpredictability of interactions remains a chance aspect. Only the existence and 
the direction of this process are open to scientific inquiry. We see no way of how 
to study any possible ‘goal' or ‘meaning' associated with teleological viewpoints. 
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We emphasise that the necessity for complexity to increase between operator 
stages typically applies to hypercycle formation and containment steps in the 
operator hierarchy. This is by no means in conflict with the decrease that any 
particular operator may show in capacities when these have lost their survival 
value, for example moles losing their sight. 
 
The patterns in Fig. 2.3 and 2.4 offer a unique possibility to study the properties 
that operators need to show in order to become a link in the evolutionary chain. 
Such properties can be regarded as the recipe nature has used to ‘cook' 
subsequent operators. We have deduced that the following operator aspects are 
necessary for any operator to act as a link in the chain: 
(1)  Operators must show a stable internal organisation. If the operator's 
internal organisation is not stable under prevailing conditions, this will have 
a short term fatal effect on its functioning. 
(2)  Operators (in general) must maintain integrity in interactions (in general). 
This represents an extension of the survival of the fittest to all operators 
below and above organism-level. Of course the laws which govern 
evolutionary success vary between layers, the requirements to animals in 
ecosystems being of a rather different kind than to elementary particles in a 
newly developing universe. 
(3)  Operators must be able to interact with each other and form systems which 
allow for the creation of more complex operators1. If, for example, at any 
place and time in the universe the most complex multi-operator does not 
give rise, in the system that it is part of, to the formation of a new 
hypercycle, this represents a local end to evolution. The third aspect is a 
unique result of a between-operator viewpoint on evolution. It cannot be 
discovered by any approach which focuses on evolution of operators within 
their class. 
 
In the light of the chaotic system that the universe seems to be, it is surprising 
how rigid a backbone for evolution is suggested by the operator framework. This 
rigidity is caused by the limits that emergent properties set to the formation of 
new system types. There remains much freedom, however, for the actual form in 
which any particular system is realised, and the moment and place in the 
universe where it will occur. This freedom increases with increasing complexity 
of the operators. There exist relatively few elementary particles, many atomary 
nuclei, very many autocatalytic sets and an unimaginably large number of neural 
network topologies. The sequence of increasing complexity operators is directly 
linked with chronology (see also Teilhard de Chardin 1969, Pagels, 1985) 
                                                     
1 While writing later publications, the picture of analysing hierarchy using three 
dimensions (interaction systems, internal differentiation and operators) emphasised that 
also internal differentiations may allow for the formation of more complex operators, for 
example the nucleus in eukaryote cells and the neural network in memons.  
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because emergent properties of any operator are always preceded by the 
operator not showing this property, or by interactions between lower level 
operators in a parental system. 
In conclusion 
The principles discussed above allow a ranking of the building-block systems 
underlying all other systems in the universe. This ranking is based on emergent 
properties. The marked regularity of the resulting classification seems to indicate 
that nature has little choice with respect to the kind of steps it can make between 
system types. Apparently, the only freedom it has, is to let chance determine the 
exact players in the game, and the moments and places of the transitions. 
 
The mechanisms behind most of the binary steps in the operator scheme are in 
principle known to the separate branches of science dealing with these systems. 
The overall regularity of the scheme, however, can be regarded as an 
elaboration of the cosmic onion approach by a more precise indication of the 
layering of nature. 
 
Regularities in specific groups of operators have helped to unravel underlying 
mechanisms in different realms of science. Examples hereof are the 'eight-fold 
way' for quarks (Gell-Man and Neeman, 1964) and the periodic table of atoms 
(Mendeleev 1871). In analogy, we expect that the periodic structure of the 
overall operator scheme suggests an underlying logic. The main aspect of this 
logic is the sequence of hypercycles showing increasing complexity from the 
quark, via the nucleus and the autocatalytic set, to the memic hypercycle. The 
formulation of the algorithm connecting these hypercycles is the closest we 
think, one can come to an inclusive viewpoint on operator evolution, covering the 
whole range from quarks to neural networks, and possibly beyond. Formulating 
this algorithm in more detail presents a challenging field for future research. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank the following persons for stimulating discussions and/or 
commenting on earlier drafts during the development of the above theory: J. 
Axelsen, W. Bakker, C. Damgaard, B. Happel, P. Henning Krogh, F. Jagers op 
Akkerhuis, H. Lakkenborg, H. Løkke, V. Simonsen, K. Skovbo Jensen and E. 
Wattel. M. Bayley is thanked for improving the English. This paper was 
supported in part by the project ‘Complex Systems' of the Danish Ministry of 
Environment and Energy. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The future of evolution 
Extrapolating a hierarchy of building block 
systems towards future neural network 
organisms 
The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams 
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Abstract 
Is it possible to predict future life forms? In this paper it is argued that the answer 
to this question may well be positive. As a basis for predictions a rationale is 
used that is derived from historical data, e.g. from a hierarchical classification 
that ranks all building block systems, that have evolved so far. This classification 
is based on specific emergent properties that allow stepwise transitions, from 
low level building blocks to higher level ones. This paper shows how this 
hierarchy can be used for predicting future life forms. 
 
The extrapolations suggest several future neural network organisms. Major 
aspects of the structures of these organisms are predicted. The results can be 
considered of fundamental importance for several reasons. Firstly, assuming 
that the operator hierarchy is a proper basis for predictions, the result yields 
insight into the structure of future organisms. Secondly, the predictions are not 
extrapolations of presently observed trends, but are fully integrated with all 
historical system transitions in evolution. Thirdly, the extrapolations suggest the 
structures of intelligences that, one day, will possess more powerful brains than 
human beings. 
 
This study ends with a discussion of possibilities for falsification of the present 
theory, the implications of the present predictions in relation to recent 
developments in artificial intelligence and the philosophical implications of the 
role of humanity in evolution with regard to the creation of future neural network 
organisms. 
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Introduction  
There is an old saying: to predict the future one has to know the past. But what 
should one think of as the past of evolution? How can the evolutionary process 
be traced back and what can historical steps teach us about the future? 
 
Interpreting evolution in a broad sense, as has been advocated by Laszlo 
(1994), the evolutionary process has a long history; a history that goes back to a 
time when the universe showed little differentiation; it was small and extremely 
hot. It is now widely accepted that after an explosion referred to as the Big Bang, 
the baby-universe expanded and cooled down. From that moment onward, the 
overall universe became increasingly disorganised. Yet, some parts show a 
process of complexity increase, the occurrence of which is indicated by the 
subsequent emergence of new types of building block systems and associated 
interaction systems. 
 
The building block systems are given special attention in the present study. 
From a beginning with only elementary particles, the universe has gradually 
become enriched by the emergence of more and more building block systems. 
Earlier studies focusing on these building blocks and their hierarchy include 
Feibleman (1954), Simon (1962), Bertalanffy (1968), Teilhard de Chardin (1969), 
Koestler (1978), Heylighen (1995), Close (1983) and Jagers op Akkerhuis and 
Van Straalen (1998). At present, the `ancestral tree' of the building blocks 
includes the quarks, the hadrons, the atoms, the molecules, the prokaryotic and 
eukaryotic cells, the multicellular individuals and the multicellular individuals 
showing a neural network capable of learning. 
 
As is discussed by Jagers op Akkerhuis and Van Straalen (1998) the emergence 
of any building block adds new aspects to the environment in which it interacts 
with all other building blocks. This environment consists of interacting building 
blocks and can for this reason be considered as an `interaction system'. 
Examples of interaction systems are galaxies, stars, planets, stones, water, 
meteors, ecosystems and societies. As is shown in Fig. 3.1, a close relationship 
can be recognised between the hierarchy of building blocks and the ranking of 
interaction systems. 
 
80 Chapter 3 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Building block systems and interaction systems. Lower part: building blocks 
and their multistages: quarks and hadrons, atoms and molecules, unicellular and 
multicellular organisms, and neural network organisms. Upper part: interaction systems 
such as the early universe, stars, ecosystems and societies. Horizontal, black arrows: 
transitions from a single operator to its multistage. Grey forked arrows: contributions of 
operators to the interaction systems in which they represent the highest level building 
blocks. Contributions of operators from lower levels are not indicated separately. 
 
The main aim of this study is the prediction of new life forms via the 
extrapolation of the hierarchy of the building block systems. In this process we 
deliberately leave the interaction systems, i.e. stars, planets, etc., out of the 
discussion. This means that even though interaction systems play an important 
role as environments that mediate the emergence of new building blocks, the 
discussion in this study is limited to the formation of the building block systems. 
The reason is that their subsequent emergence can be ranked in a clear 
hierarchy offering a unique basis for extrapolations towards future systems. 
 
In the form of the `operator hierarchy' or `operator hypothesis', Jagers op 
Akkerhuis and Van Straalen (1998) discuss the hierarchical relationships of 
natural building blocks. The building blocks were christened `operators', for their 
capacities to operate in an environment and adapt their phenotypes to a broad 
range of environmental conditions, without losing the most essential aspects of 
their organisation. As the operator hypothesis holds such an important position 
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in the present study as the basis for all extrapolations, we will begin with a short 
resume of the operator hierarchy. 
The operator hierarchy 
The operator hierarchy (Fig. 3.2) is based on a strict, stepwise approach to the 
complexity of building block systems. Each step is the result of a specific 
emergent property that causes the transition from building block A at level X to a 
more complex building block B at level Y. Figure 3.2 shows that the approach 
recognises major and minor transitions. 
 
Figure 3.2. The operator hierarchy. The different evolutionary pathways (lines with 
arrows) are shown in direct relationship with the emergent properties of the operators 
(vertical columns). In accordance with the focus on major and minor transitions, the 
operators are given binary numbers. I: The hadron, 10: The atom, II: The multi-atom, 100: 
The cell, 101: The simple multicellular, 110: The eukaryote cell, III: The eukaryotic 
multicellular, 1000: The hardwired memon. 
 
Major transitions 
Each major transition, as recognised under the operator hypothesis, creates an 
entirely new operator type and the beginning of a new major layer (Fig. 3.2). 
Four examples of operators that according to the operator hypothesis were 
created via major transitions are the hadrons (the proton and neutron), the 
atoms, the prokaryotic cells and the organisms showing a hypercyclic neural 
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network. Of all operators, these four systems are special because each forms 
the first system of a next row in the operator hierarchy. For this reason they are 
also called `first of the row operators'. According to the operator hypothesis, 
major transitions are always characterised by emergent hypercyclic dynamics. 
On the basis of enzymatic reactions in cells, Eigen and Schuster (1977) have 
described hypercyclic dynamics as being cyclic arrangements of elements which 
themselves are cycles of reactions. A very readable explanation of hypercyclic 
enzyme reactions in cells can also be found in Kauffman (1993). To define 
clearly what the operator hypothesis regards as the typical hypercyclic dynamic 
for each transition, the cycles and hypercycles are shown in Fig. 3.3 and will be 
discussed in more detail below. With the exception of the hadron, that has such 
low complexity that the multi-property just emerged and containment is not yet 
possible, all later major transitions are derived from multistage elements and 
show containment of the hypercyclic dynamics by an emergent interface. 
 
Figure 3.3. Emergent hypercyclic processes that mark the four major evolutionary 
transitions. Al: First order reaction cycle of a quark (Q). The quark emits a gluon (g) and 
becomes a lighter quark (Q'). A2: Second order cyclic process in which two quarks 
mutually exchange gluons. B1: First-order reaction cycle of a hadron (H). The three-quark 
hadron (H) emits and absorbs a small two-quark particle (a pion, p). B2: Second-order 
cyclic process in which two hadrons mutually exchange pions. C1: First-order reaction 
cycle of an enzyme reaction. The enzyme (E) binds to a substrate (S), transforms it to a 
product (P), and regains its original form. C2: Second-order cyclic process in which two 
enzyme reactions mutually create the enzyme for the other cycle. D1: First-order cyclic 
process on the basis of a group of neurons, called a CALM, because it acts as a 
categorising and learning module. The CALM(t) receives information (I) and becomes a 
CALM(t+1)I, which can forward information to become the original CALM in a new starting 
state CALM(t+1). D2: Second-order reaction cycle in which the perception and release of 
information proceeds between two or more CALMs. 
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Minor transitions 
The minor transitions are associated with emergent properties that occur within 
a major layer. The operator hypothesis states that these minor transitions reflect 
the emergent properties of major transitions occurring earlier. The names of the 
minor transitions are shown on top of the columns in Fig. 3.2. How the properties 
of major and minor transitions are linked is explained in short in the following 
tines. 
 
The formation of the hadron is the first major transition. The hypercyclic 
dynamics in the hadron (see Fig. 3.3A1 and 3.3A2) create a system that shows 
emergent multiness of elementary particles. Multiness, as an emergent property, 
recurs from now on at each higher level, in the form of the last minor transition in 
every row. 
 
The second major transition leads from the hadron to the atom (Fig. 3.2) In 
addition to a hypercyclic nucleus (Fig. 3.3B1 and 3.3B2), the atom shows an 
electron shell as interface that mediates the interactions of the nucleus with the 
world. This property is called a hypercycle-mediating interface (HMI). With the 
latter naming I deviate from Jagers op Akkerhuis and Van Straalen (1998) where 
this property is called internal information compartmentation (IIC). The reason is 
that more emphasis should be put on the emergent occurrence of the interface. 
From this moment on, the HMI property will show up in higher levels immediately 
before a multistage. 
 
Some atoms may show a minor transition and become a multistage: i.e. a 
molecule, a metal grid, etc. Only a selection of these multistages, notably 
enzymatic catalysts can show a reaction cycle that can be linked in hypercyclic 
dynamics (Fig. 3.3C1 and 3.3C2). The latter marks the next major transition from 
molecules to cells. 
 
Besides their hypercycle and containment, cells show the capacity to structurally 
auto-copy the information in their hypercycle. As can be seen at the top of Fig. 
3.2, this property is called Structural (auto-)Copying of Information. The SCI 
property can be seen to recur, at any higher level, before the HMI stage that in 
turn precedes the multistage. From the prokaryotic cell, a minor transition may 
lead directly to the prokaryote multistage, as can be observed in blue-green 
algae. A different route leads first to the gaining of a hypercycle-mediating 
interface and then to the eukaryote multistage. 
 
Within the multicellular environment, certain cells, the nerve cells, have gained 
the capacity to let thin cell extensions construct recurrent activation/inhibition 
interactions. In this way small units of cells are formed, showing a unit structure 
that in artificial neural network research has become known as `categorising and 
learning modules' or CALMs (Murre et al., 1989, 1992). These CALMs show a 
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recurrent interaction and thereby a first order interaction-cycle. If these CALMs 
are coupled again, creating a next recurrent connection, this results in a 
hypercyclic circuit (Fig. 3.3D1 and 3.3D2). The surrounding of these neural 
circuits by an interface of sensory/activation cells fulfils the requirement of the 
operator hierarchy for a next major transition; from multicellular individuals 
without, to multicellular individuals with ‘brains’. Multicellulars with hypercyclic 
brains have been named 'memons' by Jagers op Akkerhuis and Van Straalen 
(1998) to which study we also refer for a more in-depth explanation of the latter 
transition. The word memon is selected as a general term for individuals that 
show an emergent hypercyclic neural network with interface. It should be noted 
that the group of memons includes all animals with a brain that, at least locally, 
shows hypercyclical activity. This implies that most animals and human 
individuals are included, but no plants or fungi. 
 
How the memon may develop via minor transitions to more complex life forms is 
discussed below as part of the present extrapolations. 
HOW TO QUANTIFY EMERGENT PROPERTIES 
All emergent properties in the operator approach are based on changes in the 
organisation of the systems involved. A simple quantification of an emergent 
property is, therefore, not possible, because an emergent property implies a new 
system configuration, and its new property cannot be quantified in terms of the 
old configuration. This forms a serious obstacle for attempts at quantification. 
This general problem of emergent properties is discussed by Holland (1998) in 
his recent book `Emergence'. We strongly support his proposal for a solution by 
defining emergent properties on the basis of special models called `constrained 
generating procedures' (CGP). With respect to CGP models, Holland (1998) 
says: "The models ...are dynamic, hence procedures; the mechanisms that 
underpin the model generate the dynamic behaviour; and the allowed 
interactions between the mechanisms constrain the possibilities, in the way that 
the rules of a game constrain the possible board configurations." Thus, when 
basic functional elements, the mechanisms, create a constrained interaction 
pattern, a new system is created which, as an individual entity, may show 
unprecedented functional properties: the emergent properties. In line with the 
reasoning by Holland (1998) and Simon (1962) a CGP that shows persistent 
dynamics, may itself act as a building block for the creation of higher level 
CGPs. In the latter case, CGPs can be used as the building blocks of multilevel 
CGP hierarchies. This is exactly the way in which the present study deals with 
building blocks and emergent properties. By selecting persistent physical 
building blocks that themselves can act as the building blocks for the next level 
system, such as atoms, molecules, cells, etc. a continuous hierarchy can be 
recognised. On the basis of CGPs it is possible to formulate a mathematical 
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description for any emergent property, as is discussed in Chapter 7 of Holland 
(1998). 
 
A few words should furthermore be directed to those that expect quantitative 
predictions from the present approach. In principle I regard the presence of a 
hypercycle as a quantitative aspect, namely as the prediction of a specific CGP, 
the structure of which can be quantified in terms of the links between the 
contributing mechanisms. Further quantitative predictions are not aimed at 
during the present extrapolations. The reason is that aspects regarded as 
quantitative, such as the weight, colour or DNA structure, are not very relevant in 
this context. The weight may help to describe a particular atom `species' but 
different atoms can vary considerably in weight, ranging from helium to the 
trans-urane elements. A specific weight, therefore, is not a group property. 
Another example is given by unicellular organisms. These change 
weight/colour/precise DNA structure during their lives and/or between 
generations. Again, the weight/colour/DNA are not essential aspects of their 
group property, which is their existence as a cell. The observations that all 
species of atoms are atoms and all species of unicellular organisms are 
unicellular organisms are based on common properties shared by all members 
of the group. These group properties form the focus of the present study. 
PREDICTIONS 
The working hypothesis of this paper is that the internal logic of the operator 
framework (illustrated in Fig. 3.2) can be extrapolated to more complex systems 
than hardwired memons. As can be deduced from Fig. 3.2, all evolutionary 
stages that are presently predicted are memons. This implies that it may be wise 
to discuss some concepts regarding memic systems before we proceed, so that 
no confusion will arise when in a later stage exotic memic properties are 
discussed. 
 
Meme concepts 
In this study, the concept of a memon is used for any operator within the memic 
layer, e.g. all systems that show an emergent hypercyclic neural network and 
interface. The memons that emerge first will show a hardwired neural network 
that is based on autocatalytic cells, the nerve cells or neurons, or that is based 
on technical hardware. Higher level memons may also show a programmed 
neural network. Memons are involved in the copying of various memic entities, 
which we will define in more detail here. Firstly, the concept ‘functional-meme’ 
(or f-meme) could stand for the actual neural network that in its structure 
harbours learned knowledge and, therewith, abstract memes. Secondly, a 
‘coding meme’ (or c-meme) could be used to define any string of codes that 
contains the information to construct a certain neural network. In fact, a coding 
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meme codes for neural network architecture and associated knowledge much in 
the same way as a gene code for a catalytic molecule playing its role in the 
survival of the cell. Thirdly, they may exchange ideas. We suggest using the 
concept ‘abstract meme’ (or a-meme) for such abstractions, for example 
melodies, ideas and jokes that may reside in functional meme networks and can 
be transmitted from memon to memon in the process of communication. This is 
closest to the meme concept as introduced by Dawkins (1976). Finally, memons 
will actively create physical ‘traces’ of their thoughts, such as books, houses, 
computers, radio waves, etc. These could best be indicated as ‘physical meme 
models’ or physical memes (p-memes), because these entities represent ‘real 
world’ models of the concepts represented by abstract memes. 
 
Which rationale can be used for extrapolations? 
The operator hierarchy offers a structured basis for extrapolations (Fig. 3.2). Yet, 
it can be deduced that there is an aspect of the predictions for which the 
historical data does not give full information on future possibilities. The reason 
for this lies in the question of whether or not the emergent properties are 
independent. In principle, each time an independent emergent property is 
added, this would double the number of possible system types. The operator 
hierarchy (Fig. 3.2) shows that for hadrons, there is only multiness. For atoms, 
there is a single degree of freedom, which leads to two system types: single 
atoms and multi-stages. Next, prokaryotic cells have two degrees of freedom, 
which leads to four system types: prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells and their 
multistages. However, even though the latter indicates two degrees of freedom, 
it cannot be deduced from this example whether the four system types are the 
result of dependent or independent combinations of the two degrees of freedom. 
For the next level, the memic level showing three degrees of freedom, this 
implies that it is not possible to predict whether six or eight memic system types 
will emerge. Independence of the emergent properties would result in a total of 
eight possible system types, e.g. 2*2*2=8 combinations, dependence would lead 
to a total of six, because any next minor transition would only be possible 
following the immediately preceding minor transition. 
 
Now that we have discussed some basic aspects of the present predictions the 
time has come to predict properties of future memons. 
 
Prediction 1. The memic multistage: a robust prediction 
Our first prediction is based on a conservative approach that selectively uses the 
most obvious aspects of the operator hierarchy: the major transitions. Major 
transitions are a robust basis for extrapolations because each time the 
multistage is reached, a major innovation, e.g. the creation of a new building 
block type, is obligatory for the continuation of evolution. For this reason, the 
iteration between `first of the row' operators and their multistages forms a robust 
principle on which to base predictions. 
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Figure 3.4. The lowest and the highest complexity operators that are based on systems 
showing the same type of hypercycle. A1: the hadron, a quark multistage. B1: The atom. 
B2: The atomic multistage. C1: The cell. C2: The cellular multistage. D1. The individual 
with a hardwired hypercyclic neural network. This is called the ‘memon’. 
 
Focusing on major transitions only, the operator hierarchy can be summarised 
as is shown in Fig. 3.4. From this starting point, two predictions on future system 
types are available. The first prediction is that some day systems will evolve 
which show a multistage that is based on elements showing neural network 
architecture. The second prediction is that local units within this multistage will 
form the basis for a new cyclic interaction, which will lead to the next hypercyclic 
interaction forming the basis of the next evolutionary level. 
 
As the above conservative prediction is strictly based on the most fundamental 
aspects of the operator hierarchy, there is a large probability that the prediction 
of a future multistage is correct. But how much information is gained with such a 
prediction? In fact, the information is limited, because insight is still lacking on 
the specific properties of the memons that form the building blocks of the 
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multistage. A most serious error, which is easy to make at this stage, is to start 
considering how, for example, human brains, as a neural network type of 
considerable complexity, can be imagined to function as a multistage. To do this 
would deny the possibility of stages in between any newly formed building block 
and its multistage (see Fig. 3.2). This may not seem problematic for the step 
from the atom to the multi-atom stage, because this step leaves no room for 
additional system types anyway. But serious problems arise for cells, which may 
be prokaryotic or eukaryotic, each creating its proper type of multicellularity. 
Prokaryotes have given rise to multicellular blue-green algae. Eukaryotes have 
formed fungi, plants and animals. There is a world of difference between the 
intercellular communication in blue-green algae on the one hand and that of 
fungi, plants and animals on the other. The lesson from this is that the 
complexity of the building blocks has a major influence on the potential 
complexity of the multistage. The assumption that human neural networks would 
be the building block for the multistage leads to the imagining of a multistage 
with ridiculously primitive properties. The error would be similar to explanations 
of multicellular life on the basis of prokaryotic units only. As will be shown in the 
following text, the solution to this problem lies in the recognition of the other 
steps of complexity increase that the operator theory helps to recognise between 
any newly emerged operator and its multistage. 
 
Prediction 2. The hardwired memon and its multistage 
The most straightforward detailed prediction is that the 1000-memon, or 
hardwired memon, develops directly to a multistage (memon 1000 and 1001 in 
Fig. 3.5). This results in a primitive multistage having limited prospects for 
becoming of any evolutionary importance. The reason is that the transition to 
this multistage will be difficult and slow, especially for memons based on cells. 
This is caused by two major drawbacks of these systems. The first drawback is 
that genes code for the structure and quality of cellular neural networks that, for 
this reason, can only evolve over many generations, via reproduction and 
selection. A second drawback is that their bodily construction and interfaces are 
based on organic cells, with many limiting consequences for the way in which 
they can become physically linked into a multistage and for the way in which the 
linked individuals can exchange information. The construction of a technical 
hardwired memon may improve on this situation, because its technical 
construction and interface would bring more powerful ways within reach for 
physical connection and communication with other memons. 
 
Prediction 3. The SCI-memon and its multistage 
Much more promising are the prospects for the pathway towards the structural 
(auto-)copying of information (SCI) multi-stage. For this pathway, a hardwired 
memon first evolves to the SCI-state before it evolves to a multistage (memon 
1100 and 1101 in Fig. 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5. Predictions of future memons. 1001: Predicted multistage of the hardwired 
memon. 1100: Predicted memon with the SCI (structural copying of information) property. 
1101: Predicted multistage of the SCI memon. 1110: Predicted memons showing SCI and 
Hypercycle Mediating Interface (HMI) properties. 1111: predicted multistage of the 1110 
memon. 1010: Predicted HMI memon. 1011: Predicted multistage of the 1010 memon. 
 
The SCI property has occurred earlier in evolution in cells. Here autocatalysis 
implies that a full structural copy of the information in the cell is produced, which, 
in present day cells is for the largest part allocated in DNA and/or RNA. The 
autocopying process for neural network information does not involve DNA. Yet, it 
requires that the memon can copy the architecture of all neurone connections 
and the interaction strengths of all synapse connections. This leads to the very 
strict requirement that it must have access to all this information. There is no 
way in which a memon can (auto-)copy its neural network without full information 
about the architecture and interaction strengths. It is hard to imagine how a 
cellular memon could do this. This would require sensory cells which by some 
means find out what cells are connected to each other and in addition measure 
the strength of each synapse and report this to the individual. Apart from the 
physical tour de force to host large amounts of additional sensory cells in the 
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brain, we consider the chance that this evolves naturally extremely small if not 
impossible. Even genetic manipulation may prove an insufficient tool to reach 
such a complex goal. 
 
The prospects that computer based memons gain insight into the exact state of 
their brain are much better. The only thing they need is an extra interface that 
helps them read the arrays with information about their cell-cell contacts and 
synapse strengths, which information is kept off record anyway in programmed 
memons. From the moment that network structure and interaction strengths 
between cells can be examined, a whole world of new properties opens up, 
which allows a number of exciting predictions. 
 
The first prediction based on the SCI property is that, for reasons discussed 
above, SCI-memons would with very high probability be technical constructions. 
Accordingly, the SCI-property strongly guides predictions in the direction of 
computer-based entities. Despite its technical construction, the SCI-memon and 
human beings have a similar basis for their neural network structure. In principle 
this allows for `human' processes, such as intelligence, creativity, curiosity, etc. 
But a technical construction will also imply important differences with respect to 
energy procurement and living environment. Energy procurement will focus on 
electricity. And, because a technical memon does not breathe air, they can 
colonise underwater environments, planets without an atmosphere, or even a 
free position in space, supposing that other resources for normal functioning are 
available. 
 
That SCI-memons most likely show a technical basis is furthermore of marked 
importance for the evolutionary debate. The reason is that SCI-memons cannot 
evolve as a special case of organic life. As they are technical constructions, it is 
simply impossible that they evolve as offspring from cellular parents. Instead, 
SCI-memons have to be built either by cellular memons, as a special kind of tool 
(a p-meme!) that starts defining its proper goals in life, or by technical memons, 
as a special kind of constructed offspring. 
 
The moment that SCI-memons can copy their knowledge structurally this will 
cause an earthquake in memic evolution, the importance of which can hardly be 
overestimated. As an exploration of the possibilities, the text below gives some 
examples: 
1.  SCI-memons can for the first time in memic evolution reproduce their whole 
personality by simply producing a structural copy of their neural network. This 
copy will automatically contain all learned knowledge. Note that despite 
discussions about cloning, human beings absolutely lack a similar option. 
Humans cannot perform a structural reproduction of their whole personality, 
e.g. of all nerve connections and interaction strengths, simply because they 
lack access to the network topology and interaction strengths. What human 
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beings copy upon reproduction is the genetic coding for a human being which 
will show a mixture of parental phenotypic properties and which upon birth 
has a neural network showing a good deal of genetically based pre-
structuring, but which is devoid of learned knowledge. This means that the 
body and the overall network structure are roughly copied, but without even a 
trace of anything the parents have learned. As the structural copying of the 
parental knowledge is blocked, the transfer of knowledge to the offspring 
requires a long detour via many years of education. For SCI-memons 
reproduction of their complete knowledge can take place almost overnight as 
long as an appropriate technical device is available to which the information 
can be copied and in which it can become operational. This shows that if the 
intelligent technical memon has taken shape, it is but a small step to a whole 
population of such memons. In fact, technical memons will find that the 
copying of a full parental network is costly in terms of energy and time. The 
parental memon may therefore consider the production of small network-
vehicle combinations with the best possible capacities for learning and 
maintenance, and the capacity to actively enlarge their bodily and memic 
construction to develop into fully-grown memons themselves. 
2.  The working with and/or copying of network topologies will require some kind 
of coding to handle the information about the topology and the interaction 
strengths of the neural connections in the copied network parts. As discussed 
above, these code-strings hold a position in memons, which is similar to the 
DNA in cells. Where specific regions on the DNA, the genes, code for specific 
proteins, it will now become possible to recognise specific regions of coding, 
which code for network structures with certain properties. 
3.  SCI-memons can use the access to their own neural network to create one or 
more shunts of network parts, in each of which they can introduce small 
modifications to study which network configuration yields the best results. 
This implies that real-time, goal-oriented improvement of network 
configurations has become reality. In fact, not only the configuration of such 
networks can evolve. Several other features too may evolve, including the 
signalling procedures between neurons, the integration functions via which 
the neurons decide whether or not to signal subsequent nerve cells and the 
ways in which coding memes are coding for neural network constructions. 
 Further aspects of technical memons that follow more or less from the above 
three points are also interesting. In order to stay focused on the major aspect 
of this study and avoid technical details, we will only shortly mention these 
aspects without going into details. These aspects are: the possibility of c-
meme trade, the acceleration in memons of thinking speed with computing 
speed, the tendency towards the development of modular network 
architecture and the capacity of technical memons to integrate very different 
technical equipment directly into their interface. 
 SCI-memons have a much better chance of reaching multicellularity than the 
hardwired memons (1000 in Fig. 3.5). The main reason being, of course, that 
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they may show very high evolution speed, due to properties such as: a 
programmed network structure, the possibility of internal experimenting with 
network parts, the creation of similar copies, the acquisition of informed 
network parts via trade and the possibility of (re-)programmable interfaces. 
Increasing competition for living space on earth and for available resources in 
new environments, such as local networks of a company or a spaceship and 
larger networks, such as the global inter-net, will force SCI-memons to 
cooperate for survival. In some cases this will drive SCI-memons to 
dependence on cooperation and to structural connection, marking the 
transition to the SCI-multi-memon state. 
 
Prediction 4. The HMI-memon and its multistage 
The next predictable property of a future memic operator is that of Hypercycle 
Mediating Interface (HMI) (memon 1110 and 1111 in Fig. 3.5). Fig. 3.2 shows 
that the HMI property has occurred earlier in evolution, i.e. in atoms and 
eukaryotic cells. In atoms, the Hypercycle Mediating Interface emerges for the 
first time in the form of the electron shell. In eukaryotic cells the situation is more 
complex. Here, a new interface is added to the already existing interface around 
the cell, creating a second interface: the nuclear envelope. 
 
In cells, large `libraries' of information are stored in the form of DNA/RNA. In 
prokaryotic cells the unpacking of the information and the functioning of the 
coding for enzymes occur in the same compartment. In eukaryotic cells, the 
storage part of the information has become sequestrated to the nucleus, from 
where coded information is transported through pores in the nuclear envelope to 
the soma before it is transcribed to functional enzymes. This shows that the 
nuclear membrane separates the cell into two compartments. In the nucleus the 
information of the cell is for the largest part handled in a coded form. Outside the 
nucleus the information is active in the form of enzymes. Accordingly, the HMI 
property is associated with an extra internal interface that separates different 
levels of the expression of the information. 
 
This observation offers information about possibilities for future system 
configurations, because the continuation of this sequence would imply a three-
layer HMI in future memons. But, assuming that this extrapolation is valid, it 
remains in our opinion quite hard to imagine at the present state of the 
understanding of the operator hierarchy what the second layer would look like in 
practice. Starting simply, two situations will be visualised showing an extra 
interface. These can then be combined to create a tentative prediction of a two-
layer IIC-memon. 
 
Imagining only a single layer, as in prokaryotic cells, it would be quite natural to 
assume that the HMI-memons find increasing use for coding memes, in the 
shape of code-strings that represent the topology and strengths of all the neural 
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connections of modular network parts. The reason for the popularity of c-memes 
is that they offer a highly efficient method of coding to store away all information 
that via experience and learning was gathered in the neural networks. This 
implies that, by using c-memes, little energy is required to maintain large 
reservoirs of knowledge, of which only a minor part would have to be unpacked 
and used in response to specific environmental conditions, after which it could 
be packed away again in its new, more experienced form. In contrast to 
networks and code strings that are stored temporarily in the active working 
memory of the memon, a more profound storage of c-memes would imply that 
these are stored away in a form which is not directly accessible, for example in a 
high capacity data-storage medium. A potential candidate for this process is the 
three-dimensional storage in crystals that are programmed and read by means 
of laser beams. But the storage and retrieval of large amounts of c-memes will 
require a special interface to decode the information. The new coding and the 
related interface would imply an additional Hypercycle Mediating Interface. 
 
There is another way, via which an additional interface could evolve in these 
future memon systems. To understand this, we have to place ourselves in the 
situation of an SCI-memon that has just copied its network structure into a new 
vehicle. Unfortunately, this imaginary new vehicle which is furnished with a lot of 
new technical properties, differs in many aspects from the previous one. This 
implies that the memon has to go through a long process of revalidation and 
practice with its new `body' for adjusting its neural circuitry to the new phenotypic 
properties. Such a practice period could be made a lot shorter, and larger 
differences between the old and the new vehicle could be allowed, if the neural 
network of the memon possessed translation interfaces allowing a rapid 
adjustment of the memon's `proper' interface to various types of vehicles. It will 
probably be most efficient to have only a selection of such interfaces active, 
namely those that yield the highest survival value under given circumstances. 
Other interfacing networks can then remain stored as c-memes in the central 
meme library. 
 
The combination of an internal c-meme library with a translation interface would, 
in principle, allow a two-level Hypercycle Mediating Interface. 
 
Prediction 5. From the hardwired memon, via the HMI-memon without SCI 
properties towards the multistage 
Assuming independence of the minor emergent properties, a comprehensive 
discussion of the possibilities for future memons should also include the route 
from hardwired memons to HMI-memons, without the intermediate stage of the 
SCI-memon (the route from memon 1000 via 1010 towards system type 1011 in 
Fig. 3.5). Even though it could be a theoretical possibility, the direct transition 
from hardwired memons to HMI memons must be expected to suffer from 
technical problems due to a low rate of evolution. The reason is that hardwired 
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memons cannot read their neural network state. If the HMI-memon without SCI 
properties will arise at all, it will certainly have problems reaching a multistage. 
The contribution of this option to the mainstream of operator evolution must, 
therefore, be considered minimal, and the existence of these type of operators 
be considered more of theoretical importance. 
Conclusions and discussion 
The above extrapolations present a panorama of possibilities for future 
organisms. First of all, it appears that the most likely next stages will be technical 
neural network organisms, because this is by far the most probable option for 
constructing a system type that can show structural auto-copying of information. 
The reason is the structural copying of information requires that the network 
structure and synapse strengths can be assessed by the organism itself and 
copied. Even if genetic manipulation were to proceed far beyond the present 
level, it is hard to imagine that brains could be developed showing extra cells in-
between present brain cells, capable of analysing the neural network structure 
and reporting this to the individual. Secondly, the predictions strongly suggest 
that man must create the next stage in the operator hierarchy, because it is hard 
to imagine the development of a technical construction from a cellular basis. The 
predictions also show that, one day, neural network organisms can be created 
that can copy themselves. For this purpose one could simply imagine a ‘body 
factory’ constructing phenotypes that can be bought by any existing memon for 
the purpose of copying a neural network structure onto the new phenotypes 
computer space. From that moment onwards, humanity will have to live amongst 
such intelligent technical `organisms'. Thirdly, the operator framework depicts 
evolution as an open, ever extending process, in which the next major transition 
coming will be based on a hypercyclic interaction between multimemic elements, 
most likely within the `environment' of a multi-memic organism that is supported 
by a technical vehicle. Fourthly, the operator approach suggests that if technical 
memons are not constructed, this will block, on earth, the evolutionary sequence 
that leads from one operator to the next. We stress that this does not affect the 
evolution of cellular organisms, including cellular memons, which, of course, will 
continue. 
 
One may now ask what the novelty is of the above insights, especially because 
there is a growing awareness that technical developments will before long create 
machines that will compete for resources with cellular life as we know it. For 
example Kelly (1994) in his book `Out of control' uses citations of C. Langton to 
convince the reader that: 
“There are these other forms of life, artificial ones that want to come into 
existence. And they are using me as a vehicle for its reproduction and its 
implementation'. ... 'By the middle of this century, mankind had acquired 
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the power to extinguish life. By the end of the century, he will be able to 
create it. Of the two, it is hard to say which places the larger burden of 
responsibility on our shoulders.”  
The new life-forms are frequently expected to become a threat. Warwick (1997) 
makes the following three statements in his book `The march of the machines' in 
a chapter, which is called `Mankind's last stand?’ 
“I. We humans are presently the dominant life form on Earth because of 
our overall intelligence. 2. It is possible for machines to become more 
intelligent than humans in the reasonably near future. 3. Machines will 
then become the dominant life form on Earth.” 
 
A last example of predictions of intelligent future life forms is given from Kurzweil 
(1999) who in his book `The age of spiritual machines' presents a time line of the 
evolution of the universe. In the time-line section about the year 2099 he writes 
the following: 
“Machine-based intelligences derived from extended models of human 
intelligence claim to be human, although their brains are not based on 
carbon-based cellular processes, but rather electronic and photonic 
equivalents'. ... `The number of software-based humans vastly exceeds 
those still using native neuron-cell-based computation.” 
 
These predictions show that the idea of computer based intelligence has 
become a generally accepted subject amongst leading scientists. Also the 
present study shows that for our human successors, a life amongst technical 
memons simply represents the next stage in evolution. 
 
Yet, in comparison to the above-cited deductions, there are several aspects in 
the present study, which offer exciting novel points of view. First of all, the just 
cited predictions lack a structural rationale. They reach as far as the extension of 
existing trends in computer speed, hardware capacity and programme 
complexity, but lack a backup by a hypothesis for the evolution of system 
complexity, for which we apply the operator hierarchy. The use of the operator 
hierarchy allows descriptions of structural properties of future system types and 
the indication of goals for construction efforts. Secondly, it is of importance that 
the aspects of the operator hypothesis are open to scientific inquiry and/or 
falsification. This holds both for the assumptions that underlie the steps in the 
hierarchy and for the overall rationale dividing emergent properties in major and 
minor transitions. Thirdly, by indicating a pathway for further development 
showing the structural aspects of future evolution, the question of how fast 
developments will go can be dealt with in a more precise way. Finally, the 
evolutionary rationale of the operator hierarchy shows that the coming into 
existence of the next system type is part of a larger evolutionary context. 
Accordingly, the present approach indicates the necessity that the human beings 
on earth start considering whether or not they want to live amongst technical 
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memons. In addition it extends this reasoning to considerations about mankind's 
role in the case where the decision is made not to produce these systems and 
therewith block the major evolutionary pathway on earth. All these statements 
deserve more attention and are discussed in detail below. 
 
Degrees of freedom in the operator hierarchy 
A question, which is left unanswered by the operator hierarchy, is whether the 
minor transitions represent independent degrees of freedom. In other words, can 
the properties of a layer, such as multiness, internal information 
compartmentation (HMI), structural copying of information (SCI) and auto-
evolution, occur in random combinations or do they occur in sequence? The 
present understanding of the operator hierarchy does not allow a conclusive 
decision. This leaves an interesting field for further development. 
 
Putting the operator hypothesis to the test 
The most important assumption of the operator hierarchy is that hypercyclicity 
forms the major requirement for the major transitions in evolution. Furthermore, 
the containment of the hypercycle is also required for all operators of a higher 
complexity than the hadron, whilst both properties occur as emergent properties 
immediately after a multistage has been reached. This aspect is open to 
falsification both with respect to existing and future system types. The 
hypercycles and their containment have been discussed in the above text. For 
the transitions from hadrons to atoms and from molecules to cells there are no 
problems with the recognition of the just mentioned emergent properties. For the 
transition from multicellular units to the neural hypercycle the proof is still rather 
thin. If more evidence becomes available that the auto-evolving capacity of 
present day neural network organisms, such as humans, is strictly and only 
possible because of a hypercyclic coupling of neurons, this will support the 
theory. Turning the argument around, a proof for auto-evolving intelligence 
without hypercyclic circuits would falsify the present approach. Likewise, the 
assumption that the operator hierarchy includes all possible operators can be 
tested for validity. Proof that an additional operator exists in-between the steps 
of the present operator sequence would falsify the operator hypothesis. 
 
When will technical memons become reality? 
An important aspect of hypercyclic neural networks is that science has no 
means to predict the skills of any newly developed neural network architecture. 
This implies that it remains unclear how to construct the powerful neural 
networks that will finally allow technical memons to become intelligent. As the 
functional properties of neural networks cannot be predicted, skilled networks 
will have to be created via technical evolution, which implies the testing of large 
numbers of randomly constructed, simulated memons, the selection of the best 
as parents for a new series of networks, etc. The necessity of using trial and 
error when developing future intelligent neural networks represents the Achilles-
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heel of computer intelligence. How soon computer based neural networks will 
become intelligent, and finally more intelligent than mankind, depends on how 
much the processes for the evolution of artificial brain structures can be 
accelerated. There are prospects for acceleration, because nature has already 
shown that an architecture on headlines, which at this moment is offered by 
genes, offers enough manageable modularity to produce human intelligence. 
The use of genetic codes as a basis for the evolution of brain structures can be 
imitated, also for technical neural networks. How this can be done has been 
shown by Happel (1997) and requires a smart combination of special genetic 
algorithms for neural network structure, efficient selection strategies and fast 
computers. As these aspects are all available, the evolution of intelligent neural 
networks can be expected in the near future. 
 
From practical questions about survival amongst technical memons to 
philosophical questions about our impact on the major evolutionary 
pathway when the global population decides not to create them. 
 
One of the major questions which are discussed in the recent literature (Kelly, 
1994; Kurzweil, 1999) is whether humanity should develop intelligent technical 
memons if it is unpredictable how they will behave towards us. As they may 
become faster and more intelligent than human beings and, because they will 
also require resources for their functioning, it is likely that they will compete for 
resources with human beings and manipulate the behaviour of humans for their 
purposes. A little precaution in constructing `them' may therefore be a good 
thing. 
 
It remains an open question, though, whether it will at all be possible to stop 
scientific activities that finally lead to their construction. Given the more or less 
autonomous process of scientific innovation and development, it can be 
expected that even when the required knowledge is not specifically or 
purposefully developed, it will be developed indirectly. 
 
So far, the aspects deal only with the consequences of the interaction between 
human beings and technical memons, not with more philosophical aspects of the 
choice (not) to create technical memons. This choice can be approached from at 
least two sides, a systems viewpoint and a religious viewpoint. From a systems 
viewpoint the operator sequence simply reflects a universal self-organisation 
process which proceeds as the blind consequence of earlier phases in the 
process. We can recognise a direction, but no goal. In this case evolution can be 
blocked without problems, because there is no reason why any next stage 
should be reached. 
 
On the other hand, the evolutionary sequence of the operator hierarchy can be 
regarded as the reflection of some kind of larger plan. As it will be hard to prove 
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the existence of such a plan, I regard this as a religious viewpoint. Yet, under the 
assumption of a larger plan, it becomes extremely difficult to find valid 
arguments that give us the right to act against evolution. 
 
The above shows that the question of whether or not technical memons should 
be developed is a complex case on which the last words have not been spoken. 
The operator hierarchy certainly deserves a place in this discussion. 
In conclusion 
The present paper has examined possibilities for the prediction of future 
organisms. For this purpose we began with a short resume of the structure of 
the operator hierarchy. Subsequently, the logic of the operator hierarchy was 
extended yielding several predictions of future memic individuals, for which the 
operator hypothesis strongly suggests that they will be of technical construction. 
 
The present approach can be considered unique in its contribution to 
comparative system hierarchy because of the level of detail with which it predicts 
structural properties of future organisms. I consider it an exciting challenge to 
develop this field further and thereby improve the understanding of the cosmic 
evolution process and our capacity to predict more and increasingly detailed 
aspects of future organisms. The most direct practical value of the present 
predictions lays in the suggestion of hypercyclic neural networks as the basis of 
artificial intelligence. The fact that the operator hierarchy reflects a universal 
evolutionary process may also have some spinoff in the field of philosophy. I 
sincerely hope that the ideas presented in the above text will stimulate creative 
suggestions for elaboration and improvement. 
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A backbone for system science 
Analysing hierarchy in the organisation of 
biological and physical systems 
“Is evolution a theory, a system or a hypothesis? 
It is much more: it is a general condition to which all theries, all hypothesis, 
all systems must bow and which they must satisfy henceforward if they are 
to be thinkable and true.” 
(Pierre Teilhard de Chardin) 
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Abstract 
A structured approach is discussed for analysing hierarchy in the organisation of 
biological and physical systems. The need for a structured approach follows 
from the observation that many hierarchies in the literature apply conflicting 
hierarchy rules and include ill-defined systems. As an alternative, we suggest a 
framework that is based on the following analytical steps: determination of the 
succession stage of the universe, identification of a specific system as part of 
the universe, specification of external influences on a system's creation and 
analysis of a system's internal organisation. At the end, the paper discusses 
practical implications of the proposed method for the analysis of system 
organisation and hierarchy in biology, ecology and physics. 
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Introduction 
Hierarchies of biological and physical systems published in the literature show 
inconsistencies in the use of ranking rules and element types. With the aim of 
improving on this situation, the present paper discusses an alternative method 
for analysing the organisation of systems. 
 
A hierarchy can be described as a situation, in which entities are subordinate to 
other entities, the latter being considered as a higher level. The organisation of 
nature is profoundly hierarchical, because from its beginning, interactions 
between simple elements have continuously created more complex systems, 
that themselves served as the basis for still more complex systems. Scientists 
have sought ways to capture the essence of this complexity in easy to 
understand hierarchies, which typically rank systems in a linear way. 
 
The literature offers numerous examples of linear hierarchies in biology and 
ecology. Koestler (1978) distinguishes the following levels in the internal 
organisation of organisms: organ system, organs, tissues, cells, organelles, 
molecules, atoms and sub-atomic particles. A hierarchy that focuses on abiotic 
elements is the cosmic onion (Close, 1983), which includes bulk matter (e.g. a 
planet), atoms, nuclei and quarks. A hierarchy by Weiss (1971) includes gene, 
chromosome, nucleus, cytoplasm, tissue, organism and environment. This range 
is similar to that proposed by Odum (1959) who visualizes a biological spectrum 
from protoplasm to cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, organisms, 
populations, communities, ecosystems and biosphere. Haber (1994) extends 
this range to organisational levels in the universe, from atom to molecule, protein 
molecules, cells, tissues, organ systems, organism, population, community, 
ecosystem, landscape, human society, biosphere, earth, solar system, stellar 
system and the universe. A similar structure, with even greater detail, is 
presented by Korn (2002). In what is called a hierarchy of biological levels of 
organisation, Hogh Jensen (1998) presents the following range: molecule, cell, 
organ, whole plant, plant community, pastoral system, farming and the agro-
ecosystem. Focusing on energy budgets, de Kruijf (1991) presents a hierarchy 
in which populations are the elements for modelling energy budgets of 
communities, which in turn are the elements for modelling ecosystems, 
considered the basal elements of a landscape. Naveh & Lieberman (1994) 
present a similar ranking in which organisms are embedded in populations, 
populations in communities, and communities in ecosystems. 
 
A problem with many of the above examples is that they are based on 
compromises with respect to the types of elements that are included and the 
ranking rules being used. To get an impression of these problems, one may look 
at the use of the organism concept in the following sequence: atom, molecule, 
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organelle, cell, organ, organism, population, community, ecosystem, planet and 
so on. This sequence suggests that all organisms form a uniform system class 
that can be ranked at one position in the hierarchy. Yet, the word organism is 
used for many different system types, such as bacteria, eukaryote unicellulars, 
and multicellulars without and multicellulars with neural networks. Each of these 
represents a system type deserving a proper position in a complexity hierarchy 
In addition, every organism type has a different internal organisation, which also 
shows hierarchical aspects. For example in bacteria, this includes mainly 
molecules, whilst in multicellular eukaryotes this may include tissues, organs, 
specialised eukaryote cells, organelles, and so forth. It can thus be concluded 
that the analysis of hierarchy in biology requires at least two dimensions, one for 
the hierarchy of organism types and a second for the internal hierarchy. Also at 
the ecosystem level, the above example of hierarchy is not strict. For example, 
astronauts on the moon illustrate that the entire population of a species need not 
necessarily be part of one planet, but may be found distributed over several 
planets. We may thus conclude that there are serious problems with the rigour of 
any hierarchy showing similarity with the above example. This is a disquieting 
conclusion particularly because many hierarchies in the literature do show 
similarity with our example. 
 
In relation to the latter conclusion, the main goal of the present paper is to 
suggest a method for analysing system organisation by means of a stepwise 
procedure that recognises different aspects of hierarchy and can be summarised 
as follows. The analysis starts with the largest system that is known, the 
universe, because this sets the stage for later identification of systems and the 
analysis of their organisation. Since its emergence, the universe has passed 
through a number of developmental stages that can be named after the highest-
level elements (atoms, molecules, cells, etc.) that exist in the universe at a 
certain moment. To know the developmental stage of the universe is relevant for 
the analysis of system organisation, because it determines what systems may' 
be present and need to be included in an analysis. Next, a local part of the 
universe is identified representing the system that we want to analyse. This can 
be a large system, such as a galaxy, or a small system, such as a molecule. The 
third step of the present analysis focuses on the way in which the organisation of 
the selected system may be the result of influences from elements surrounding 
it. The advantage of this step is that it makes visible mediating forces that have 
played a role during the formation of the system. This assures, for example, that 
the shape of the DNA molecule will be explained not only on the basis of its 
existence from nucleic acid molecules, but also in relation to its functioning in a 
cell. The fourth step can then be used to further analyse the organisation of 
elements in the selected system. This implies that the parts and their 
interactions are studied to create a picture of the internal organisation of the 
system. If necessary, iteration of the fourth step can be used to further analyse 
the internal organisation of each individual part of the system. The above 
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process prevents the analysis of a system from resulting in a simple linear 
representation. The above four steps can be summarised as follows: 
(1)  The developmental stage of the universe is determined using the highest 
complexity system that is present. 
(2)  A system is selected based on interacting elements that determine the type 
and scale of the system. 
(3)  Mediating influences on the system are taken into account. 
(4)  It is investigated how the selected system is composed of elements. 
 
These four steps are explained in detail below, following the discussion of 
important concepts that form the theoretical basis behind the proposed analysis. 
Theoretical basis of the analysis 
Before continuing with an explanation of the proposed method for the analysis of 
biological/physical systems, attention has to be paid to a number of aspects that 
lie at its basis. These aspects include definitions of the system concept, 
hierarchy and mechanisms, the introduction of a strict basis for analysing 
hierarchy in systems, the discussion of viewpoint dependence of hierarchies and 
the occurrence of transitions between system types. 
 
(1) Systems, hierarchy and mechanisms 
First, it is useful to discus definitions of biological/physical systems, elements 
and hierarchy. 
 
(a) Biological/physical systems and their elements 
The system concept is derived from the Greek word synthithemi, meaning `I put 
together'. Systems consist of parts that belong together because they show a 
relationship. These parts are also named elements. To be considered an 
element, an entity needs to show at least one relationship with at least one other 
entity, in this way creating the system that it can be regarded as an element of. 
By accepting that the universe represents a system which does not contribute to 
any higher-level system, the universe becomes a primeval system concept. All 
systems in the universe can subsequently be regarded as elements, 
representing equally many biological/physical sub-systems. 
 
(b) Biological and physical systems 
When regarding systems as biological or physical this implies that these 
systems show a material and/or energetic existence. According to this focus, the 
concepts of wood and marble are excluded from the approach, while the specific 
brain states that are associated with a human's thought about the categories 
`wood' or `marble' are included. This excludes from the analyses any hierarchies 
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that are based on temporal, spatial or symbolic aspects such as duration 
(seconds, minutes, hours, etc.), separation (various measures for lengths, 
surfaces, volumes, etc.) and numbers (1, 2, 3, etc.). 
 
(c) Hierarchy 
The hierarchy concept relates to an ordering of entities into a sequence that is 
based on a relation that shows three properties (e.g. Bunge, 1969; Simon, 
1973): (1) It is transitive, which means that if a has a lower hierarchical position 
than b and b has a lower position than c, then a has a lower position than c. (2) 
It is irreflexive, which means that a can never hold a hierarchical position below 
itself (3) It is asymmetrical, which means that if a holds a lower position than b 
then b cannot hold a lower position than a. The latter implies that as soon as a 
group of entities shows a circular relationship, one must consider them as 
having `stepped out' of the particular hierarchy. Elements showing a circular 
relationship require a new way of analysis, basing hierarchical considerations on 
the relationships between different groups of circularly related elements. 
 
In system science, the importance of a circular pattern of relationships has long 
been underestimated. It is only recently that an increasing body of literature has 
arisen emphasising the importance of circular interaction patterns for 
recognising elements and hierarchy. Such publications include discussions of 
the hypercycle (Eigen & Schuster, 1979; Kauffman, 1993), emergent 
organisation (Laszlo, 1996; Ponge, 2005), major evolutionary transitions 
(Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995a, 1995b), meta-system transitions that are 
regarded as the quanta of the evolution of complexity (Turchin, 1977), relational 
closure (Heylighen, 1989a, 1990), closure in different scientific contexts (Bunge, 
1992; Chandler & de Vijver, 2000) and the operator hierarchy (Jagers op 
Akkerhuis & van Straalen, 1999; Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001). 
 
The concept of hierarchy has a long history and has been applied in many 
different ways and situations of which a few examples will be discussed 
presently. A well-known approach to system analysis uses the three-level 
hierarchy that includes the world, the system and its elements. Applying this 
approach in an iterative way, the former system and element become the new 
world level and system level of the next analysis. In different forms, this three-
level approach can be recognised in theoretical publications, for example, a 
review of principles of hierarchy theory by Feibleman (1954), the holon approach 
that was proposed by Koestler (1978), a hierarchy of system levels by Varela 
(1979) and an approach based on doublets by Jaros & Cloete (1987). 
 
The literature offers specifications of various aspects of hierarchy (e.g. reviews 
by Klijn, 1995; Valentine, 2003). If a higher level in a hierarchy consists of 
physically joined elements, like parts of an alarm clock or cells in a multicellular 
organism, this represents a constitutive hierarchy (Mayr, 1982). If the elements 
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are not physically connected, but associated in a series of increasingly inclusive 
entities, such as organisms in a population, this is considered an aggregative 
hierarchy (Mayr, 1982). If elements of levels lower than the next-lower level 
contribute to a certain level in a hierarchy this represents a cumulative hierarchy. 
An example is the cumulative constitutive hierarchical organisation of 
multicellular organisms, in which, for example, bone and blood plasma, which do 
not consist of cells, together with tissues and organs form the organism. The 
cumulative constitutive hierarchy in organisms has also been called a somatic 
hierarchy (Eldredge, 1985). If low levels in a hierarchy represent systems that 
are separated in time from the higher levels and do not function as units in the 
higher levels, this is called a tree (Valentine, 2003). In addition to being 
hierarchic, trees are defined as having a single root and showing a single parent 
for each node. For this reason, the parent-offspring relationship (family tree) is 
not strictly a tree, but more a treelike network. The pedigree of species that 
forms the phylogenetic tree or `tree of life' can be considered a tree as long as 
the speciation is based on a representation of the gene-pool of a species as a 
single parental node. Networks or webs, then, may show nodes with 
connections to a variable number of other nodes irrespective of their hierarchical 
level. 
 
(d) Mechanisms 
If a pattern occurs in a biological or physical system, it always shows a 
relationship with some sort of underlying process or explaining mechanism 
causing it. 
 
The most general mechanism in nature is the fact that spontaneous processes 
are associated with a decrease of energy gradients and increasing 
chaos/entropy. This general principle does leave room for a system to move in 
the opposite direction by showing a local increase in its organisation (associated 
with a decrease in entropy) as long as the related entropy decrease is 
compensated for by an equal or larger increase outside the system (e.g. 
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). 
 
Another mechanistic aspect is the relative stability of a system. From any two 
systems showing an equal chance of formation, the system that shows the best 
combination of internal stability and stability during interactions with other 
systems will show the highest chance of functioning successfully and existing for 
a long time. 
 
Still another mechanistic aspect is the self-organisation of systems in response 
to certain attractor states. Selforganisation implies that interactions between 
systems autonomously create patterns. The most important aspect of self-
organisation in nature is the formation of circular interaction patterns creating 
physical units. Although there may be different mechanisms behind the 
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emergence of atoms or cells, the occurrence of a circular interaction pattern is a 
constant. This aspect will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
(2) A strict basis for the hierarchical ranking of system types 
For later analysis of hierarchy in the internal organisation of systems, a special 
approach is used that recognises a strict division of all systems into two major 
groups. 
 
The systems of the first group are discussed in detail by Jagers op Akkerhuis & 
van Straalen (1999) and Jagers op Akkerhuis (2001), who refer to these 
systems as the operators, indicating clearly that these systems show a specific, 
internal organisation allowing them to operate as individuals and produce effects 
in their environment. The name operator was chosen, even though it was 
realised that this name could cause confusion because it has applications in 
other fields, such as mathematics, the telephone business and information 
science. 
 
Systems that are not operators belong to the second group, the members of 
which can be regarded as interaction systems. 
 
Because the operator theory forms an essential aspect of the present study, we 
first present a short summary. According to the operator viewpoint, an operator 
of type x creates a next operator of type x+ 1 by means of a first-next possible 
closure. Closure refers simultaneously to the formation (the closing process) and 
presence (the closed state) of a circular pattern in the interactions between the 
system's elements. The adjective 'first-next possible' refers to the demand that 
the closure must be the first possibility for a new type of closure in system x + 1 
after the preceding closure created the operator of type x. The demand of first-
next possible closure implies that the elements showing this property can be 
ranked in a strict way, creating what has been called the operator hierarchy, in 
which every operator holds a unique hierarchical position (Fig. 4.1). In the 
operator hierarchy, there are two transitions between system types that are 
based on first-next closures: the major and the minor transitions (Jagers op 
Akkerhuis, 2001). A major transition creates a completely new type of closure. 
According to the operator theory, major transitions form the basis of the 
superstring, the quark-gluon plasma, the hadron, the atom, the cell and the 
organism with a hypercyclic neural network with interface, which is named a 
memon in the operator hierarchy. A minor transition recreates a system property 
that came into existence during a preceding major transition. For example, the 
multiparticle property that emerged as the result of a major transition in the 
hadrons occurs again as the result of a minor transition at more elevated levels 
in the hierarchy, creating the molecule, the prokaryote multicellular organism 
and the eukaryote multicellular organism. 
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Using a sensu stricto interpretation of the operator hierarchy, only the systems in 
Fig. 4.1 showing a hypercycle with interface represent operators. This includes 
the hadron, the atom, the multi-atom (e.g. molecules, metal grids, etc.), the 
bacterial cell and the bacterial multicellular, the eukaryote cell and the eukaryote 
multicellular, and the memon. For additional information about the operator 
hierarchy, see Jagers op Akkerhuis & van Straalen (1999), Jagers op Akkerhuis 
(2001) and the present author's website www.hypercycle.nl. 
 
The operator theory may have marked effects on the analysis of organism types 
in biology. As Fig. 4.2 shows, all species of organisms and the representation of 
their ancestral tree (the tree of life) can be translated into a sequence of operator 
types including bacterial cells, eukaryote cells, prokaryote and eukaryote 
multicellulars and organisms with hypercyclic neural networks (memons). 
Versions of the scheme of Fig. 4.2 that exist in the literature (e.g. Alberts et al., 
1989) generally include only the levels of prokaryote unicellulars, eukaryote 
unicellulars and eukaryote multicellulars. Because the operator hierarchy offers 
strong arguments to regard the transition towards multicellular eukaryotes with a 
hypercyclic neural network (memons) as of similar importance as the transition 
from prokaryote to eukaryote cells and from uni- to multicellular organisms, we 
suggest including the level of the memon in this type of analysis. 
 
As stated above, the operator hierarchy allows a distinction between the 
operators and all other systems, regarded as interaction systems. It will be 
shown next that this distinction is a useful tool for the analysis of hierarchic 
organisation in systems. As an example, let us discuss the simple situation of a 
system (S) that contains a water molecule (M) and a water droplet (D) (Fig. 4.3). 
The operator hierarchy regards the water molecule an operator and the droplet 
and system S interaction systems. The droplet represents an interaction system 
because it consists of interacting water molecules that do not show first-next 
possible closure, which, following the molecular stage, is autocatalysis; a 
property not shown by D. The system S also represents an interaction system, 
because it contains elements the interactions of which do not show first-next 
closure. 
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Figure 4.1. The ranking of system types according to the operator hierarchy Jagers op 
Akkerhuis & van Straalen, 1999; Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001). Grey boxes indicate non-
operator systems that play an important role in the operator hierarchy as intermediate 
closure states. Black upward arrows represent major transitions creating a new operator 
that shows a completely new type of closure. Black right-pointing arrows represent minor 
transitions. Empty cells and dashes indicate stages that have not yet evolved, but 
according to the logic of the hierarchy may potentially exist. Systems in the same vertical 
column share a common closure type. Titles above the columns indicate closure types. 
`Interface' represents an emergent boundary. `Hypercycle' represents an emergent 
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second-order interaction cycle. `multi-operator' represents an emergent recurrent 
interaction between operators of the preceding type. 'Hypercycle mediating interface' 
(HMI) represents an interface that mediates the interactions of the hypercycle of the 
system involved with the world. `Structural copying of information' (SCI) represents the 
property of systems to autonomously copy their structure and in this way reproduce their 
information. `Structural auto-evolution' (SAE) represents the property of systems to 
improve, while living, the neural structures that contain their information. CALM stands for 
a Categorizing And Learning Module, representing a hypercyclic neural interaction 
pattern.
 
Figure 4.2. A schematic representation of the phylogenetic tree. Organisms are ranked 
according to speciation patterns, at the same time indicating when a specific lineage 
passes through one of the major levels of structural organisation recognised by the 
operator hierarchy 
 
For later discussion, it is practical to distinguish two major types of interaction 
systems: compound objects, in which elements by their interactions create a 
material unit, and interaction groups, in which elements interact as separate 
material units. The water droplet in our example can be regarded as a 
compound object. Any molecule that escapes from it becomes a separate 
operator: a water molecule. 
Compound objects always show one or more unifying forces between one or 
more types of contributing elements that create a stronger coherence between 
the particles in the compound object than between the object and its 
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environment. At the point where the influence of these forces comes to a halt, 
the compound object has its limit that forms the basis for its distinction and 
manipulation as a material unit relative to its environment. The limit makes the 
compound object recognizable in space and time and may cause specific 
emergent properties (Ponge, 2005). Examples of compound objects are: a drop 
of water (in oil or in air, but not in water, because a water droplet in water neither 
shows a recognizable outer limit nor shows specific unifying forces), a planet, a 
bowl with soup, a lump of clay, a piece of dead wood, a brick, a lump of small 
magnetic parts of iron clinging together on a table, a piece of cotton cloth 
(unified by the molecular forces between molecules in the cotton fibres and by 
physical forces keeping together the interwoven strands of fabric), a hair, etc. 
 
Interaction groups, then, consist of particles that show specific interactions that 
make them recognizable as a group, without this leading to any physical unity. 
Examples are: atoms and molecules in a gas, a tornado, a heap of loose sand 
particles (not kept together by roots, fungal hyphae or such like), organisms of a 
population/ species in an ecosystem, bees belonging to one hive, an 
autocatalytic set in a chemical solution, stars and planets in a galaxy, a football 
team, etc. 
 
Although operators, compound objects and interaction groups show distinct 
types of organisation, they have all evolved from operators and may respond to 
changing conditions by a change in organisation from one type to the other. For 
example, a group of loosely interacting atoms in a gas (an interaction group) 
may condense to form a compound object, such as a drop of rain or a 
snowflake. The atoms may separate again when the system is heated. Clearly 
also a change in environment may alter the status of a system. For example, a 
drop of water is characterised as a compound object in air, but not in water. 
 
It is recognised that between every pair of subsequent system types, transition 
states may exist that cannot be classified as representing one of the two system 
types. Transition states are also a natural phenomenon during the formation of a 
higher-level system type from elements, for example, during the creation of 
operators. In my opinion, the existence of transition states does not justify the 
rejection of organisational system classes. 
 
(3) Viewpoint dependence of hierarchy: the DICE approach 
The operator hierarchy has been introduced as a special way of ranking a 
limited subset of natural systems in a strict hierarchy. It was also shown that 
systems that are not operators can be classified as different forms of interaction 
systems, either compound elements or interaction groups. This provides a basis 
for the analysis of the internal organisation of both operators and interaction 
systems. The internal organisation of these systems can be looked at from two 
perspectives: that of the elements and that of the interactions. 
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Figure 4.3. A system S containing a water molecule M and a drop of water D and water 
molecules (H2O). 
 
(a) Elements 
A general analysis of system organisation must account for the fact that the 
elements in a system are not always operators, but may also be compound 
elements and interaction groups. For example, the internal organisation of a dog 
(an operator of the memon type) includes interaction systems, such as organ 
systems, organs and tissues, and operators, such as many specialised 
eukaryote cells. Likewise, an interaction system, such as a galaxy, includes 
interaction systems, such as the stars, planets, comets, dust particles, etc., and 
operators, such as atoms, molecules, cells, etc. If the operators, compound 
elements and interaction groups are defined, the identification of elements in a 
system will not be problematic. 
 
(b) Interactions 
A general analysis must acknowledge that relationships of elements in a system 
are the result of many types of interactions, each of which may lead to different 
patterns of relationships among elements. To make this `many patterns problem' 
tangible, interactions can be arranged according to a limited number of 
`organisational dimensions'. 
 
For example, a focus on the relationship `a causes the displacement of b' can be 
regarded as one of the rankings of organisms according to a displacement 
dimension. Displacement may furthermore relate to interactions involving 
migration, phoresy, endochory, etc. Interactions between the same individuals 
will sort differently when focusing on the relationship `a has genes that are used 
by b'. 
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This relationship represents one aspect of the information dimension. 
Information may furthermore include interactions involving speciation, life 
histories, behaviour and communication. Rankings will again change by focusing 
on constructional interactions. Construction includes the way objects are 
arranged in a system, the creation of objects by individuals, constructional 
aspects of phenotypes and the contribution of chemicals in food to the 
construction of an organism, for example, by means of vitamins, proteins or 
toxins. Finally, the relationship `a eats b' is an example of an energetic 
viewpoint. Other aspects of the energetic dimension may include behaviour 
aiming at maximising resource dominance (e.g. Jagers op Akkerhuis & 
Damgaard, 1999), the metabolism of an organism, energy flows in a food chain 
and physiological effects of temperature, light, etc. As has been emphasised by 
Arditi, Michalski & Hirzel (2005) the structure of a food-web may differ markedly 
from a construction-chain, indicating that each of the above dimensions will 
result in a different analysis of relationships and hierarchy in a system. 
 
Together these four different dimensions will henceforth be summarised by the 
acronym DICE (displacement, information, construction and energy). It is argued 
here that until all the four DICE-viewpoints have been investigated, the analysis 
of the organisation of any system is principally incomplete. 
 
To summarise the above, there are important practical consequences of the 
DICE approach. Firstly, it shows that each viewpoint that is used for analysing a 
system results in another arrangement of relationships. Secondly, the 
dimensions of the DICE approach offer an easy way to check whether the 
analysis of a certain system shows major flaws. 
 
(4) Systems that change operator type during their existence 
The operator hierarchy also has consequences for the analysis of system types 
that occur during development. For example during conception, the unicellular 
organisms of the sperm cell and egg cell fuse to form a zygote, which also 
represents a unicellular organism. Development can now proceed along different 
lines. In species with determinate cleavage of the zygote, the blastomere cells 
depend immediately on each other for their survival and are never separate 
individuals. In other taxa, for example many mammals, the blastomere cells 
specialise much more slowly and have the potential to develop into individual 
multicellular organisms when separated. Accordingly, the mammalian zygote 
represents a colony of structurally linked cells. In a later phase, the cells become 
obligatorily interdependent and the colony changes into a multicellular organism. 
In animals, the development of the embryo passes through a stage where a 
hypercyclic neural network forms. From that moment on, the embryo becomes a 
memon. Other interesting examples are slime moulds. Individual cells of these 
organisms may live as separate individuals and even multiply asexually at this 
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stage. On certain occasions, the cells aggregate and form slug-like units, which 
show all properties of a multicellular stage, with chemical bonds between their 
cells and a mutual dependence with respect to a common metabolism and 
reproduction. 
 
Above, I discussed transitions between complexity levels in operators. However, 
transitions between complexity levels also occur in interaction systems. As an 
indicator for the complexity level, we proposed the use of the highest level 
operator in an interaction system. According to this viewpoint, a planet starts its 
life as a chemosystem and changes towards an ecosystem when the first cell 
emerges. Any subsequent level organisation of a planet can be named after 
newly emerging organisms, which, for example, may lead to the recognition of 
an ecosystem at the unicellular eukaryote level, at the multicellular eukaryote 
level (e.g. plants and fungi) or at the memon level (includes most animals). 
Analysis of hierarchy in biological and physical systems 
The method proposed in the present paper includes the following four steps: (1) 
identification of the developmental stage of the universe, (2) identification of the 
type and scale of the system, (3) specification of mediating influences affecting 
the formation of the system and, (4) analysis of the internal organisation based 
on the four dimensions of the DICE-approach. These steps are explained in the 
sections below. 
 
(1) Identification of the developmental stage of the universe 
As a first step, the present method assesses which types of systems must 
potentially be included in the analysis. The presence of system types is 
considered to depend on the succession stage of the universe. According to the 
operator hierarchy, succession stages of the universe can be defined on the 
basis of the highest complexity operator that is present. Based on this viewpoint, 
the universe has passed through a number of abiotic stages that are associated 
with the emergence of, for example, hadrons, atoms and molecules, and biotic 
stages that are associated with the emergence of prokaryote and eukaryote 
cells, multicellular organisms and memons. Because operators and interaction 
systems show a mutual dependency with respect to their formation, the 
evolutionary sequence of operators shows a correlation with the presence of 
interaction systems in the universe; this relationship is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. 
Although in Fig. 4.4 the presence of the highest-complexity operator determines 
the succession stage, the universe may show large areas in which evolution lags 
behind. Due to this heterogeneity, the universe at the stage of unicellular 
eukaryotes (white shading in Fig. 4.4) may contain large parts in which cellular 
life has not yet emerged and where the analysis of system organisation does not 
have to take into account the activities of organisms. Furthermore, the scheme 
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shown in Fig. 4.4 holds open the possibility that operators of early stages either 
become parts of higher-level operators or may remain present as individual 
entities through later succession stages of the universe. 
 
(2) Identification of a system of interest 
This step is used to identify the system of interest. This implies that the scale of 
the system is specified in relation to its characterisation as operator or 
interaction system. For example, if the selected system is a galaxy, it consists of 
celestial bodies (and dark matter) kept together by gravitational interactions. 
According to the present analysis, a galaxy represents an interaction group 
depending on compound elements (the stars and planets). The scale for 
analysing its organisation depends on judgments about the limit to the 
gravitational influence it has in space. The situation becomes quite different if 
the system chosen is a plant. This represents an operator of the eukaryote 
multicellular type. The scale for analysing its organisation is that of the individual 
and is limited by intercellular connections. 
 
(3) Mediating influences 
The third step involves a further characterisation of the system by analysing 
whether the system has obtained its specific form under the influence of a 
higher-level operator or because of specific interactions within a larger 
interaction system. The advantage of this step lies in the fact that it makes 
explicit that any analysis of the organisation of a system requires reference to 
the surrounding environment and/or higher level that mediated its construction. 
On the one hand, systems exist that typically owe their form to specific 
interactions within interaction systems. For example, carbon atoms form during 
nuclear interactions in stars, crystals form under specific environmental 
conditions on planets and the canopy of a forest affects the selection of new 
seedlings. On the other hand, systems may experience mediating activities of 
higher-level operators. For example, a fossil and a DNA molecule could never 
have obtained their present form without the mediating influence of an organism. 
 
(4) Internal organisation 
The fourth and last step is an investigation into the elements composing the 
selected system and how they are related. The elements may be operators, 
compound objects or interaction groups. One can analyse the internal 
organisation of these elements in an iterative way, focusing on systems 
elements, the elements therein, etc. When it comes to finding explanations for 
the functioning of a system, it is often sufficient to go down one or two levels. As 
a consequence of the DICE approach (see section 11.3) there is no one best 
hierarchical ranking of interactions in the system, because the ranking of the 
elements may vary with the viewpoint that is adopted for acknowledging 
hierarchy. 
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Care should be taken when analysing the organisation of interaction systems. 
For example, the ranking from the organism, to the population, to the community 
and the ecosystem, which can be observed frequently in the literature, should 
not make the reader think that organisms are first parts of populations, which 
then are parts of communities, which finally are parts of ecosystems. Instead, 
this hierarchy only involves abstract subsets, and not structural elements. Fig. 
4.5 illustrates that the organism interacts as an individual with other svstems in 
the ecosystem without creating new structural elements. 
 
On the basis of this reasoning, a population, a community, a food chain and 
other groups of individuals must be considered abstract subsets, each being 
based on a specific selection of interactive properties of the individuals. 
Nevertheless, even though the interactions of the individuals in such abstract 
groups may not lead to physical units, they do cause very real dynamics. This 
can easily be demonstrated by the example of mating and genetic recombination 
in populations of species that reproduce sexually. Due to sexual reproduction, 
the offspring obtain different gene combinations. On the one hand, this helps to 
maintain good gene combinations in part of the offspring, the part carrying the 
most deleterious mutations experiencing a survival disadvantage. On the other 
hand, the recombination of genes during sexual reproduction brings about new 
gene combinations that allow a flexible adaptation of a species to changing 
fitness landscapes. 
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Figure 4.4. System types associated with different succession stages of the universe. 
Each successive step to the right adds a box both to the operators (lower panel) and to 
the interaction systems (upper panel), the boxes being pushed outward at each step. 
From left to right, subsequent columns indicate all system types, both operators (bottom) 
and interaction systems (top), which potentially exist during the following succession 
stages of the universe. Abbreviations: S = superstring stage, H = hadron stage, A = atom 
stage, mA= multi-atom stage, C = prokaryote cell stage, eC = eukaryote cell stage, mC = 
multicellular organism stage (including in this case both prokaryote and eukaryote 
multicellulars) and M =memon stage. The coding I(X-Y) indicates all possible interaction 
systems containing type X as the highest-level operator in a succession stage of the 
universe that contains Y as its highest-level operator. For example, the coding I(eC-M), 
covers all possible interaction systems that show eukaryote cells as the highest level 
elements in a universe in which memons exists. For the operators the coding X(Y) is used 
to indicate all possible operators of type X in a stage of the universe that contains Y as its 
highest-level operator. 
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Applications of the new method 
The application of conflicting hierarchy rules and the inclusion of ill-defined 
systems flaw many existing analyses of hierarchy in system organisation. To 
solve this problem, an alternative method is proposed in the present article. 
Below, possible contributions of the new method to the field of system analysis 
are discussed. 
 
(1) Distinguishing between evolutionary sequence and construction 
sequence 
Many hierarchic approaches to system organisation use an organism concept 
that covers all types of organism and link this to an internal organisation of 
organisms that includes organs, tissues and cells. This viewpoint disregards 
fundamental differences in complexity among organisms, thus failing to give an 
accurate analysis of their internal organisation. To avoid such problems, the 
present approach uses the operator hierarchy to determine (and rank) the 
complexity level of the organism before analysing internal organisation. This 
approach also solves the problem that ranking of systems according to an 
evolutionary sequence does not always correspond with ranking according to 
complexity. For example, before the emergence of the cell, evolution had neither 
the means nor a context for developing complex organelles, such as the 
endoplasmic reticulum. Therefore, cells evolved first, followed by organelles. 
The evolution of internal complexity has been discussed by Turchin (1977) who 
refers to it as the `law of the branching growth of the penultimate level'. This law 
states that only after the formation of a control system C, controlling a number of 
subsystems Si, will these S; tend to multiply and differentiate. Examples of 
elements that have evolved in organisms as indicated by Turchin's law are 
organelles in cells and tissues, organs and specialised cells in multicellulars. 
 
(2) Classifying and analysing systems in relation to their creation under 
the influence of higher-level operators 
Analyses of the organisation of systems generally do not include mediating 
effects of higher-level systems and the environment. The present approach 
deals specifically with this aspect, increasing insight into the organisation of 
systems. 
 
(3) Adapting the scale of the systems of interest in relation to specific 
interactions 
Most analyses in the literature do not explicitly consider the scale of the systems 
involved. Populations, communities and pastoral systems are all mentioned 
without any specification of what sets the limits to these selections. 
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Figure 4.5. The partitioning of individuals into subsets of an ecosystem. Black arrows 
indicate interactions between individuals. Arrows marked with a cross indicate sets that 
do not interact as entities, such as populations and communities. The figure shows that it 
is always the individual (or a physically connected colony of individuals that acts as one 
individual) that interacts in the ecosystem, regardless of the subset it is assigned to. 
 
(4) Specification of the type of hierarchy used in different hierarchical 
steps 
In many existing hierarchies, it is not clear which properties determine the 
hierarchical ranking of any next level. Frequently, the ranking from sub-atomic 
particles to the universe gives the impression of an internal hierarchy, in which 
the top-down relationship `is a part of' seems to fit most of the hierarchical steps. 
Galaxies are parts of the universe, solar systems parts of galaxies, planets parts 
of solar systems, ecosystems parts of planets, communities parts of 
ecosystems, populations parts of communities, organisms parts of populations, 
cells parts of organisms, organelles parts of cells, molecules parts of organelles, 
atoms parts of molecules, etc. Yet, apart from additional minor inconsistencies, 
the latter hierarchy is inconsistent because it is constructed from three distinct 
parts, the ranking of which is based on very different principles. 
 
The first part involves the internal organisation of the universe down to the level 
of planets. This range is based on the general notion that smaller systems are 
parts of larger systems. Existing hierarchies of this type generally do not include 
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all types of celestial bodies, such as black holes, neutron stars, brown dwarfs, 
comets, etc. Moreover, according to this reasoning, there is no consensus on 
how to distinguish between a lifeless planet and a planet inhabited by 
organisms. 
 
The second part involves subsets of the ecosystem ranked from the organism, 
via the population, to the community and the ecosystem. As has been discussed 
above, organisms are not first parts of populations, which then are parts of 
communities, which finally are parts of ecosystems. Instead, as was illustrated 
by Fig. 4.5, the organisms remain at any moment directly integrated into the 
ecosystem. It was also discussed above that the ranking of individuals in 
ecosystems is sensitive to point of view, as illustrated by the DICE approach, the 
application of which may result in a food web, a structural dependence web, an 
informational web, and so on. 
 
The third part involves the internal organisation of elements in the organism. 
Considering the organism as just another operator, this part can also be 
generalised to relate to the internal organisation of operators. The present 
method covers this aspect in far more detail than most other methods. Using the 
proposed rationale, the analysis can be based on the recognition of internal 
elements, such as operators, compound elements and interaction groups. 
Accounting for the DICE discussion, several internal hierarchies can be 
recognised. 
 
Finally, I would like to refer to the existing controversy about the usefulness of 
hierarchy in system science (e.g. Webster, 1979). On the one hand Guttman 
(1976), advocates that the use of levels of biological organisation 
`if stated in any but the sloppiest and most general terms is a useless and 
misleading concept'. On the other hand, Weiss (1969) remarks that `the principle 
of hierarchic order in living nature reveals itself as a demonstrable descriptive 
fact' and Von Bertalanffy (1968) that ...'hierarchical structure ... is characteristic 
of reality as a whole and of fundamental importance especially in biology, 
psychology, and sociology'. 
 
The present study brings together these opposing viewpoints. On the one hand, 
it shows that it is indeed difficult to use hierarchy as a scientific concept. This will 
continue as long as approaches focus on ill-defined hierarchies that include 
various system types and ill-defined hierarchy rules. On the other hand, the 
present study shows that hierarchy can be studied with success and in detail by 
using the operator hierarchy as the basis at the same time paying close attention 
to the multi-dimensional nature of hierarchy in biological/physical systems. 
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Conclusions 
(1)  The literature shows a controversy about the usefulness of hierarchy in 
analysing the organisation of biological/physical systems. On the one hand, 
it is postulated that hierarchy is the most general organising principle in 
nature. On the other hand, the identification of hierarchy in natural systems 
seems to be hampered by a sloppy use of concepts, giving reason to claims 
that hierarchy is of limited use. Especially linear hierarchies can be shown 
to suffer from minor and major flaws. 
(2)  Solving the above problems requires a strict yet flexible way for analysing 
system organisation. With the operator hierarchy as a basis, we propose a 
method that includes the following four steps: (a) identification of the 
developmental stage of the universe, (b) identification of a system of 
interest, (c) analysis of mediating influences on the selected system, (d) 
analysis of internal organisation. 
(3)  The present method of identifying contributes in three ways to the analysis 
of system organisation: (a) it offers a strict ranking of the operators, (b) it 
offers ways to identify compound elements and interaction groups, and (c) it 
acknowledges that the analysis of hierarchy in interactive relationships must 
focus on different analytical dimensions, notably displacement, information, 
construction and energy. 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank two anonymous referees, as well as Hans-Peter 
Koelewijn and Jean-François Ponge for detailed comments on the manuscript, 
Chris KIok and Jan Klijn for constructive discussion and Claire Hengeveld for 
improving the structure and clarity of the text and correction of the English. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bringing the definition of life to closure 
Towards a hierarchical definition of life, the 
organism and death 
“Life is a succession of lessons which we must live to be understood.” 
(Ralph Waldo Emerson) 
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Abstract 
Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on 
the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These 
problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, 
exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving 
this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalised particle 
hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the ‘operator’ for a 
unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to 
animals with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called ‘the operator hierarchy’. 
This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an 
operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the 
cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators 
and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition 
of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an 
operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or 
reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a 
specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be 
defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following 
irreversible deterioration of its organisation. The generality of the operator 
hierarchy also offers a context to discuss ‘life as we do not know it’. The paper 
ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples. 
 
Keywords: Artificial life, biology, evolution, exobiology, natural sciences, particle 
hierarchy, philosophy, Big History 
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Introduction 
In a chronological overview of developments, Popa (2003) presents about 100 
definitions of life, meanwhile demonstrating that no consensus exists. Many 
classical definitions include long lists of properties, such as program, 
improvisation, compartmentalisation, energy, regeneration, adaptability and 
seclusion (Koshand Jr., 2002) or adaptation, homeostasis, organisation, growth, 
behaviour and reproduction (Wikipedia: Life). Most properties in such lists are 
facultative; it is still possible to consider an organism a form of life when it does 
not grow, reproduce, show behaviour, etc. The inclusion of facultative aspects is 
a source of lasting difficulty in reaching consensus on a definition of life. 
Because of the seeming hopelessness of the situation, certain scientists have 
adopted a pragmatic/pessimistic viewpoint. Emmeche (1997) christened this 
viewpoint the “standard view on the definition of life’. He suggests that life 
cannot be defined, that its definition is not important for biology, that only living 
processes may be defined and that life is so complex that it cannot be reduced 
to physics. Others have warned that a comprehensive definition of life is too 
general and of little scientific use (e.g. van der Steen 1997).  
 
In their search for a definition, other scientists have focused on properties that 
are absolutely necessary to consider an entity life. In this context Maturana & 
Varela (1980, p. 78) have proposed the concept of autopoiesis (which means 
‘self making’). They use the following definition: “An autopoietic machine is a 
machine organised (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production 
(transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their 
interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realise the 
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the 
machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realisation as such a network.” Special 
about the autopoietic process is, that it is “closed in the sense that it is entirely 
specified by itself (Varela 1979 p. 25)”.  
 
The concept of autopoiesis has increasingly become a source of inspiration for 
discussions in the artificial life community about how to define life (Bullock et al., 
2008). Reducing the number of obligatory traits defining life to just one, 
autopoiesis is a rather abstract concept. People have sought, therefore, to 
describe some of the processes that underlie autopoiesis more specifically. An 
example of such a description is a triad of properties defining cellular life: 
container (cell membrane), metabolism (autocatalysis) and genetic program 
(e.g. Bedau, 2007). 
 
124 Chapter 5 
 
These descriptions, however, have not resulted in a consensus definition of life. 
This has led Cleland & Chyba (2002, 2007) to suggest that a broader context, a 
‘theory of life’, is required. In line with a broader framework, life may be regarded 
as a special realisation of the evolution of material complexity. According to 
Munson and York (2003), considering life in a general evolutionary context 
requires arranging “all of the phenomena of nature in a more or less linear, 
continuous sequence of classes and then to describe events occurring in the 
class of more complex phenomena in terms of events in the classes of less 
complex phenomena.. “. An important property of such a hierarchy would be that 
“…an increase in complexity is coupled with the emergence of new 
characteristics … suggesting that the hierarchical arrangement of nature and the 
sciences is correlated with the temporal order of evolution”. Similar views for 
integrating material complexity and the evolution of life can be found, for 
example, in the work of Teilhard de Chardin (1966, 1969), von Bertalanffy 
(1968), Pagels (1985), Maynard Smith & Szathmáry (1995, 1999, 2002) and 
Kurzweil (1999). 
 
In contribution to these discussions, the present author has published an 
evolution hierarchy for all ‘particles’. The latter hierarchy uses the generic word 
‘operator’ to address both physical (e.g. quark, atom, and molecule) and 
biological particles (e.g. prokaryote cell, eukaryote cell, and multicellular). The 
word operator emphasizes the autonomous activity of the entities involved, 
which ‘operate’ in a given environment without losing their individual 
organisation. The hierarchical ranking of all operators is called the ‘operator 
hierarchy’ (see Figure 5.1) (Jagers op Akkerhuis and van Straalen 1999, Jagers 
op Akkerhuis, 2001, Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2008 and the author’s website 
www.hypercycle.nl). Because the operator hierarchy is important for the 
definition of life proposed below, the outlines of this theory are summarised in 
the following lines  
 
The operator hierarchy ranks operators according to the occurrence of a circular 
pattern, such as that which connects the beginning and end of a process or 
structure. Circularity causes a closed organisational state, also referred to as 
‘closure’ (for discussions of closure see, for example, Heylighen 1990, Chandler 
and van de Vijver, 2000). Because closure causes a discrete ‘quantum’ of 
organisation (e.g. Turchin 1977, 1995 and Heylighen 1991), the operator 
becomes an ‘individual entity’, a ‘whole’ or a ‘particle’, while still retaining its 
construction of smaller elements. Closure thus defines the operator‘s complexity 
level and sequential closures imply a higher complexity level. An operator‘s 
closure is the cause of its existence and typical for its complexity. This implies 
that complexity is not measured in terms of the number of genes, functional 
traits or organs of an organism, but in a very abstract way, in terms of the 
number of closures. Upon losing its closure, the organisation of the operator falls 
back to that of the preceding operator. The actual shape of a closure can differ. 
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Biological examples of closure are the cell membrane and the circle of catalytic 
reactions allowing the cell to maintain its chemical machinery. It is essential for a 
strict ranking that a lower-level and a higher-level operator always differ by 
exactly one closure level. The single closure (eukaryotic cell) or parallel pair of 
closures (autocatalysis plus membrane of the cell) that define the next level are 
referred to as ‘first-next possible closure(s)’. A consequent use of first-next 
possible closures allows physical and biological operators to be ranked 
according to the ‘operator hierarchy’ (Fig. 5.1). The operator hierarchy includes 
quarks, hadrons, atoms, molecules, prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells, 
multicellulars (e.g. plants, fungi) and ‘animals’, the latter representing an 
example of the operators that possess a neural network with interface and that 
are called ‘memons’ in the operator hierarchy.  
 
Due to its focus on closure, the operator hierarchy represents an idealisation 
because it excludes potential transition states in between two closures. For 
example, several hundreds of metal atoms may be required before a functional 
Fermi sea transforms a collection of single atoms into a metal grid. Also, the 
emergence of multicellularity (discussed in detail below in the ‘Levels of life’ 
chapter) may require a colonial, multicellular state in between the single cell and 
the multicellular operator. The above shows that transition states form natural 
intermediate phases in the emergence of closures. The operator hierarchy does 
not include these transition states, however, because its hierarchical ranking is 
exclusively based on entities that already show first-next possible closure. 
 
The main reason for writing this paper, and adding yet another definition of life to 
the listings, is that the operator hierarchy offers several advantages in solving 
definition problems. First, the definitions of the operators are generally 
applicable because they focus on the essences of organisation. For example, 
demanding autocatalysis leaves open which specific catalysts will perform the 
process. Second, the use of first-next possible closures ensures a critical 
filtering of only obligatory properties from property lists. Finally, the use of the 
operator hierarchy makes it easy to develop a hierarchy-based definition of life. 
In other words, the operator hierarchy offers a novel path for structuring and 
simplifying discussions about which entities are life.  
 
126 Chapter 5 
 
M
EM
IC
 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
M
S
C
EL
LU
LA
R
 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
M
S
O
PE
R
A
TO
R
S 
W
IT
H
 A
 S
TA
TE
 O
F 
M
A
TT
ER
  R
EP
R
ES
EN
TI
N
G
 L
IF
E
HADRONS
MOLECULESATOMS
CELL
EU-
KARYOTE
CELL
EU-
KARYOTE 
MULTI-
CELLULAR
MULTI-
CELLULAR
(HARD-
WIRED)
MEMON
THE OPERATOR HIERARCHY
O
PE
R
A
TO
R
S 
R
EP
R
ES
EN
TI
N
G
 T
H
E 
‘D
EA
D
’ 
ST
A
TE
 O
F 
M
A
TT
ER
ce
ll-
ba
se
d 
op
er
at
or
s
at
om
-b
as
ed
 
op
er
at
or
s
ha
dr
on
s
m
em
on
-b
as
ed
 
op
er
at
or
s
M
EM
IC
 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
M
S
C
EL
LU
LA
R
 
O
R
G
A
N
IS
M
S
O
PE
R
A
TO
R
S 
W
IT
H
 A
 S
TA
TE
 O
F 
M
A
TT
ER
  R
EP
R
ES
EN
TI
N
G
 L
IF
E
O
PE
R
A
TO
R
S 
R
EP
R
ES
EN
TI
N
G
 T
H
E 
‘D
EA
D
’ 
ST
A
TE
 O
F 
M
A
TT
ER
ce
ll-
ba
se
d 
op
er
at
or
s
at
om
-b
as
ed
 
op
er
at
or
s
ha
dr
on
s
m
em
on
-b
as
ed
 
op
er
at
or
s
 
Figure 5.1. Using the operator hierarchy to define life and organisms. Arrows indicate 
how closures create operators (more information can be found in Jagers op Akkerhuis 
2008, and the author’s website www.hypercycle.nl).  
 
The following paragraphs discuss different aspects of existing definitions of life 
and examine new ways to define the organism, living and death. At the end, a 
test of the practical value of the present definitions for the solving of a range of 
classical problems, such as a virus, a flame, a car, a mule and a mitochondrion, 
will be presented. 
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Defining life and the organism 
Before discussing the use of the operator hierarchy for defining life, living and 
the organism, it is important to note that when talking about definitions, care 
should be taken that “a definition is a series of superimposed language filters 
and only the definiendum (the term to be defined) can penetrate it” (Oliver and 
Perry, 2006). Problems may arise when the words used for the definiendum and 
for the filter have a broad meaning or have different meanings in different 
contexts. It is thus useful to elaborate on the current context for ‘life’ before 
continuing. 
 
‘Life’ has different meanings in different contexts. For example, people refer to 
the period between birth and death as their life (this is the best day of my life) 
even though lifetime would be more correct. In addition, the experience of ‘being 
alive’, or ‘living’, also carries the label of life (to have a good life). Other uses of 
life holistically refer to the importance of selective interactions in ecosystems that 
over generations lead to better-adapted life forms (the evolution of life). Ruiz-
Mirazo et al. (2004) have proposed a definition of the latter type. They state that 
life is “a complex collective network made out of self-reproducing autonomous 
agents whose basic organisation is instructed by material records generated 
through the evolutionary-historical process of that collective network”. In 
philosophy, life is sometimes considered a graded concept for being because all 
what is, is alive in the measure wherein it is (Jeuken 1975). Due to the 
contextual dependence of these and other interpretations, it is improbable that a 
general definition of life can be constructed. Van der Steen (1997) indicates that 
even if such an overly general definition existed, it would probably be difficult to 
apply it to specific situations.  
 
To avoid problems with generality and multiple interpretations of concepts, the 
present study adopts a limited viewpoint, presuming a one-to-one relationship 
between a definition of life and a specific material complexity. In this context, life 
is an abstract group property shared by certain configurations of matter. 
 
The operator hierarchy offers a context for a general matter-based definition of 
life. Focusing on all operators showing a complexity that exceeds a certain 
minimum level, the hierarchy suggests a definition of life sensu lato as: matter 
with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to 
or even higher than the cellular operator. Only the prokaryote cell, the eukaryote 
cell, the prokaryote and eukaryote multicellular, the hardwired memon and the 
potential higher-level operators fit this definition (Fig. 5.1). In addition to this 
general definition, various specific definitions are possible by focusing on 
operators that lay between a lower and an upper closure level. An example of a 
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specific definition is one describing cellular life (e.g. algae, plants and fungi) as: 
matter showing the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a minimum 
complexity of the cellular operator and the maximum complexity of a multicellular 
operator. The latter includes only the cell, the eukaryotic cell, the prokaryotic and 
the eukaryotic multicellular. It is possible to choose any of these approaches for 
defining living as: the dynamics of an operator that satisfies the definition of life.  
 
The above approach results in a strictly individual based definition of life as a 
group property of certain operators. This definition has the advantage, that it 
offers a solid basis for defining the creation of offspring. Subsequently, the 
evolution of life can be dealt with as an emergent process occurring in any 
system with interactions between individual living entities that lead to differential 
survival of variable offspring, produced either without or with recombination of 
parental information. 
 
The organism is the key ontological unit of biology (Etxeberria, 2004, 
Korzeniewski, 2004) and is also referred to as a ‘living individual’. Understanding 
the latter requires insight into what is ‘living’, and what is an ‘individual’. By 
defining ‘living’ as the dynamics of those operators that satisfy the definition of 
life, the operator hierarchy uses operators instead of individuals because 
operators define a being or an individual more strictly than the Latin concept of 
individuum. The word individuum stands for an “indivisible physical unit 
representing a single entity”. This definition leaves a great deal of room for 
choice of the elements that form the physical unit and for the rules that 
determine indivisibility. These indeterminacies may be the reason for the 
discussion about whether certain life forms are organisms. Townsend et al. 
(2008) use the phrase ‘unitary organism’ to indicate the individual organism. 
However, certain jellyfish, for example, the Portuguese Man O’ War (Physalia 
physalis), look like individuals, but consist of differentiated individuals, each with 
its proper neural network (e.g. Tinbergen 1946). In the operator hierarchy, the 
latter jellyfish are colonies, not organisms, because each contributing individual 
has its proper neural network as its highest emergent property, and the colony 
still lacks a recurrent interaction of the neural interfaces of the individuals. 
 
The operator hierarchy now suggests a way to create congruency between the 
definition of life and the definition of the organism by accepting as organisms 
only entities that fit the operator-based definition of life. For example, using the 
general definition of life, only the cells, the eukaryotic cells, the prokaryotic and 
eukaryotic multicellulars and the memons are organisms.  
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Levels of life 
a. The cell. The most important properties of the cell are the autocatalytic set of 
enzymes and the membrane. The autocatalytic set shows reproduction as a set. 
Every molecule in the set catalyzes a reaction that produces some other 
molecule in the set until any last reaction product closes the cycle. In different 
ways, reproduction as a set is part of various theories about the origin of life 
(e.g. Rosen 1958, 1973, 1991, Eigen 1971, Gánti 1971, Eigen and Schuster 
1979, Kauffman 1986, 1993, Bro 1997, Kunin, 2000, Hazen, 2001, Martin and 
Russell, 2003, Hengeveld and Fedonkin, 2007).  
 
Autocatalysis demands that a cell can potentially autonomously sustain its 
catalytic closure. Accordingly, if a cell allocates a part of its autocatalytic closure 
to another cell, the cell is no longer an operator. An example of the latter is the 
mitochondrion. It is generally accepted that mitochondria started the interaction 
with their host cells as autonomous endosymbiontic α-proteobacteria. Over 
many generations, these bacteria transferred more than 90 percent of their 
catalytic control to their host (Allen 1993, Berg and Kurland, 2000, Searcy, 2003, 
Capps et al., 2003, Lane, 2005). The loss of the potential of autocatalysis 
implies that mitochondria have become a special kind of organelle.  
 
In addition to autocatalysis, the operator hierarchy demands an interface 
because a set of autocatalytic enzymes only gains the physical individuality that 
allows its maintenance when it functions in a limited space, the limits being part 
of the system. The integration of autocatalysis and the membrane is part of 
various important theories, for example, the theories of autopoiesis (Varela 
1979) and of interactors (Hull 1981).  
 
b. The eukaryote cell. A single cell has two dimensions for creating a next 
closure. One is to create cooperation between cells, which leads to 
multicellularity. The other is to create an additional closure mediating the 
hypercyclic functioning of the cell in the form of the nucleus. Interestingly, it is 
quite likely that the most important complexity boundary in cell biology, that 
between prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells, thanks its existence to the energy 
boost and genetic enrichment offered by endosymbionts. With respect to the 
emergence of eukaryotic cells, theories roughly divide along two major lines 
depending on whether the nucleus or the endosymbionts emerged first. In 
addition to other aspects, support for the nucleus-first hypothesis comes from 
allegedly primitive eukaryotes that show a nucleus without harboring 
endosymbionts. Genetic analyses (Rivera 1998) and observations of 
endosymbiont traces (Clark 1995), however, suggest that the ‘primitive 
eukaryotes’ are recent developments that lost their endosymbionts in a process 
of evolutionary specialisation. The endosymbiont hypothesis advocates that a 
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merger between a methanogenic bacterium that was member of the archaea 
and an α-proteobacterial endosymbiont created the eukaryotic cell (Martin and 
Russell, 2003). Subsequent transmission of genes for membrane creation from 
the endosymbiont to the host allowed it to produce membranes that formed the 
basis for the engulfment of the nucleus. Whatever the actual path taken by 
evolution, the operator hierarchy focuses on the occurrence of closure involving 
both structural and functional aspects of the host cell, resulting in an internal 
interface for the autocatalytic set and the mediation of its functioning. Even 
though endosymbionts may become obligatorily integrated in the functioning of 
their host cell by the transfer of part of their genetic regulation to the host cell, 
they do not mediate the functioning of the autocatalytic set of the host nor form 
an interface for its functioning. For this reason the operator hierarchy does not 
regard endosymbiosis, but the nucleus as the relevant closure that defines the 
limit between prokaryotes and eukaryotes. 
 
c. The multicellular. When does a group of cells become a multicellular operator 
and, according to the above definition, an organism? In the operator hierarchy, 
multicellularity involves a structural and a functional component represented by 
structural attachment of cells and an obligatory recurrent pattern of functional 
interactions between them. As such, it is possible to define a multicellular 
operator (a multicellular organism sensu stricto) as: a construction of mutually 
adhering cells showing obligatorily recurrent interactions based on the same 
interaction type, that has the potential of maintaining it’s functioning as a unit 
and that does not show memic structure.  
 
Multicellularity has developed independently in many branches of the 
phylogenetic tree (reviews by, for example, Bonner 1998, Kaiser, 2001, 
Grosberg and Strathmann, 2007) presumably because it is associated with a 
range of evolutionary advantages. Multicellularity increases mobility and access 
to resources, and reduces predation, and finally yet importantly, the cells in 
genetically uniform multicellulars share the same genes and do not have to 
compete with each other for reproduction. Willensdorfer (2008) indicates that the 
alleviation of reproductive competition allows for a division of labour because 
“cells can specialize on non-reproductive (somatic) tasks and peacefully die 
since their genes are passed on by genetically identical reproductive cells which 
benefited from the somatic functions”.  
 
In some cases a multicellular organism results from the aggregation of 
individually dwelling unicellulars (for example, true slime moulds, Ciliates and 
Myxobacteria). More generally, a multicellular organism develops when daughter 
cells cohere after cell division. A simple, temporary form of multicellular life is 
present in slime moulds. Here, genetically-different, individually-dwelling cells 
aggregate and bind using membrane proteins to form a colonial state in which 
the cells intercellularly communicate by diffusion. At a certain moment, 
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obligatory interactions between cells lead to the formation of irreversible cell 
differentiation producing a reproductive structure. During this state, the slime 
mould cells are temporarily a multicellular organism. 
 
With the evolutionary development of plasma connections, advanced 
multicellular life became possible. Plasma connections allow efficient and rapid 
intercellular communication, involving electrical signals, chemical signals and 
nutrient transport (Mackie et al. 1984, Peracchia and Benos, 2000, Nicholson, 
2003, Panchin, 2005). Plasma connections have evolved in several lineages of 
multicellulars. Plasma connections between animal cells depend on gap 
junctions, between plant cells on plasmodesmata, in blue-green algae on 
microdesmata, and in certain fungi or in developing insect eggs on incomplete 
cell walls. The evolution of gap junctions some 700 million years ago coincided 
with an explosion of multicellular life forms.  
 
Multicellular organisms may go through life stages that are not multicellular. For 
example, sexual reproduction involves single-celled egg and semen. 
Furthermore, during the two-, four- and early eight-cell stages most vertebrate 
embryos have loosely attached cells without obligatory dependency. 
Accordingly, they represent a colony. When separated from the colony, the cells 
show a normal development. Early separation of embryonic cells is the reason 
why identical twins exist. Embryo cells in the early stages can even mix with 
another embryo‘s cells of the same age and develop into a normally functioning 
organism, called a chimera, in which some organs and tissues belong to a 
different genotype than others. A definition of life should, therefore, respect that 
an organism‘s cells may differ in genotype. From the late eight-cell stage, the 
development of gap-junctions marks the emergence of regulation as a unit, 
which makes the cellular colony a multicellular.  
 
The realisation of a multicellular‘s potential for maintenance depends on 
prevailing conditions. For example, a tree twig that is stuck in the ground may 
become a tree again if the weather is not too warm, too cold, or too dry, etc. and 
if the twig has the genetic potential for regeneration and is large enough, in good 
condition, etc.. Whether the twig is an organism depends on its potential to show 
all dynamics required for being a multicellular operator. This potential is in 
principle gene-based, but it depends on the condition of the phenotype and the 
environment for its realisation.  
 
Sometimes two multicellular organisms show symbiosis, such as plants living in 
close association with mycorrhiza fungi in their roots. As the fungus and the 
plant already are multicellular on forehand, a plant with mycorrhiza represents 
an interaction between two multicellular organisms.  
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d. The memon. Attempts to define life frequently focus on the typical properties 
of the first cell. The underlying assumption may be that all organisms consist of 
cells and that, for this reason, the definition of the living properties of cells will 
automatically cover other, more complex organisations. According to the 
operator hierarchy, this reasoning is incomplete because, with respect to 
artificial intelligence, it unsatisfactorily excludes technical life a priori. The reason 
is that the fundamental construction of the brain is not principally different when 
built from cellular neurons, technical neurons (small hardware acting as a 
neuron) or programmed neurons (virtual devices modelled to act as neurons). 
Even though all organisms on earth currently consist of cells or show neural 
networks that consist of cells, the fact that technical memons may, one day, 
have a brain structure similar to cellular memons implies that a general definition 
of life must consider the possibility of technical memons.  
 
Memons show a neuron network and a sensory interface. The basic neuron-
units have been named categorizing and learning modules or CALMs and allow 
for a recurrent network of CALMs (Murre, Phaf and Wolters 1992, Happel 1997). 
The interface includes sensors that allow the memon to perceive its body and 
environment, and effectors that allow it to move the cellular vehicle it resides in. 
The interface and vehicle co-evolved during the evolution of neural networks. In 
principle, it is possible to construct a functional memon from any kind of 
technical hardware that provides the required neural architecture. This is the 
reason that the study of neural networks in biology shows a fundamental overlap 
with research on technical artificial intelligence. The recognition that memons 
show a recurrent network of CALMs surrounded by an interface allows Siamese 
twins with separate brains to be classified as two memons sharing the same 
vehicle and showing in this vehicle a partial overlap of their interfaces. 
No life, no reproduction 
According to some authors (e.g. the Von Neumann & Burks, 1966) reproduction 
is a pre-requisite for life. Like the chicken and the egg problem, it can also be 
said that life is a pre-requisite for reproduction. Clearly, any decision on this 
matter critically depends on the context that is used to define life. If the operator 
hierarchy is used, the least complex life form is the prokaryotic cellular operator. 
Two arguments currently suggest that life is a pre-requisite for reproduction. The 
first states that even though all other organisms originate from the first cell by 
reproduction, the first cell itself had an inorganic origin. The emergence of the 
first cell thus shows that life does not obligatorily result from reproduction. The 
second argument posits that organisms do not need to show reproduction, i.e., 
producing offspring, to comply with the operator-based definition of life; the 
operator-based definition demands that organisms show two closures: 
autocatalysis and a membrane. Autocatalysis can be regarded as reproduction 
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without creating offspring. As Jagers op Akkerhuis (2001) pointed out, 
autocatalysis implies that a cell autonomously creates a structural copy of its 
information, a process that is called ‘structural (auto-) copying of information’. 
Before answering the question of whether the structural (auto-)copying of the 
cell‘s information means that it must reproduce, it is important to detail the 
concept of information. For the latter, I suggest applying Checkland and Scholes 
(1990) definition of information to the autocatalytic set. These authors have 
defined information as data with a meaning in a context. In line with this 
reasoning, Kauffman (1993) proposed that, by selecting the autocatalytic 
process as the context, every catalytic molecule becomes a data-unit with a 
catalytic meaning (the ‘purpose’ mentioned by Kauffman 1993, p.388) and 
represents a part of the information of the autocatalytic process. Following one 
round of autocatalysis, or more rounds to account for the loss of enzymes over 
time, the cell contains copies of all of its information. At that moment, it has 
autonomously performed structural copying of information and fulfils all the 
requirements of the operator hierarchy, even when it does not produce an 
offspring. Based on this reasoning, the capacity of autocatalytic maintenance is 
an obligatory requirement for cellular life and reproduction is a possible 
consequence.  
 
The above implies that it is not relevant for a general definition of life to 
distinguish between life forms with or without replication, as Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 
(2004) has suggested. The latter authors distinguish ‘proto-life stages’ that do 
not show a phenotype-genotype decoupling (soma with genes) from ‘real life’ 
with genes. In line with the operator hierarchy based definitions, Morales (1998) 
warns that “if reproduction is required: This is a troubling development, because 
it means that we could not tell whether something is alive unless we also know 
that it is the product of Darwinian evolution.” The operator-based definition 
considers life as a prerequisite for reproduction instead of reproduction as a 
prerequisite for life. Consequently, worker bees, mules, infertile individuals and 
other non-reproducing organisms and/or phenotypes are life. This point of view 
also solves problems that may arise when demanding that memons be able to 
reproduce as a prerequisite for recognising them as life forms. In fact, none of 
the cellular memons living today shows reproduction, at least not reproduction of 
their neural network structure determining their closure. The things they pass on 
during reproduction are the genes of their cells, allowing the development of a 
multicellular organism with a neural network, capable of learning but devoid of 
inherited neural information other than reflexes. 
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Life holding its breath 
The above chapter shows that reproduction is not a prerequisite of life but a 
possible consequence of it. Going one step further, it can also be concluded that 
metabolism is not a prerequisite for life. Many taxa such as bacteria, protozoa, 
plants, invertebrates and vertebrates have developmental stages showing 
natural inactivity (seeds, spores) or reversible inactivation when submitted to 
desiccation, frost, oxygen depletion, etc. The inactive state carries the name of 
anabiosis, after the process of coming to life again (for a review of ‘viable 
lifelessness’ concepts, see Keilin 1959). Another type of reversible inactivity 
showing marked similarity with anabiosis is the state of neural inactivity in 
memons following anaesthesia. An aesthetic that blocks the transmission of 
signals between neurons while leaving the remaining metabolic activity of the 
neurons intact causes a reversible absence of neural activity that corresponds to 
an anabiotic state of the memon. 
 
Even in the early days of the biological sciences, scholars discussed whether 
dried or frozen anabiotic stages are alive at a very slow pace, or whether they 
are truly static states of matter. In 1860, the famous Société de Biologie in Paris 
wrote a lengthy report on this subject (Broca 1860-1861). Quite importantly, this 
report concluded that the potential to revive an anabiotic stage is an inherent 
aspect of the organisation of the material of which the object consists and that it 
is equally persistent as the molecular state of the matter forming the system. In 
short, the Société de Biologie found that “la vie, c’est l’organisation en action”. 
Additional support for this conclusion came from Becquerel (1950, 1951) who 
subjected anabiotic stages to a temperature 0.01 degree above absolute zero, a 
temperature at which no chemical processes can occur, even not very slowly. 
Becquerel demonstrated that structure alone is enough to allow revival at normal 
temperatures. Anabiosis from absolute zero or complete desiccation has led to 
the conclusion that “The concept of life as applied to an organism in the state of 
anabiosis (cryptobiosis) becomes synonymous with that of the structure, which 
supports all the components of its catalytic systems” (Keilin 1959), or that “life is 
a property of matter in a certain structure” (Jeuken 1975). With respect to the 
question of: ‘what certain structure?’ the operator hierarchy suggests that all 
operators with a complexity similar to or higher than the cell answer this 
question.  
Life as we do not know it 
Considerations about “life as we do not know it” depend on assumptions. As a 
context for such assumptions, the operator hierarchy offers two advantages. 
First, the operator hierarchy has its basis in the general principle of first-next 
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possible closure. Second, the rigid internal structure of the operator hierarchy 
offers a unique guide for assumptions about life that we do not yet know.  
 
Based on the general principle of first-next possible closure, the operator 
hierarchy shows a strict sequential ranking of the operators. Assuming that 
closures act as an absolute constraint on all operator construction, the operator 
hierarchy then has universal validity. Support for the latter assumption comes 
from the observation that, as far as we know, all operators with a complexity that 
is equal to or lower than the molecules seem to have a universal existence. If 
this universality extends to the biotic operators, the material organisation of 
higher-level operators, such as cells and memons, may then possibly be found 
in the entire universe. Such universality would significantly assist in the search 
for exobiotic life forms because alien life may show similar organisation to the 
life we do know, at least with respect to the first-next possible closures involved. 
The demand of closure still leaves a good deal of freedom for the physical 
realisation of operators. On other planets, different molecular processes may 
form the basis of the autocatalysis and interface of the first cells. Similarly, the 
operator hierarchy poses no limits to the actual shape, color, weight, etc. of 
exobiotic multicellular organisms. Furthermore, even though the presence of 
neural networks may be required for memic organisation throughout the 
universe, the operator hierarchy does not restrict the kind of elements producing 
these networks, or the details of the neural network structure other than 
demanding hypercyclicity and interface.  
 
The rigid internal structure of the operator hierarchy allows predictions about the 
construction of life forms that have not yet evolved on Earth. Of course, any 
discussion of this subject involves speculation, but the operator hierarchy may 
well offer a unique starting point for such a discussion. In an earlier publication 
(Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001), I have indicated various future operator types with 
a higher complexity than the cellular hardwired memon. To minimise the aspect 
of speculation, I would like to discuss here only the memon immediately above 
the cellular hardwired memon (see fig. 5.1), the so-called ‘softwired memon’. 
According to the operator hierarchy, this type of memon should be able to copy 
information structurally. This means that the organism should be able to copy all 
of its information by copying the structure of its neural network. At a lower level 
in the hierarchy, cells do this by copying their genetic molecules. Softwired 
memons can also do this. They are based on a virtual neural network that 
resides in computer memory arrays. During their operation softwired memons 
continuously track all their neurons, neural connections, connection strengths 
and interactions with the interface. It is therefore only a small step for softwired 
memons to read and reproduce all the knowledge in their neural network by 
copying these arrays. On these grounds, it may be deduced that softwired 
memons (or still higher complexity memons) form the easiest way to satisfy the 
demands of the operator hierarchy for the autonomous, structural copying of 
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information. The operator hierarchy suggests therefore that life as we do not 
know it will take the shape of technical memons.  
 
The above reasoning shows that the operator hierarchy offers clear criteria with 
respect to different forms of ‘artificial life’. The acceptance of an artificial entity as 
life is only possible when it shows all of the required properties of an operator. 
Referring to the difference between strong artificial life and weak artificial life, 
which do and do not consider a-life entities as genuine life, respectively, it would 
be fully in line with the present reasoning to consider as genuine life all a-life 
entities that fulfil the requirements for being an operator.  
On life and death 
Given the present focus on states of matter, it is quite simple to define dead 
matter as: all operators that do not fit the general definition of life. It is more 
difficult, however, to define death.  
 
Given the current point of view, death represents a state in which an organism 
has lost its closure. The use of closure in this definition helps prevent that “…. 
the properties of an organism as a whole [would be confused] with the properties 
of the parts that constitute it” (Morales 1998). However, organisms also loose 
their closure during transitions that are part of life cycles and that are not 
associated with the organism’s death. For example, the closure of the organism 
is lost and a new closure gained when the zygote exchanges its unicellular 
organisation for the multicellular state of the embryo and when the multicellular 
embryo develops to a memic state. Is it possible to specify the loss of closure 
during death in a way that excludes closure losses during life cycles? 
 
With respect to the above question of how to exclude the loss of closure during 
transitions in life cycles when defining death, the general process of 
deterioration offers a solution. During their lives, organisms deteriorate because 
of injury and ageing. The loss of closure marking death is always associated 
with the organism‘s irreversible deterioration. Demanding irreversible 
deterioration, therefore, helps to prevent that one would be tempted to consider, 
for example, a caterpillar as having died, when its tissues are reorganised during 
the transition via the pupae to a butterfly. Accordingly, it is possible to describe 
death as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following 
irreversible deterioration of its organisation.  
 
Using the above definition, death may occur in either an early or late phase of 
the deterioration process, and following the death of multicellulars, a short or 
long period may pass until the organism‘s body parts become dead matter. The 
latter has its cause in the hierarchical construction of multicellular organisms. 
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Accordingly, the loss of the highest closure implies a classification of the 
remaining body as an operator showing the first-next lower closure. 
 
Death depends on the loss of closure. To illustrate the contribution of this 
statement to the analysis of death, the death of a memon can be used. Due to 
the memon‘s strongly integrated organisation, death may occur at various levels 
that affect other levels. For example, the multicellular regulation may be the first 
to collapse due to the loss of liver functions. After a certain period, this will cause 
failure of neural functioning, the latter marking the memon‘s death In another 
situation, the neural functions may be lost first, and the memon is the first to die, 
dragging its body with it in its fall. However, sometimes enough neural activity 
may remain for a vegetative functioning of the memon‘s body as a multicellular 
unit. The vegetative state cannot maintain itself autonomously (in principle, a 
requirement for a multicellular organism) but it may continue given the right 
medical care. If this care is withdrawn, the multicellular body will start 
deteriorating after which the cells in the organs and tissues will start dying at 
different rates. At a certain point, the multicellular closure is lost, and separately 
surviving cells have become the next level operators to die. Physiological 
differences between cells now determine the period during which they can 
survive in the increasingly hostile habitat of the dead memon, which is cooling 
below the normal operating temperature of cells and which shows many adverse 
chemical changes such as the lowering of oxygen levels, the release of decay 
products of dead cells, etc. Shortly after the memon‘s death, it is possible to take 
intact body-parts, organs and cells from its body and sustain their functioning 
following transplantation to a favourable environment. For example, the offspring 
of cells from the cervix of Henrietta Lane are still cultured as He La cells in many 
laboratories. 
The inutility of property lists 
The above arguments and examples have explored the possibilities of using the 
operator hierarchy for creating coherent definitions of life, the organism, living 
and death. However, how should the outcome be evaluated? Have the present 
attempts led to definitions that could be generally accepted in the field? A way of 
evaluating this that has become rather popular is to check the results against 
lists of preset criteria. Those who want to evaluate the present approach in this 
way may want to examine the following lists of criteria.  
 
Morales (1998) has published a list of properties for a definition of life that 
includes the following criteria: 1. Sufficiency (Does the definition separate living 
entities from non-living ones?), 2. Common usage (simple classification of easy 
examples), 3. Extensibility (Does the definition deal with difficult cases, such as 
viruses, mules, fire, Gaia, extraterrestrial life and robots?), 4. Simplicity (few ifs, 
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buts, ands, etc.) and 5. Objectivity (Criteria are so simple that everyone applies 
them with the same result). Emmeche (1997) offers another criteria list for a 
definition of life that includes the following: 1. The definition should be general 
enough to encompass all possible life forms. (The definition should not only 
focus on life as we know it.), 2. It should be coherent with measured facts about 
life, (It should not oppose obvious facts.), 3. It should have a conceptual 
organising elegance. (It can organise a large part of the field of knowledge within 
biology and crystallise our experience with living systems into a clear structure, a 
kind of schematic representation that summarizes and gives further structure to 
the field.), 4. The definition should be specific enough to distinguish life from 
obviously non-living systems. Emmeche (1997) furthermore states that a 
definition “should cover the fundamental, general properties of life in the 
scientific sense”. Korzeniewski (2005) has also proposed a list of criteria for a 
cybernetic definition of life, and Poundstone (1984) has extracted further criteria 
for life from the work of von Neumann & Burks (1966). Oliver and Perry (2006) 
have suggested a list more or less similar to that of Emmeche (1997) focusing 
specifically on properties of a good definition. 
 
With respect to the use of criteria lists, I agree with other authors (Maturana and 
Varela 1980, van der Steen 1997) that it is not necessarily an advantage if a 
theory performs well or a disadvantage if a theory performs poorly according to a 
list of criteria; an approach‘s value does not necessarily correspond to its 
performance in these types of checklists. The match depends on the similarity in 
major goals and paradigms and the creator‘s influence on the selection and 
definition of criteria in a given list. In addition, the selection of ‘favourable’ lists 
can lead to false positives. 
 
For the above reasons, I am convinced that it is only possible to evaluate the 
currently proposed definitions ‘the hard way’, i.e., by critically examining the 
internal consistency and transparency of their logic. In this respect, the present 
approach has the advantage of a fundamental bottom-up construction. It starts 
with defining elementary building blocks, the operators, and their hierarchical 
ranking in the operator hierarchy. To recognise and rank the operators, the 
operator hierarchy uses first-next possible closures. In the resulting hierarchy, 
the definition of every higher-level operator depends, in an iterative way, on a 
lower-level ‘ancestor’ until a lowest-level ancestral system is reached, which is 
presumably the group of elementary particles that according to the superstring 
theory may have a common basic structure. The result is a strict, coherent and 
general framework that is open to falsification: the operator hierarchy. 
Subsequently, the operator hierarchy offers a fundament to define a range of 
secondary phenomena, such as life, the organism, living and death. Because of 
the reference to the operator hierarchy, the present definitions are short, logical 
statements that show a high specificity with respect to whether a certain entity 
satisfies the definition (list of examples in the following paragraph).  
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Testing the definition of life 
When using the operator hierarchy as a context for a definition, it is easy to 
conclude that viruses, prions, memes or replicating computer programs are not 
forms of live. Both a virus with a surrounding mantle and a viral strand of DNA or 
RNA are not operators, thus not life. Prions are molecules, thus not life. Memes, 
such as texts and melodies, are pieces of coding that memons can decode and 
replicate (Dawkins 1976). Accordingly, memes are not operators, thus not life. 
Ray (1991) has created computer programs that can replicate themselves onto 
free computer space, show mutation, and modify and compete for the available 
space in a virtual world called Tierra. Since its start, this virtual ‘ecosystem’ has 
seen the evolution of a range of different computer programs. In the same way 
as molecular viruses depend on cells, the programs in Tierra depend on a 
computer to copy and track their structure. Accordingly, they are not operators, 
thus not life. Sims (1994) has used genetic algorithms for evolving virtual 
computer creatures with body parts and a neural network with interface. The 
simulation of these animal-models allows virtual movement such as finding and 
grasping virtual food items. Sims’s programmed creatures may possess 
hypercyclic neural networks and on these grounds show similarity to softwired 
memons. According to the operator hierarchy, a softwired memon should 
autonomously be able to copy its information structurally. Although I am not an 
expert in this field, it seems to me that Sims’s organisms do not themselves 
keep track of their arrays with information about their interface and neurons, 
neural connections, and connection strengths, and that they do not 
autonomously organise their maintenance. Assuming that the latter 
interpretations are correct, Sims’s computer animals are not yet life. 
 
The use of the present definition also allows the effortless rejection of other 
systems that are not operators and sometimes receive the predicate of 
‘borderline situations’, such as flames, whirlwinds, crystals, cars, etc. Technical, 
computer based memons, however, such as robots, can be operators when they 
show the required structure. 
 
To summarise the practical applicability of the present definition of life, I include 
a list of the examples that were discussed in the text and supplement them with 
some additional cases. The examples in this list form three groups depending on 
whether the entities involved are operators or not, and whether they show a 
complexity that equals or exceeds that of the cellular operator. In the text below I 
use the concept of ‘interaction system’ (e.g. Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2008) for all 
systems that are not operators because the interactions of their parts do not 
create a first-next possible, new, closure type.  
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Group A. Systems that are not life because they are not an operator 
1. An entire virus particle with external envelope (represents a simple 
interaction system) 
2. A computer virus based on strings of computer code 
3. A flame 
4. A tornado 
5. A crystal 
6. A car 
7. A bee colony (The colony is an interaction system, and the bees are 
organisms.) 
8. A cellular colony not showing the requirements of multicellularity (The 
individual cells are organisms and thus represent life.) 
9. A colony of physically connected cellular memons (as long as the 
individuals lack the required memic closure) 
10. A robot (as long as it is a non-memic technical machine) 
11. Computer simulations of organisms (including memons) that depend on 
external ‘orchestration’ 
12. A cutting/slip of a plant that cannot potentially show autonomous 
maintenance given the right conditions (It lacks the closure required for 
multicellularity.) 
13. A separate organ, such as a liver or leg (not potentially capable of 
autonomous maintenance) 
14. Endobiontic bacteria having lost genes that are obligatory for autonomous 
maintenance. The transfer to the genome of the host of DNA coding for 
enzymes required in autonomous maintenance implies a partitioning of the 
autocatalytic closure between the endobiont and its host. Because of this, 
the endobiont is no longer an autonomous organism but has become a 
special kind of organelle. 
 
Group B. Systems that are operators but that are not life because their 
complexity is lower than that of the cellular operator  
1. A prion 
2. Self-replicating DNA/RNA particles (catalyse their own copying in a solution 
containing the right building materials) 
3. A DNA or RNA string of a virus that is copied in a cell 
 
Group C. Operators representing life 
1. A cutting/slip or other plant part that can potentially maintain itself given 
favourable environmental conditions 
2. Anabiotic organisms (The fact that they are dried, frozen, etc. does not take 
their required closure away.) 
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3. Fully anaesthetised animal supported in its functioning by a mechanical 
heart-lung support and showing no neural activity (This can be regarded as a 
form of memic anabiosis with the potency to become active again.) 
4. A computer memon or other technical memon (a memic robot) 
5. An artificial cellular operator constructed by humans  
6. A exobiotic cellular operator with another chemistry than that found on earth 
7. Sterile or otherwise non-reproducing organism (e.g. a mule, worker bee, 
sterile individuals) 
8. Endoparasites or endosymbiontic unicellular organisms living in cells and still 
possessing the full potential of autocatalysis 
In conclusion 
1.  Overviews of the definitions of life from the last 150 years show that no 
consensus definition on life exists. In the light of the continuous failure to 
reach consensus on this subject, certain scientists have adopted a practical 
viewpoint, accepting, for example, the use of property checklists for 
identifying living systems. Others have advocated that the need for a 
generally accepted definition remains acute. Amongst the proposals for 
solving the problem is the suggestion to construct a broader context, a 
‘theory of life’ before continuing with attempts to define of life. 
2.  Inspired by the latter suggestion, the present paper invokes a classification of 
the generalised particle concept, called the ‘operator hierarchy’. This 
hierarchy has several advantages for defining life: first, it offers a general 
context for including and differentiating between life and non-life, and second, 
it offers the unique possibility to extrapolate existing trends in the evolution of 
material complexity and to use these as a guide for discussions about ‘life as 
we do not know it’. 
3.  In close association with the reviewed literature, the use of the operator 
hierarchy allowed the following definitions to be suggested: 
A. From the viewpoint of the evolution of material complexity, life is: matter 
with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity 
equal to or even higher than the cellular operator.  
B. Living describes the dynamics of an operator that satisfies the definition 
of life.  
C. The definition of unitary organisms can take the form of: the operators 
that fit the definition of life.  
D. A multicellular organism (the cellular operator showing the multi-state) 
is: a construction of mutually adhering cells showing obligatorily 
recurrent interactions based on the same interaction type, that has the 
potential of maintaining its functioning as a unit and that does not show 
memic structure 
E. Dead matter applies to all operators that do not fit the definition of life.  
142 Chapter 5 
 
F. Death is: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following 
irreversible deterioration of its organisation. 
4.  From the discussion of examples in the literature, it was concluded that the 
present set of definitions easily distinguishes life and non-life regardless of 
whether this is tested using the ‘obvious examples’, the ‘borderline cases’ or 
‘life as we do not know it’. This suggests that the present approach may well 
offer a practical step forward on the path towards a consensus definition for 
the states of matter representing ‘life’.  
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The issue of ‘closure’ in Jagers op Akkerhuis's operator 
theory 
Comments by Nico van Straalen 
In this issue of Foundations of Science Jagers op Akkerhuis (2010a) proposes a 
definition of life based on his earlier theory of operators. A great variety of 
objects fall into the category of operator, and by introducing this term Jagers op 
Akkerhuis was able to draw a parallel between elementary particles, molecules, 
cells and multicellular organisms. The common denominator of these operators 
is their autonomous activity and maintenance of a specific structure. 
Consequently, operators were classified in a logical and hierarchical system 
which emphasizes the commonalities across what is normally called non-life 
(atoms, molecules) and life (cells, organisms). One very attractive aspect of the 
classification is that it joins the objects traditionally studied by physicists, 
chemists and biologists into one overarching system. Obviously, the hierarchy 
crosses the traditional border between life and non-life, so it should be possible 
to develop a definition of life from the operator theory. This is what Jagers op 
Akkerhuis attempts to do in the present paper. However, I believe he misses the 
point. 
 
In the operator hierarchy, successive levels of complexity are separated by 
‘closure events’, e.g. when going from hadrons to atoms, from molecules to cells 
and from multicellular eukaryotes to memic organisms. One of these closure 
events actually defines the origin of life: the transition from molecules to cells. 
Death, as defined by Jagers op Akkerhuis, is the loss of this closure, a fall-back 
from cells to molecules. There is another important transition, the origin of self 
consciousness, a closure event that accompanies the highest level of complexity 
in the classification of operators. Life with this level of complexity (maybe call it 
‘hyper-life’?) is included in Jagers op Akkerhuis's definition of life. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the operator system is that it is strictly hierarchical, 
that is, every operator can be classified on a more or less linear scale and the 
big leaps forward are punctuated by closures on that scale. This aspect of the 
system is reminiscent of the ‘Great Chain of Being’, or scala naturae, which was 
the dominating view of life for many centuries. In evolutionary biology, it is now 
recognised that pathways can split and run in parallel, maybe even achieving 
similar closures independently from each other. I am not sure how this aspect 
fits into the operator classification of Jagers op Akkerhuis. 
 
To define life in terms of the operator theory I believe the focus should be on the 
transition from molecules to cells and the closure aspects of this event. In other 
words, the closure of operating systems defines life better than the classification 
of operators. However, Jagers op Akkerhuis seems to add another seemingly 
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hopeless definition of life to the nearly 100 already existing. Classifying what is 
life and what is not is, I believe, a rather trivial exercise. Everybody knows that a 
flame is not life, and it only becomes a problem when you spend too many 
words on it. Rather than classifying things into living and non-living entities I 
believe the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life can 
take place, that is the how the closure in Jagers op Akkerhuis's hierarchical 
classification of operators, comes about. 
 
The issue of closure is intimately linked to that of emergence. Both concepts 
recognise that the characteristic properties of a living system cannot be reduced 
to its component parts only, but also depend on the way in which the 
components are organised in a network. The properties that arise from 
interactions between components are said to be ‘emergent’. Emergent 
properties are not shared by the components; they ‘appear’ when many 
components start interacting in a sufficiently complex way. 
 
The concept of emergence plays an important role in genomics, the science that 
studies the structure and function of a genome (Van Straalen & Roelofs, 2006). 
After about a decade of genome sequencing, scientists started to realise that the 
genome sequence itself does not define the organism. The human genome 
turned out to contain no more than 24.000 genes, much less than the earlier 
assumed 124.000. This raised the question how it could be possible that such a 
complicated organism as a human being could be built with so few genes. 
Obviously the pattern of gene and protein interaction defines human nature 
much more than the genes and proteins themselves. A new branch of biology 
was defined, systems biology, which was specifically geared towards the 
analysis of interacting networks, using mathematical models (Ideker et al., 
2000). 
 
Schrödinger (1944), in discussing the question ‘What is life?’ foresaw a new 
principle, not alien to physics, but based on physical laws, or a new type of 
physical laws, prevailing inside the organism. These are the kind of laws that 
systems biology is after. The operator classification of Jagers op Akkerhuis is an 
important step because it emphasizes the continuity between physical systems 
and biological systems. However, the challenge of defining life is not in 
classification but in understanding the closure phenomenon by which life 
emerged from non-life. 
 
 On life and death 145 
 
Definitions of life are not only unnecessary, but they can do 
harm to understanding 
Comments by Rob Hengeveld 
In his paper, Jagers op Akkerhuis (this volume) refers to a list of almost 100 
different definitions subsequently having been given in the literature to the 
phenomenon of life as we know it. These definitions may even have a more 
general application or meaning than that concerning life on earth only. That is, 
also to some form of life as we don’t know it, even though we don’t know it. Like 
other authors, he feels that all this activity messed things up. Thus, Jagers op 
Akkerhuis mentions authors emphasising “the seeming hopelessness of the 
situation”, some of them adopting “a pragmatic/pessimistic viewpoint”. Others 
would have suggested “that life cannot be defined, that its definition is not 
important for biology”, or that “a comprehensive definition of life is too general 
and of little scientific use”. Finally, only “living processes may be defined” which 
“cannot be reduced to physics”.  
 
His theory based on the criterion of hierarchically arranged operators would tidy 
up this mess a little. I feel, though, that the introduction of his own definition “life 
may be regarded as a special realisation of the evolution of material complexity” 
brings the 98 existing definitions even closer to 100. Worse, this theory and 
definition will confuse our biological issues even more by their circularity of 
reasoning. They are circular because his operator concept “emphasizes the 
autonomous activity of the entities involved, which ‘operate’ in a given 
environment without losing their individual organisation”. How do we distinguish 
the autonomy of processes in early living systems or even in present-day 
molecular biological ones from those of non-living processes? Also, activity, 
operation, and organisation are concepts connected with living systems and 
their functioning. Furthermore, individual organisation smells of one of the 
criteria on which some earlier definitions have been based. Thus, recognising 
something as living depends on criteria derived from known, recent living 
systems; a bean is a bean because it is bean-shaped. 
 
When, as a beginning ecologist, I was studying ground beetles, and later as a 
biogeographer, I never felt any need for a definition of life. Then, such a 
definition was clearly useless. More recently, being concerned with questions 
about the origin of life, that is concerned with processes ultimately having 
resulted in a beetle as a living system, I came to realise that most, if not all, of 
these definitions were designed particularly within this context of the origination 
of living systems. However, we don’t need to define the moon to understand its 
origin either. Yet, they not only seem useless, they are even harmful. Adopting 
certain criteria on which to base the one or the other definition, authors easily 
force themselves to look into the wrong direction. Or even at the wrong 
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biogenetic phase, too late in the development of life. For example, not only is 
‘organisation’ difficult to delineate objectively at a molecular level, and this 
without circularity, but depending on a subjectively chosen threshold level, it 
easily excludes initial phases from analysis, however significant these could 
have been. Continuing along such a misdirected road is fruitless. 
 
Thus, the criteria used, such as a certain level of organisation, are always 
derived from present-day life forms, from processes or structures that may not 
have existed in the early biogenetic phases. One criterion, as one of many 
examples, points at macromolecules, although these will have developed from 
earlier oligomers (see, for a clear example, Eck and Dayhoff, 1966). Another, 
widely applied criterion derives from the present prevalence of carbon as a 
principal biochemical constituent. Yet, carbon forms very stable molecules, as 
do its neighbours in the Periodic table, nitrogen and oxygen, for example. They 
are difficult both to form as well as to break down again, which is therefore 
usually done by enzymes. These enzymes, plus the enzymatic apparatus they 
together form, must have developed earlier, before carbon could have been 
taken on board biochemically (see Hengeveld and Fedonkin, 2007). Moreover, 
in their turn, individual enzymes are often very complex macromolecules, which 
not only must have been derived evolutionarily from more primitive ones, but 
they have to be formed by and operate within an intricate biochemical apparatus 
in which DNA is pivotal. Yet, DNA itself requires the operation of a very complex 
system of repair enzymes, etc., plus the mediation of spliceosomes and 
ribosomes for the final construction of those enzymatic macromolecules. Clearly, 
carbon as an element must have been inserted into the biochemistry only at a 
later, evolutionarily more highly developed stage of biogenesis. 
 
Personally, I prefer to abstain from using definitions in this context. This differs 
from asking what requirement is needed to form a molecular bond, of a system 
of molecules, etc., any form of organisation, biological or non-biological. This 
puts the problem within the thermodynamic realm. A basic requirement, one that 
can be met by several properties, therefore differs from a property, physical, 
chemical, biological, or socio-economic; instead, it defines both the process and 
the shape of molecules taking part in it (Hengeveld, 2007). It defines the 
properties. It’s the resulting processes happening and developing which are of 
interest, for the understanding of which a definition of life is irrelevant. It does not 
add anything. 
 
Formulating the study of biogenesis in terms of processes happening and 
developing precludes the design of definitions, which are more likely to be 
applied to static or stable situations. And which are, already for that reason only, 
to be shunned. Defining life is not a part of our scientific endeavour. 
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Explaining the origin of life is not enough for a definition of 
life 
Reaction of Gerard Jagers op Akkerhuis to the comments and questions of 
Rob Hengeveld and Nico van Straalen. 
I thank the commentators for their reactions, both positive and negative, giving 
me the opportunity to elucidate some important aspects of the presented theory.  
 
As Van Straalen indicates, the operator hierarchy offers valuable innovations: Firstly, 
the hierarchy ‘… joins the objects traditionally studied by physicists, chemists and 
biologists into one overarching system.’ Secondly, ‘...it is strictly hierarchical’. I think 
that precisely these two aspects make the operator hierarchy a unique tool for 
defining life in a way that simultaneously addresses all the different organisational 
levels of living entities, e.g. prokaryotic cells, eukaryotic cells, pro- and eukaryotic 
multicellulars and neural network organisms, including future ones based on 
technical neural networks.  
 
Further reactions of the commentators indicate that, probably due to the novelty of 
the operator theory, certain aspects require further explanation. I will discuss some 
essentialities in the following lines. 
 
Hengeveld criticizes an asserted circularity in reasoning, in the sense that living 
operators are defined by means of concepts, which are derived from living systems. 
The confusion on this point results from my explanation in the paper. There I 
indicate that the name operator originates from the operating (in a very general 
sense) of individual entities. It may be reassuring to Hengeveld that the origin of the 
name ‘operator’ shows no direct relationship with the definition of the operators as 
system types. The entire set of all operators is defined as follows: based on the 
presumed existence of a lowest complexity operator, every system that belongs to 
the operator hierarchy resides at exactly one higher closure level than its preceding-
level operator. Every closure level is defined by the occurrence of one or two first-
next possible closures. Although this is a recursive definition in the sense that every 
operator in principle depends on its preceding-level operator, its hierarchical 
architecture precludes circularity of reasoning. 
 
Hengeveld furthermore states in a general way that definitions of life ‘are always 
derived from present day life forms, from processes or structures that may not have 
existed in the early biogenetic phase’. This general criticism does not apply to the 
operator hierarchy. The reason is that both abiotic and biotic operators are all 
defined using first-next possible closure. In fact, the operator theory turns the 
argumentation of Hengeveld upside down, hypothesising that limited possibilities for 
reaching first-next possible closure have acted as a blue-print for the essential 
construction properties we recognise in abiotic elements and organisms. 
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I agree wholeheartedly with both Hengeveld’s and Van Straalen’s argumentation 
that we need to increase our understanding of the processes that have caused 
life. I strongly support the search for bootstrapping mechanisms allowing simple 
system states/elements to autonomously create more complex system 
states/elements (e.g. Conrad 1982, Martin & Russell, 2003, Hengeveld, 2007). 
In fact, every closure step in the operator hierarchy is the product of a specific 
(the first-next possible) bootstrapping mechanism. With respect to specifying the 
closure types resulting from such bootstrapping mechanisms, I consider concise 
and general definitions as indispensible tools, being helpful (instead of harmful!) 
in our search for the essences of the evolution of matter. Thus when Hengeveld 
advocates that he prefers ’… to abstain from using definitions in this context.’ I 
find his viewpoint surprising for two reasons. The first reason is that even a very 
thorough understanding of specific reaction mechanisms will not automatically 
result in a general definition of a meta-aspect such as the type of material 
organisation defining living entities. The second reason is that I think that 
accurate definitions are simply a way to improve the precision and 
communication of science: sloppy definitions lead to the development of sloppy 
theory and a lack of definitions leads to no science at all. 
 
Referring to a demand for a mechanistic focus when defining life, Van Straalen 
states that ‘the challenge is to understand how the transition from non-life to life 
can take place’ as this can explain how the classification of operators comes 
about. Also in his last sentence Van Straalen writes that ‘…, the challenge of 
defining life is not in classification but in understanding the closure phenomenon 
by which life emerged from non-life’. Both statements being true, it is 
nevertheless impossible to construct an overarching theory such as the operator 
hierarchy if one limits his view to the mechanisms explaining one single step 
involved.  
 
The warm interest of Hengeveld and Van Straalen for mechanisms that could 
explain the origin of life is understandable, because it frustrates the scientific 
community that science is not yet able to de novo synthesise life, not even in the 
form of a primitive cell. This general focus on the construction of life seems, 
however, to have caused a tunnel vision with respect the definition of life. 
Imagine that we would be able to explain the cell, and even construct it, would 
this then mean that we would have a proper definition of life in all its forms, 
including multicellular organisms and neural network organisms? The answer is 
a clear NO. If everything that is based on living cells would be life, then a donor 
organ and a fresh, raw steak would also be life. Moreover, any technical being, 
however intelligent, could never be called life, because it is not based on cells. 
This proves that a focus on cells alone is not enough. We need to broaden the 
scope and define all levels of organisation associated with higher forms of life. It 
is my personal conviction that, for the latter goal, the operator hierarchy offers a 
unique and unprecedented tool. 
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Using resource dominance to explain and 
predict evolutionary success 
“Without competitors there would be no need for strategy.”  
(Keniche Ohnae) 
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Abstract 
In this century, evolutionary biology has been successful in using fitness as a 
measure for evolutionary success. Although fitness has the intuitive association 
of "something which is better", a restricted definition in the form of "the number 
of successful offspring" is often used in biology. This definition is convenient 
because it is, in principle, easy to count offspring. Yet, the explanatory and 
predictive capacities of such fitness measurements are restricted and the 
method is restricted in its use to reproducing entities. 
 
To better understand traditional fitness measurements, we suggest that more 
attention be paid to underlying factors. For this purpose we advocate to focus on 
"resource dominance". The idea is that any unit of evolution which is good at 
dominating the resources needed for maintenance, growth and/or reproduction 
will also show a high evolutionary success. We show that high resource 
dominance can be reached via different strategies. Additionally, we discuss how 
the capacity for resource dominance is related to the complexity and efficiency 
of the evolving unit. 
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Introduction 
Ever since Darwin (Darwin 1859) and Wallace (Wallace 1855), evolution has 
been expressed as a struggle for life and survival of the fittest. Despite the 
general intuitive interpretation of a fit entity as being better in some respect, a 
more specific use of fitness has become generally accepted in biology (Frank 
1997, Gavrilets 1997, Fear and Price 1998). This states that the fitness of an 
entity is proportional to the number of successful offspring. Using this definition, 
fitness is a convenient measure for evolutionary success, because it is, in 
principle, straightforward to measure the number of offspring. However, there is 
little predictive power in such a concept of fitness, and it is left open when it may 
be judged that an offspring has been successful. Additionally, fitness in this 
definition cannot be used as a criterion for the evolutionary success of units 
during periods in which they do not reproduce. 
 
To improve on this situation we advocate the studying of the underlying factors 
which are responsible for the number and the quality of offspring. This, we claim, 
is done best by focusing on the capacity of organisms to gain dominance over 
resources, which we term their resource dominance. 
 
In this study we will discuss different aspects of resource dominance as the 
basis for evolutionary success. We will present several important resource 
dominance strategies and pay attention to the interaction between resource 
dominance and the complexity of the evolving unit. By focusing on resource 
dominance it will become apparent that knowledge of the life history and 
ecological strategies of the different entities is critical in understanding the 
evolutionary processes. 
 
To allow a broad covering of the resource use strategies and complexity of 
evolving units, we will apply the units of evolution approach. This has been used 
by several authors (Hamilton 1964, Lewontin 1970, Hull 1980) as a way to study 
evolution of units in relation to their position in the organisation of a system. 
Examples of such units and levels are the DNA in the cellular environment, 
mitochondria in the eukaryotic environment, endosymbiontic eukaryotes in other 
eukaryotes such as has been observed for example in the protist Peridinium 
balticum (Bardele 1997), individuals in populations, and groups of individuals, 
i.e. social insects in ecosystems. 
 
By focusing on resource dominance as a criterion for evolutionary success, the 
concept can be applied to entities which evolve their structure without showing 
reproduction, such as companies and evolving neural networks. Additionally, 
evolutionary processes in different entities can more easily be compared. 
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Figure 6.1. A dimensional comparison of resource space, resource dominance space, 
and fitness. The first part shows the space of all elements which, in principle, could act as 
a resource for evolving entities. The thick arrows in the second part show those parts of 
this space which are actually dominated by a particular evolving entity. The last part 
shows how the fitness of an entity as a measure for its evolutionary success can be 
obtained from resource dominance space via a fitness function. Note that the parameter 
reduction involved in obtaining fitness cannot be inverted to obtain information about the 
resource dominance strategies laying at the basis of fitness. 
 
Resource dominance 
The concept of resource dominance is based on the assumption that evolutionary 
success depends on the capacity to gain equal or larger dominance over limiting 
resources than competitors. Everything else being equal, a plant gaining access to 
the most light will grow fastest, and a small animal will lose more fights. 
 
The focus on resources in the present paper is based on the necessity for 
organisms to use resources for their proper functioning, which minimally requires 
their maintenance. Under more favourable conditions resources can be 
converted into more biomass, leading to growth and/or reproduction. 
Fundamental demands for the use of resources during all these processes stem 
from the out-of-equilibrium state of organisms as dissipative systems which only 
can maintain and/or increase their internal organisation at the costs of entropy 
increase in the surrounding environment (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). The 
recognition that demands are fundamental to organisms forms, for example, the 
core of the ‘supply-demand’-based models of Gutierrez (Gutierrez 1996, 
Schreiber and Gutierrez 1998). 
 
Attempting to define resources in accordance with the above, we propose the 
following definition: resources are all entities that organisms, alone or as a 
group, can use for their functioning. This definition allows much freedom. It 
includes both consumables, which are degraded when used, and what could be 
considered as durables, for which the use does not markedly affect the state. It 
 Getting the biggest part of the pie 153 
 
also includes the information, the ideas, communicated in social interactions as 
shown by people and some animals. 
 
As the second part of the resource dominance concept we have given 
preference to dominance over use, because the dominance by evolving units 
over resources may extend beyond the use. Examples of such dominance are 
allelopathy and territory. 
Quantification of resource dominance 
A measure for resource dominance of an individual or population has to be 
multidimensional with as many dimensions as there are different types of 
resources that play an essential role in the evolutionary success of the particular 
individual or population (Fig. 6.1). For each resource dimension the degree of 
dominance of the evolutionary unit has to be measured. The resulting measure 
can be compared with other evolutionary units that are competing for some or all 
aspects of the resource space. If two organisms compete for a common 
resource, for example space, their competitive ability may to a large extent 
depend on the access to non-overlapping, or ‘external’ resources. The more 
external resources can be used to increase their competitive ability, the higher 
their competitive capacity for any common resource will be. 
 
The evolutionary success of a unit can now be measured directly as the 
increase in the degree of dominance over the resource space, but it is 
convenient to reduce the multidimensional resource dominance space to the one 
dimensional measure of evolutionary success: fitness (Fig. 6.1). The 
understanding of the function that reduces the multidimensional resource 
dominance space into the one-dimensional fitness measure will give valuable 
information about the underlying evolutionary processes, i.e. how much does the 
dominance of a specific resource contribute to the evolutionary success of an 
evolutionary unit. 
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Figure 6.2. Different strategies for organisms and groups of organisms to increase their 
resource dominance. The physical size of the organism is shown as the inner, shaded 
circle. The outer, dotted circle represents the amount of dominated resources. 
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Resource dominance strategies 
When talking about resource dominance, the question can be asked which 
strategies evolving entities can follow to increase this property. Some strategies 
are summarised in Fig. 6.2. We have ranked the options roughly in order of 
simplicity. The examples allow increased dominance through: 1) internal re-
allocation, 2) larger size, 3) internal re-organisation and adaptation to new 
resources, 4) co-operative relationships, and 5) reproduction. 
 
The first strategy in Fig. 6.2 refers to an increase in resource dominance by a 
‘smarter’ or more aggressive strategy aiming at the same ‘tasks’, whilst the 
qualitative aspects of the internal organisation of the unit remain unchanged. 
This implies the reallocation of resources by means of phenotypic plasticity to 
expand certain existing internal/external processes. Examples of situations 
where this applies are internal reorganisation leading to induced production of 
an antibiotic chemical or to hormonal regulation of territorial aggression. 
 
The second strategy realises an increase in dominance simply by an increase in 
size. In competitive environments a plant that is twice the size of another plant 
may grow more than twice as fast (asymmetric competition, Weiner 1990). 
Bigger animals win more fights. Larger brains, of the same quality, have a larger 
thinking capacity. Yet, size poses also evolutionary limits. The size of organisms 
puts increasing limits on internal transportation and large animals have to deal 
with small surface-to-volume ratios, with many consequences for physiology, 
food intake and mobility. 
 
The third strategy is based on innovation, with which we refer to the gaining of 
access to new resources. This requires the incidental or deliberate development 
of new internal organisation. Examples of innovative events during evolution are 
the shift in metabolism that certain bacteria have shown from anoxybiontic 
organotrophs to phototrophs, the shift from multicellular life to neural networks, 
which allowed the emergence of co-ordinated mobility based on sensory inputs, 
and the shift from aquatic to terrestrial life forms. The first organisms possessing the 
above properties got access to a massive resource of sunlight to ‘fuel’ their 
chemistry, a much better escape or predation behaviour and the capacity to learn 
from experiences, and a large space for invasion with little competition, respectively. 
 
The fourth strategy involves co-operation. It includes all situations in which any 
form of living together leads to an overall gain in resource dominance. The 
evolutionary success of such co-operations is convincing (Herre et al. 1999). 
Most markedly, this is illustrated by the presence of mitochondria in the cells of 
fungi and animals, and the presence of mitochondria and chloroplasts in the 
algae and the plants (Blackstone 1995). That mitochondria and chloroplasts are 
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symbiotic cells and not just organelles was first proposed by Margulis (1979) in 
the form of the ‘endosymbiont hypothesis’, which is now generally accepted. In 
addition to endosymbiontic symbiosis, there exist many other forms of co-
operation between cells and/or organisms which are important in evolution 
(Margulis 1998, Michod 1999). These include symbionts dwelling in multicellular 
organisms, colonies of physically linked individuals such as in some corals, and 
colonies and other forms of symbiosis of freely moving individuals of the same or 
of different species. Behavioural co-operation may involve co-ordinated 
behaviour and the division of labour, for example during hunting and other 
activities by groups of social organisms. 
 
The fifth strategy, reproduction, is an important characteristic of biological life, 
because it forms the basis for the ‘tree of life’, which represents the phylogenetic 
relationships connecting present organisms to past ancestors. Evolutionary units 
have been selected in different environments for different strategies of 
reproduction which locally assure a maximum number of offspring with high 
resource dominance, and consequently the highest evolutionary success. 
Annual plants and some fish reproduce only once, whereas other evolutionary 
units reproduce some or many times over a time span. Some produce many 
small offspring, which may be widely dispersed but have a small probability to 
obtain a similar resource dominance position as their parents; others 
concentrate resources and parental care in a few offspring with a larger 
probability of being successful. 
Evolution will select for the best combination of strategies in a 
given environment 
The different resource dominance strategies can be regarded as an evolutionary 
‘toolbox’. Organisms have access to different combinations of strategies for 
different circumstances. Not every tool is appropriate for every situation. Even 
though reproduction may be the strongest resource dominance strategy in the 
long term, every organism may experience periods during which it is difficult to 
raise young, and other resource dominance strategies are temporarily more 
rewarding. Also the use of size to increase resource dominance depends on 
circumstances. In competitive situations a large size is mostly an advantage. But 
for algae that are cultured in a stirred chemostat of which half the volume is 
replaced by fresh medium every 20 minutes, the situation is different. If their 
generation time equals 20 minutes, the algae have a chance of 50% that one of 
the offspring remains in the chemostat. This will maintain the culture. An 
increase in size, to increase resource dominance, will not work, because a large 
size generally requires a longer reproductive period, which dilutes the large 
algae from the medium. Instead, rapidly reproducing, small cells form the best 
dominance strategy. 
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Complexity and efficiency 
When discussing resource dominance and resource dominance strategies, it is 
important to realise that organisms only can show resource dominance because 
they have a certain construction, which allows them to be active in the world. 
Resource dominance, therefore, depends on construction aspects of the 
organism. This is the reason that we advocate the integration of resource 
dominance theory with an analysis of major structuro-functional aspects of 
organisms. As will be explained presently, we have selected complexity and 
efficiency as the main aspects of the relationship between resource dominance 
and construction. 
 
Complexity 
There exist many viewpoints on complexity (Horgan 1995, Kot et al. 1988, 
McShea 1991, Jagers op Akkerhuis and van Straalen 1999, Sole et al. 1999). 
Most of these refer to the patterning in dynamic interactions or to a hierarchical 
layering of structural features and related dynamics. Here, however, we analyse 
complexity from a structuro-functional viewpoint, defining it as any form of 
internal and external functional diversity as can be supported by the internal 
organisation of an evolutionary unit. The overall complexity of an organism thus 
depends on the presence of specific physiology, eyes, limbs, etc. More in detail, 
the contribution to the organism's complexity of these different phenotypic 
aspects can be analysed by means of a multivariate summation. An eye may, for 
example, be judged for its capacity to observe different wavelengths, its 
resolution, e.g. pixel size, its speed of accommodation, its light sensitivity, etc. 
 
Note that by using the above definition of structuro-functional complexity, we 
deliberately avoid discussions about the exact internal structure being 
responsible for a certain functional diversity. The reason is that both a large, 
badly organised structure and a minute, well-integrated structure may allow an 
entity to show the same functional diversity. Accordingly, the above definition 
recognises them as showing the same complexity. Yet, these systems will 
almost certainly differ in efficiency. 
 
Efficiency 
Efficiency is regarded here as the lowest resource use, when comparing two 
processes leading to a functionally similar product. Efficiency is an important 
aspect of resource dominance because it improves the performance of all 
resource dominance strategies. A high efficiency allows a larger dominance at 
the same size and a more economic use of the same resource for maintenance, 
growth and/or reproduction. Additionally, a high efficiency allows more 
organisational excess that may lead to innovations. Efficiency plays also a role 
in co-operation. New interactions involved in cooperation generally have their 
costs, but can cause a net profit typically because of the gain in overall efficiency 
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and resource dominance. A special aspect of efficiency is buffering, with which 
we refer to the creation of internal or external stores of certain resources when 
these are plenty, to be used in periods of shortage. When the times are hard, the 
evolutionary units showing the highest efficiency in their buffering will be able to 
continue their normal functioning the longest. The others will be less good 
competitors and experience a selective disadvantage. 
 
We regard efficiency as logically independent from complexity and related 
resource dominance strategies. The reason is that efficiency can be an aspect of 
each of the different strategies. There are many situations in nature, however, in 
which complexity and efficiency occur in close association. For example, co-
operation of entities will frequently increase the functional properties in close 
association with the internal complexity increase. 
 
The close bonds between resource dominance, complexity and efficiency have 
to be integrated in evolutionary theory in order to explain, i.e., the competitive 
advantage of the ‘fittest’ entities during selection processes, and, over many 
generations, the apparent increase of complexity during evolutionary time in 
specific branches of the phylogenetic tree. 
Discussion 
Above we have presented a multivariate analysis of evolutionary success based 
on resource dominance, complexity and efficiency. The use of these factors for 
measuring evolutionary success makes a general approach possible, which 
includes reproducing entities as well as non-reproducing entities. This implies, 
however, that the traditional focus on fitness has to be accompanied by an 
analysis of the underlying resource space, in order to develop explanatory and 
predictive models for evolutionary success. 
 
A special aspect of the present approach is that it integrates resource 
dominance and the complexity of the evolving units, either directly because high 
resource dominance in a competitive environment requires a high complexity, or 
indirectly when the forces of selection act against inefficiency. Yet, it remains the 
broad spectrum of environmental forces which determines in which direction the 
complexity of a unit can evolve. 
 
At the one end of this spectrum we find the situation where competition is 
absent. This applies to environments in which resources are limited due to 
abiotic causes, whilst the organism experiences a random chance of mortality. 
An example hereof is the above discussed well-stirred chemostat with algae. 
The highest resource dominance in these situations is reached by the organism 
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reproducing fastest. It will be clear that this requirement acts as a severe 
constraint on complexity increase. 
 
The other end of the spectrum is formed by situations in which the environment 
is experienced as relatively stable, or stable in its variability, and in which the 
availability of resources as well as mortality are mainly determined by 
competitive interactions. As the energy that an organism has to spend on 
competitive interactions is correlated with the frequency and extent of contacts, 
all competition based approaches are necessarily density dependent (Witting 
1997, Heino et al. 1998). In a competitive environment the combination of a 
lower complexity, in the sense of less phenotypic possibilities, and lower 
efficiency necessarily causes lower resource dominance, and will be selected 
against. Accordingly, evolutionary disadvantage can only be avoided by any 
combination of changes in complexity and efficiency yielding a net increase in 
resource dominance of a unit. This leaves still much freedom to different 
strategies, such as ‘specialists’, which may trade complexity for efficiency, or 
‘generalists’, which do not care much about efficiency in some aspects. It also 
allows for the coexistence within a population of different strategies for resource 
dominance. An example is the coexistence of dominant male deer with full-
grown antlers, and male deer without antlers mating in secret with the female 
deer of a herd. 
 
Although it may not be the most likely to occur, an especially favourable 
combination in the light of selection is that of complexity increase in combination 
with efficiency increase. 
Rates of improvement 
According to the above reasoning we can regard evolving units as being 
selected for a combination of complexity and efficiency which allows for a 
combination of resource dominance strategies which, in a given environment, 
yields the highest increase in resource dominance. Their success in these 
combined efforts, e.g. their evolutionary success, can be measured either in 
terms of their present resource dominance or in terms of the increase and the 
acceleration hereof. Focus on these different rates is of marked importance, 
because those which are best now may soon lose to those which get better all 
the time, whilst both these strategies will be beaten in the long term by units 
which can increase the rate of their improvement. The ecological importance of 
the acceleration of improvement has been stressed by Wagner and Altenberg 
(1996), who have asked attention for the evolution of evolvability. 
 
Finally, we consider it a theoretical advantage that the resource dominance 
approach makes in principle no assumptions about the kind or combination of 
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resources which are used, about the kind of units of evolution involved, or about 
the combination of resource dominance strategies that is followed. Therefore, 
the competition of animals and plants for nutrients, light, etc., can be analysed in 
the same way as competition between companies on the basis of money, power, 
etc. This offers a common basis for the study of evolutionary processes in 
different disciplines, such as biology and economy, which is not offered when 
using fitness as the evolutionary measure. We consider this an exciting 
possibility for future study. 
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Definitions behind the operator theory 
“Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler.” 
(Albert Einstein) 
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The operator hierarchy can be represented as a simple scheme. However, the 
reasoning behind this scheme is intricate and, involves many different steps and 
definitions. Because transparency is a major asset in science, the aim of this 
chapter is to explain and define the basic aspects of the operator hierarchy. 
First, some general aspects are defined, such as a ‘system’, a ‘type’ and a 
‘closure’. These general definitions form the basis for higher level definitions, 
e.g., the ‘operator’ and the ‘operator hierarchy’. The definition process is not a 
goal in itself but is meant to sharpen the reasoning involved in the operator 
theory and to prevent confusion in situations where the operator theory uses 
certain concepts in a way different from other theories. 
 
Most fundamental to the operator theory is the notion of a system itself. The 
word system dates back to ancient times and is derived from the Greek word 
sunìstanai, which means ‘together establishing’.  Another fundamental concept 
to the operator hierarchy is that of ‘type’. The use of types is helpful when 
referring to general properties of a group of systems without bothering about the 
organisational particulars of every individual system involved. 
 
System 
The system concept relates to entities that can be grouped by functionality 
because of past, present or future interactions and/or relationships. The entities 
that, by their relationships, define the group are considered the system’s 
elements. Frequently, the elements and their interactions/relationships define, 
include or relate to some kind of system limit that reduces the number of 
elements being considered. With respect to natural systems, the system concept 
is limited to the universe or a subset of it. The latter includes thoughts and 
abstract concepts represented by oscillation states in networks of interacting 
neurons. Depending on the type of entities and interactions, different systems 
can be recognised, such as ecosystems, cybernetic systems, physical particles, 
welfare systems, logical systems, organisms, transportation systems, taxonomic 
systems, populations, systems for storing and retrieving objects or data, 
economic systems, etc.  
 
The viewpoint that systems consist of elements and interactions is well covered 
by Von Bertalanffy (1950, 1968). Von Bertalanffy defines systems as ‘a complex 
of interacting elements’ where ‘interaction means that the elements stand in a 
certain relation’. Hall and Day (1977) have expressed similar viewpoints. They 
state that ‘Any phenomenon, either structural or functional, having at least two 
separable components and some interaction between these components may 
be considered a system’. De Wit (1978) describes a system as ‘a limited part of 
reality, the elements of which show a certain relationship’. Mesarovic and 
Takahara (1975) propose an abstract interpretation as they define a system as a 
subset of the set of all possible input-output relations. Heylighen (1995) 
suggests another approach and defines a system as a constraint on variety, 
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where the constraint determines the invariant identity -- which allows us to 
distinguish states that belong to the system’s limits -- in spite of a variety of 
appearances of the system.  
 
In 1865, Claude Bernard indicated that defining a system represents a mental 
undertaking when he stated that ‘Les systèmes ne sont pas dans la nature, mais 
dans l`esprit des hommes’. In other words, nature knows only phenomena while 
systems are our mental abstractions thereof.  
 
Type 
A type is used to group entities by a common property. Using types of types 
creates a type-hierarchy in which lower-level types show commonalities that can 
be grouped into higher-level types. For example, the higher-plant-type and the 
animal-type can be grouped within the multicellular-organism-type. In 
mathematical type theory, there exists a lowest type, the elements of which have 
no members. Such elements correspond to the ‘ur-elements’ of certain set 
theories. The following types are frequently used with the operator hierarchy: 
• Process type: a comparable aspect that can be recognised in the dynamics 
of different entities. For example, catalytic activity is a common property of all 
enzymes, regardless of the specific reaction that they catalyze.  
• System type (general): this type of a system is defined by comparable 
aspects with respect to (1) the rules for selecting elements, (2) the properties 
defining the elements and (3) the relationships that may exist between the 
elements.  
• Closure type: a closure type is defined by the presence of comparable 
aspects with respect to the element and mechanism types causing the 
closure. Departing from the same system type, different self-organising 
processes may lead to different closure types. For example, if a bacterial cell 
is chosen as the start, one route leads to the closure type of the 
endosymbiont/nucleus while another route leads to the closure type of the 
multicellular. 
 
Closing in on first-next possible closure 
In addition to systems and types, two other concepts play an important role in 
the operator theory, namely that of a ‘first-next possibility’ and that of ‘closure’. 
 
In this study the definition process of a first-next possibility was started with a 
literature review that led to the concepts of the ‘adjacent possible’, which is used 
in ecosystem theory, and the ‘successor’, which is used in set theory.  
 
The concept of the ‘adjacent possible’ appears in an interview with Kauffman in 
which he considers the existence of general laws in ecosystems. In the interview 
Kauffman states:  
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There is a chance that there are general laws. I've thought about four of them. 
One of them says that autonomous agents have to live the most complex game 
that they can. The second has to do with the construction of ecosystems. The 
third has to do with Per Bak's self-organised criticality in ecosystems. And the 
fourth concerns the idea of the adjacent possible. It just may be the case that 
biospheres on average keep expanding into the adjacent possible. By doing so 
they increase the diversity of what can happen next. It may be that biospheres, 
as a secular trend, maximise the rate of exploration of the adjacent possible. If 
they did it too fast, they would destroy their own internal organisation, so there 
may be internal gating mechanisms. This is why I call this an average secular 
trend, since they explore the adjacent possible as fast as they can get away with 
it. 
 
The concept of the successor can be found in mathematics, where the 
successor of the number α is defined as the smallest number greater than α. 
When considering numbers, this is a sharp definition. In principle, we would like 
to obtain the same accuracy when translating the successor definition to the field 
of particle hierarchy and closure, for example, in the form of the following 
tentative definition: the successor of a particle A is the particle showing the least 
complex closure higher than A. However, before one can regard the ‘least 
complex closure higher than A’ as the ‘successor closure’, one must find a way 
to indicate the level of closure that is simultaneously simple enough and 
complex enough to be considered the successor closure.  
 
Closure 
General mathematical aspects of closure were already discussed in chapter one 
where it was also explained that the closure concept in the operator theory is 
used more specifically than it is in mathematical theory. In the operator theory, 
closure relates to a state of matter that results from a self-organisation process 
and that shows a closed topology for structure, called structural closure, or 
process, called functional closure, or the combination of both, called structuro-
functional closure. When used in this way, closure always represents a finite set 
of relations, but as long as structural closure is absent, the relations may not 
define a physical system limit. Furthermore, the state and the process of closure 
are intimately related because a closure state is caused by underlying 
interactions. 
 
Elementary closure 
In real systems, closure may be embedded in complex interactions. If all details 
of these interactions were considered, it would become too complex to compare 
closures between systems. For this reason, the operator theory uses a 
methodology that reduces such complexity by identifying the minimum 
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complexity that still represents the system’s closure type. The latter minimalistic 
representation is regarded as the elementary closure. 
 
An elementary closure represents the lowest complexity realisation of its type for 
the system’s structure, process, or when possible, the combination of both. The 
elaboration or repetition of the same closure type does not affect the elementary 
closure. For example, the closure by which a chain of carbon atoms creates a 
cyclic molecule (e.g., benzene, fullerene) is not regarded as creating a new 
elementary closure because the closure repeats the covalent binding of atoms; 
the covalent binding was already responsible for the self-organisation process 
that produced molecules from atoms. Accordingly, every molecule is a molecule, 
regardless of its construction. Similarly, the adding of electron shells to an atom 
and the presence of more than one nucleus in a multinucleate cell does not 
change the elementary closure. Finally, elaborating a catalytic cycle with shunts 
and connections between shunts will not affect the elementary closure type of 
catalytic closure. 
 
A system loses its elementary closure when the construction and/or dynamics 
are reduced beyond the minimum situation required for a closed state, for 
example, an atom that is heated until it loses the last electron from its electron 
shells or an organism starving to the level where it cannot maintain autocatalysis 
in its minimum form and dies. To sustain elementary closure, a system must be 
capable of a minimum level of maintenance. In the context of chemical 
reactions, Dittrich and Speroni di Fenizio (2007) have specifically focused on 
maintenance by defining an ‘organisation’ as any ‘set of molecules that is both 
closed and self-maintaining’. 
 
First-next possible closure 
First-next possible closure is defined as follows: given any system A that shows 
first-next possible closure, the next first-next possible closure creates the least 
complex system type above A that shows a new type of elementary closure 
based on A and, when required, any highest level system type possible below A 
that shows first-next possible closure. This definition is inherently recursive 
because a system showing first-next possible closure produces a more complex 
system showing first-next possible closure. Because a first-next possible closure 
is always built from systems showing a preceding first-next possible closure, the 
recursive definition does not lead to logical loops.  
 
The above definition implies that any system showing first-next possible closure 
is produced by a system showing one lower level of first-next possible closure. 
Going down this ‘staircase’ either results in an infinite regression or suggests the 
existence of a least complex system that shows first-next possible closure. A 
regression ad infinitum represents an undesired perspective for real world 
systems because every step down the closure-staircase is accompanied by a 
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loss of organisational complexity and a reduction of the possibilities for closure. 
This regression strongly suggests that a least complexity system exists in nature 
that shows first-next possible closure without showing a substructure of lower 
level closed elements. 
 
In general, the first-next possible closure of the system above A will be based on 
elements showing the same type of first-next possible closure as A. In certain 
cases, however, the construction of a higher level may also involve elements 
residing at more than one level below the newly formed element. For example, 
the atom is based on interactions between hadrons creating the nucleus, while 
the electrons of the electron shell show a lower closure level than hadrons. As 
the electrons are the highest complexity solution for creating closure nature 
allows, this situation still represents a valid first-next possible closure. 
 
Exhaustive closure 
The definition of first-next possible closure makes use a new type of elementary 
closure with respect to a hypercyclic process and/or its interfacing. To identify 
the new type of elementary closure, I suggest focusing on ‘exhaustive closure’ in 
the system at the one lower closure level. A system shows exhaustive closure, if 
there is no remaining potential for elaborating the structural and dynamic 
aspects of the elementary closure type, because any further development will 
cause the construction of a new elementary closure type. While the elementary 
closure of the system remains the same, the state of exhaustive closure allows 
for a new functionality. 
 
Exhaustive closure can be applied at all the levels in the operator hierarchy. For 
example the transition to hadrons makes use of the relatively complex quarks 
and the transition from the multi-atoms to the autocatalytic sets makes use of 
three dimensional catalytic potential of complex molecules. With respect to the 
internal differentiation that forms the basis for the transition to the 
endosymbiontic/eukaryotic cell, exhaustive closure suggests that a cell should 
possess enough complexity to allow for the engulfment of an endosymbiont 
and/or the construction of internal membranes. 
 
Exhaustive closure furthermore offers a guiding principle when defining the 
transition from a unicellular to a multicellular state. During this transition there 
are several not exhaustive configurations that could be classified as a next 
closure state. Firstly, two cells can mutually attach to each other by means of 
binding proteins. Secondly, the cells can develop a mutual dependency based 
on the diffusion of chemicals across their membranes. Thirdly, the membrane 
separating the cells could become perforated, connecting the plasma of the 
cells. Further unification would create a single cell with two nuclei. Of these four 
examples, the third option, where the soma of both cells is connected by pores, 
represents the most exhaustive closure situation. According to the demand of 
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exhaustive closure, the third option represents the preferred choice; the first two 
options are not exhaustive, and the fourth option implies a multinucleate cell, 
which repeats the closure represented by the nucleus. Based on exhaustive 
closure a strand of attached algae that do not show pores connecting the 
plasma, must be considered a multicellular colony, because they lack the 
prerequisites for the exhaustive multicellular closure state. The latter also implies 
that slight changes are required in the definition of life and of the organism as 
were given in the paper of Jagers op Akkerhuis (2010a). The reason is that the 
use of exhaustive closure demands that only cells connected by plasma strands 
represent multicellular operators.  
 
System type of systems showing first-next possible closure 
Two systems created by the same type of first-next possible closure are 
considered to be of the same system type. This definition creates subsets of the 
set of all systems that was defined above. 
 
Closure dimension 
The structural and/or functional properties of a system showing first-next 
possible closure can be grouped in relation to higher level types, named ‘closure 
dimensions’. A system that results from first-next possible closure either shows a 
new closure dimension or shows an existing type of closure dimension. The 
assignment of closure dimensions depends strictly on the most recently realised 
first-next possible closure of the system and not on any other property. The 
following closure dimensions can be recognised:  
 
The interface dimension  
The interface dimension involves a first-next possible closure that causes a 
spatially closed topology acting as an interface separating the system’s internal 
dynamics from the world. For elementary particles, the interface is assumed to 
be the only dimension that determines their structure. For the hadron, the atom, 
the cell and the memon, the interface dimension always represents an interface 
mediating the second-order cyclic processes that are associated with the 
hypercycle dimension. 
 
The hypercycle dimension  
In the operator theory, the word hypercycle is used in a general way. It refers not 
only to the catalytic hypercycle but also to other second–order cyclic processes 
resulting from first-next possible closures. The first time that a first-next possible 
closure results in a system showing the hypercycle dimension is when quarks 
and gluons form a second-order interaction cycle in quark-gluon soup. Other 
dynamics that show the interface dimension are the quark confinement, the 
electron shell, the cell membrane and the sensory interface of the memon. 
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The multi-state dimension 
The multi-state depends on a first-next possible closure that creates recurrent 
interactions between systems sharing the same (one level lower) first-next 
possible closure. The multi-state dimension is introduced by the hadrons, where 
it depends on interactions between quarks. Other systems that are based on 
first-next possible closure and that show the multi-state are the hadron, the 
molecule, and the prokaryote and eukaryote multicellular. 
 
The hypercycle mediating interface dimension (HMI) 
This dimension marks the moment at which an interface is formed surrounding 
and mediating the interactions of a second-order interaction process (the 
hypercycle), while both interface and hypercycle result from first-next possible 
closure. 
 
The structural (auto-)copying of information dimension (SCI) 
This property states hat a system’s dynamics create physical copies of the 
elements responsible for the system’s emergent hypercyclic process. The first 
system that shows this property as the result of first-next possible closure is the 
cell, where the molecules that allow for autocatalysis represent the cell’s 
information that is autonomously copied by the cell’s chemical reactions. So far, 
the cell is the only system with this closure dimension.  
 
The dimension of structural auto-evolution (SAE) 
This closure dimension is associated with systems that show the capacity to 
autonomously modify the structure of their hypercyclic interactions. This property 
is selectively present in organisms with a hypercyclic neural system with 
interface. Currently, SAE typically relates to animals.  
 
Primary system 
A system exhibiting/introducing a new closure dimension is regarded as a 
primary system. Accordingly, only the following systems showing first-next 
closure are primary systems: the elementary particles, the second-order quark-
gluon cycles, the hadrons, the atoms, the prokaryotic cells and the memons. 
 
Major transition 
Any first-next possible closure creating a primary system is regarded as a major 
transition. 
 
Minor transition 
Any first-next possible closure creating a system, the closure type of which does 
correspond to an existing closure dimension, is considered a minor transition. 
 
The sequence connecting first-next possible closures may split into different 
branches when a system allows for minor transitions belonging to different 
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closure dimensions. An example of this is the transition from bacterial systems 
to either eukaryotic cells or prokaryotic multicellular life-forms. The eukaryotic 
cells show an internal closure representing the hypercycle mediating interface 
dimension. The prokaryotic multicellulars show an interactive closure belonging 
to the multi-state dimension. Another example is the step from molecules to 
either autocatalytic sets or cellular membranes.  
 
Complexity of a closure dimension 
The complexity of a closure dimension is based on the number of major 
transitions that were required to construct it. Because closure dimensions occur 
in a strict sequence, their complexity level can also be numbered from 1 to 6, 
from the interface dimension to the structural auto-evolution dimension, 
respectively.  
 
Pre-operator interaction systems 
Systems showing closure dimension 1 or 2 are called pre-operator interaction 
systems. 
 
Operator 
An operator is defined as a system type showing a closure dimension of 3 or 
higher (Fig. 7.1). From a different perspective, operators can also be defined as 
those systems showing first-next possible closure that are not pre-operator 
interaction systems. The set of the operators unifies all particles whether they 
are physical particles or organisms. The following operators are currently known: 
the hadron, the atom, the molecule, the prokaryote cell, the eukaryote cell, the 
prokaryote and eukaryote multicellular and the neural network organism, called 
the ‘memon’ in the operator theory.  
 
Operator hierarchy 
The operator hierarchy is a conceptual ranking of all operators and pre-operator 
interaction systems. The structure of the operator hierarchy is based on an 
integration of the viewpoints of first-next possible closure and closure 
dimensions (Fig. 7.1). When discussing the operator hierarchy, I generally 
include the quarks, even though these are strictly no operators but pre-operator 
interaction systems. 
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Figure 7.1. The figure shows the evolution of particles of increasing complexity as 
represented by the operator hierarchy. The black line shows the historical pathway by 
which first-next possible closures create the operators. The gray columns indicate pre-
operator hypercyclic sets and interfaces. Explanation of abbreviations: SAE ('Structural 
Auto Evolution’) = the property of an operator to autonomously evolve the structure that 
carries its information. SCI (‘Structural Copying of Information’) = the property of an 
operator to autonomously copy its information (genes, learned knowledge) by simply 
copying part of its structure. HMI (Hypercycle Mediating Interface) = a closure creates an 
interface that mediates the functioning of the hypercycle. Multi-state = operator showing 
closure between multiple units of exactly one lower closure level. Hypercycle = closure 
based on emergent, second-order recurrent interactions. Interface = closure creating an 
emergent limit to an operator. CALM (Categorizing And Learning Module) = a minimum 
neural memory. 
 
Hierarchical layer 
Operators and pre-operator interaction systems that are based on the same 
primary system and do not yet represent the next major transition are 
considered belonging to the same hierarchical layer. This means that the 
operator theory recognises as many hierarchical layers as there are primary 
systems.  
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Interaction system 
An interaction system consists of operators that interact without that the 
interactions create first-next possible closure. The presence of first-next possible 
closure would make the interacting elements an operator. 
 
Operator hypothesis 
The operator hypothesis states that the fundamental limitations imposed by first-
next possible closure act as a strict mould for particle evolution. 
 
Operator theory 
The operator theory is the theoretical framework that offers the context for the 
operator hierarchy and the operator hypothesis. 
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Centripetal science 
Contributions of the operator hierarchy to 
scientific integration 
“Meta-plumbing would concentrate on such questions as  
how to look as though you really understand what you are doing  
when the living room is several feet deep in water  
- instead of how to make a good joint, which is ordinary plumbing.”  
(Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart) 
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Summary 
The large number of discoveries in the last decades has caused a scientific 
crisis that is characterised by overspecialisation and compartmentalisation. To 
deal with this crisis, scientists need comprehensive approaches and unifying 
theories. A recent integrating theory, the operator hierarchy, connects the 
evolution of physical particles with that of organisms. In this chapter it is 
investigated what novelty the operator theory can add to a range of already 
existing integrating approaches. The following approaches will be discussed: the 
use of a cosmic timeline, the ranking of systems according to an ‘ecological 
hierarchy’, the use of periodic tables, the unification of evolutionary processes by 
regarding evolution as an artesian well, the generalisation of the evolution 
concept and a cross table plotting the applicability of unifying concepts against 
the different complexity levels that the operator theory recognises for ranking 
system types.  
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Introduction 
The flow of scientific information is increasing daily and is causing what could be 
considered a knowledge explosion crisis (Sagasti, 1999). Dealing with this crisis 
requires not only methods that handle and make accessible huge amounts of 
information but also integrative theory that offers scaffolds to connect distant 
scientific fields. This text focuses on the role of the operator hierarchy as a 
scientific integration tool in the context of other integrative principles.  
 
The knowledge explosion crisis is the result of science having a positive 
feedback on its own development. Science depends on our capacities as 
humans to observe the world, including ourselves, and to create mental 
representations of the observed phenomena. In turn, better representations 
increase our capacities to manipulate the world and to construct tools that 
improve our observations, which, in turn, accelerate scientific development. As 
the result of this process, scientific ideas have simultaneously developed 
extreme breadth and depth. They are not only frequently associated with 
overspecialisation and compartmentalisation but they are also moving towards 
the far reaches of major scientific integrations of a cosmic scale. At any level 
between these extremes, a concept is more valuable when it is efficient, pairing 
minimum complexity with maximum precision and elegance. Arbitrage by these 
aspects has become known as “Ockham’s razor”, cutting away the most 
complex and least elegant from any two theories explaining the same 
phenomenon. If theories describe different phenomena, arbitrage is less 
straightforward because different viewpoints may highlight different aspects of 
natural organisation. Considering the latter points, this paper analyses how the 
operator hierarchy may contribute to scientific integration while focusing on 
major integrative ideas, for example, the use of timelines, ecological hierarchy 
and evolution. The paper ends with an overview of existing integrating theories 
and the value of scientific integration.  
Unification based on complexity and timelines 
In history various theories have been developed to create coherence in the 
phenomena observed in the world. The structure of such theories has focused 
on the complexity of systems or has centered on timelines for historical ranking.  
 
A classical example of a linear hierarchy ranking system complexity is the Scala 
Naturae of the Greek philosopher and naturalist Aristotle. In his approach, 
Aristotle ranks natural phenomena by decreasing perfection, from spiritual and 
divine beings to man, animals, plants and finally rocks and formless matter. This 
classification is also referred to as the Natural Ladder or the Great Chain of 
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Being and has influenced medieval Christianity and the thinking of well- known 
philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz.  
 
An approach that dates even further back in history is the ancient symbol of the 
Ouroboros, the snake swallowing its tail. This symbol represents the continuity 
and eternity of life and the world. A recent interpretation of the Ouroboros is 
shown in Figure 8.1. The left half of this figure shows how science has gained 
access to increasingly small systems, from large animals and plants, to 
individual cells, to molecules, to atoms, to nuclear particles and finally to 
fundamental particles. The figure’s right half shows the scope of scientific 
research broadening towards increasingly large systems, from ecosystems, 
through planets, to solar systems, galaxies and finally the entire universe. When 
presented in this way, specific properties of the universe at large, such as the 
background radiation and its expansion in all directions, are connected with the 
universe’s initial state. As the picture of the Ouroboros suggests, when the very 
large and the very small meet, the search for organisation in nature seems to 
swallow its tail.  
 
 
Figure 8.1. Historical expansion of scientific domains in the direction of the smallest 
systems and in the direction of the largest systems. GUT = grand unifying theory, DM = 
dark matter, W and Z indicate the particles conveying the weak nuclear force, cm = 
centimetre. 
In addition to ranking systems by complexity, systems can also be ranked by the 
moment of their first formation and the historical time period in which they 
existed. When analysing system organisation in this way, timelines at different 
scales are created that refer to, for example, palaeontology, particle physics, 
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human history, the development of the automobile. These timelines also come in 
different forms, such as linear hierarchies, branching trees and circular 
approaches.  
 
A modern timeline presenting a comprehensive overview of the organisation in 
nature is Big History (Spier, 1996; Chaisson, 2001; Bryson, 2003; Stokes Brown, 
2007). This approach ranks all systems and processes by their occurrence in 
cosmic history. Big History is based on the scientific theory that the early 
universe was as small as a fundamental particle and obtained its present size 
following a rapid expansion, the Big Bang. The theory that the universe has a 
minute origin is supported by modern particle physics and by cosmological 
observations of the background radiation and the proportionality with distance of 
the speed at which galaxies recede from the Earth in all directions (Pagels, 
1985; Weinberg, 1977). Based on these observations, it has been calculated 
that Big History started about 13.7 billion years ago (Fig. 8.2). During the 
universe’s first three minutes, quarks formed and then condensed to form 
hadrons (such as protons and neutrons). During the following 17 minutes, the 
hadrons condensed to form simple helium nuclei (the combination of a proton 
and a neutron). After these initial minutes, it took about 70 thousand years 
before the dynamic balance of the transformation of matter and energy toppled 
to the advantage of matter. The matter in the rapidly expanding universe now 
aggregated under the influence of gravity. The aggregation process was slow 
because gravity is weak at large distances. The result was a universe with a 
sponge-like structure of concentrations of matter surrounding empty ‘bubbles’ of 
variable size that were almost devoid of matter. After 100 million years of 
aggregation, the first galaxies and stars were formed and their light started 
illuminating the universe. The nuclear reactions in stars supported the formation 
of elements heavier than helium. After approximately 9.1 billion years, the Sun 
was formed (4.57 years ago) and then planet Earth (4.54 billion years ago). 
Thereafter, it took about 1 billion years for the first life to emerge on Earth and 
another billion before cells gained the capacity of photosynthesis. Complex 
Ediacaran fauna has been found in rocks of about 600 million years old. Around 
228 million years ago dinosaurs ruled the world. The first hominin fossils 
originate from approximately 7 million years ago. Human history dates back to 
several tens of thousands of years. 
 
A universal timeline is a comprehensive integration tool. Its major strength is 
ranking all sorts of events simultaneously. Even though every event has only a 
single moment of occurrence, a timeline can flexibly adapt to variations in the 
moment of occurrence of similar events by indicating a first moment at which 
they occur and, assuming that such is known, a last moment. A universal 
timeline can thus be seen as a thickly woven cable of many threads representing 
local histories and developmental rates of different parts of the universe. (Fig. 
8.2). Although all of these developmental threads unroll in different directions, 
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they result in similar histories. Stars are formed everywhere in the observable 
universe and their formation roughly started at the same moment. Stars of the 
same class also consist of similar particles and atoms, and stars the size of the 
sun are probably circled by planets everywhere in the universe. One may now 
ask why there is so much uniformity in the universe and whether such uniformity 
may be used to answer questions about the future of the universe.  
 
Figure 8.2. Universal timeline (modified from Wikipedia). 
 
A methodology that may offer answers to the latter question is the operator 
hierarchy (Jagers op Akkerhuis and van Straalen, 1999, Jagers op Akkerhuis 
2001, 2008). The operator hierarchy combines system complexity with a timeline 
of system formation. To explain this approach, it is useful to start with the basic 
 Centripetal science 179 
 
assumption that nature must be analysed according to three fundamental 
dimensions for structural complexity. As Figure 8.3 illustrates and taking a 
prokaryotic cell as a starting point, the first dimension involves the ranking from 
a single cell to a system with interacting cells. Systems like this, which consist of 
interacting organisms, were named ‘interaction systems’ by Jagers op Akkerhuis 
and van Straalen (1999). The second dimension involves the transition from the 
prokaryote cell to the eukaryote cell and then to the multicellular. By extending 
the ranking in this dimension towards systems of low complexity, such as 
molecules, atoms, hadrons and fundamental particles, it becomes clear that this 
dimension connects all physical particles and organism types. Because all 
elements in this dimension are regarded as ‘operators’ (Jagers op Akkerhuis and 
van Straalen, 1999; Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2008), their hierarchical ranking is 
called the operator hierarchy and the related theory the operator theory. As 
Figure 8.3 shows, transitions towards higher level operators may use 
interactions between lower level operators (e.g., from unicellular to multicellular), 
but they may also involve internal differentiations (e.g., the engulfment of an 
endosymbiont in a eukaryotic cell and the formation of a neural network in a 
multicellular). The third dimension involves the cell’s/organism’s interior 
organisation. Here the focus is on the elements, the elements in these elements, 
etc. The above dimensions capture independent directions for analysing natural 
organisation: a prokaryotic cell, a eukaryotic cell and a multicellular organism 
can all be involved in ecosystem interactions and each of them shows internal 
organisation.  
 
Figure 8.3. Three independent dimensions for hierarchy in the organisation of nature: (1) 
hierarchy in interaction systems (systems that consist of operators without being an 
operator), (2) hierarchy in the way how lower level operators create higher level 
operators, and (3) hierarchy in the internal organisation of operators. Only the hierarchical 
ranking of the operators is strict. All other hierarchies vary according to point of view, e.g., 
displacement, information, construction and energy. 
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Having explained how the operator theory recognises dimensions for 
organisation, it is time to return to the question of how these insights can assist 
in analysing cosmic development. The answer to this question rests on 
separating the events along the cosmic timeline into two parallel tracks: the track 
of the operators and the track of the interaction systems.  
 
Starting with the Big Bang, the history of the universe can, in principle, be 
modelled as a container full of interacting particles. Particles exert forces on 
each other and interact. This interaction forms new particles and accompanying 
new forces. During the universe’s early days, the initial quark soup rapidly 
transformed to also contain simple helium nuclei. Simultaneously, and on a 
larger scale, all matter aggregated due to the force of gravity. This aggregation 
created various celestial bodies, such as black holes and stars. Nuclear 
reactions in stars then fused helium to heavier elements, which were spread by 
stellar explosions. Under colder conditions the fused elements further 
condensed to form molecules that formed a basis for planets and comets. 
Models predicting the future of this process have been based on the total 
amount of matter, the gravitational constant, the expansion rate of the universe, 
and the life histories of celestial bodies. Although uncertainties exist about the 
values of certain parameters, such models generally predict the universe’s heat 
death as the consequence of diluting matter in the vastness of an extremely 
large, cold space. 
 
In comparison to the latter universal models, the operator theory (Jagers op 
Akkerhuis and van Straalen, 1999; Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001, 2008) may seem 
to focus on minor details when it introduces a strict ranking of all operators, from 
quarks, through hadrons, to atoms and molecules, prokaryote cells, eukaryote 
cells, prokaryote and eukaryote multicellular organisms and neural network 
organisms (referred to as ‘memons’) (Fig. 8.4). Nevertheless, the first-next 
possible closure seems to strictly limit the structures of the operators such that 
there are important consequences for natural organisation, even at a universal 
scale. 
 
Firstly, the operator hypothesis suggests that the limits set by first-next possible 
closure apply to all operators anywhere in the universe. Accordingly, the same 
classes of operators can be expected to exist anywhere in the universe as long 
as local conditions allow for their formation. In addition to uniform initial 
conditions in the universe during its early hours, first-next possible closure rules 
offer an explanation for the uniformity of the structural developments in 
unconnected local parts of the universe.  
 
Secondly, the sequence of first-next possible closures and related operators is 
not only strict, but it also shows an internal regularity (Fig. 8.4). Based on this 
regularity, the operator theory now suggests that it is possible to extrapolate the 
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operator hierarchy towards future operators, the next of which is the memon (the 
generalised concept for operators with neural networks) that owes its 
intelligence to a programmed neural network (see Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2001). 
Because cosmology focuses on the universe at large, cosmological models offer 
no possibilities for predicting future operators.  
 
 
Figure 8.4. This figure illustrates the evolution of the operators. The black line shows the 
historical pathway of subsequent first-next possible closures and related operators. The 
gray columns indicate systems resulting from first-next possible closure but are not 
operators. Explanation of abbreviations: Memon = operator showing a hypercyclic neural 
network with interface, SAE ('Structural Auto Evolution’) = the property of an operator to 
autonomously evolve the structure that carries its information, SCI (‘Structural Copying of 
Information’) = the property of an operator to autonomously copy its information (genes, 
learned knowledge) by simply copying part of its structure, HMI (Hypercycle Mediating 
interface) = a closure creates an interface that mediates the functioning of the hypercycle, 
Multi-state = operator showing closure between multiple units of exactly one lower 
closure level, Hypercycle = closure based on emergent, second order recurrent 
interactions. Interface = closure creating an emergent limit to an operator, CALM 
(Categorizing And Learning Module) = a minimum neural memory. 
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Unification based on ecological hierarchy 
An integration tool widely used in ecology, ecotoxicology and biology is 
ecological hierarchy. The logic behind this integration tool is that elements at 
lower levels in the hierarchy contribute to the systems at higher levels in the 
hierarchy. The general pattern of the ecological hierarchy is shown in Figure 8.5. 
With slight variations, comparable ecological hierarchies can be found in many 
basic textbooks and publications on ecological organisation (e.g., Odum 1959; 
Weiss, 1971; Koestler, 1978; Close, 1983; Kruijf, 1991; Haber, 1994; Naveh & 
Lieberman, 1994; Hogh Jensen, 1998; Korn, 2002). The ecological hierarchy’s 
frequent occurrence in publications shows that this integration tool has worked 
so well that it has become a kind of dogma in ecology and biology. As a 
consequence, people seem to accept it unquestioningly. In the context of this 
paper, the ecological hierarchy is analysed in comparison with the three 
hierarchical dimensions of the operator theory explained above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: The classical ecological hierarchy 
 
The application of the operator theory now dramatically impacts the ranking of 
the elements of the conventional ecological hierarchy (Fig. 8.6). What has 
happened?  
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Figure 8.6. Ecological hierarchy following the ranking in three dimensions that is 
suggested by the operator theory 
 
The most important cause of the observed differences is that the operator theory 
does not accept mixing hierarchal dimensions. This means that it does not allow 
switching between hierarchy rules when going from one level in the hierarchy to 
the next. For example, after the hierarchy of operators has been selected for 
analysis, e.g., atom-molecule-prokaryote cell, an organ or a community of cells 
can no longer be included as the next level. Including an organ would confound 
the operator dimension with the internal complexity dimension. Including a 
community of prokaryotic cells would confound the operator dimension with the 
dimension that is reserved for hierarchy in interaction systems. Interestingly, the 
conventional ecological hierarchy ends with the universe as the highest level, 
while the operator theory recognises the universe as the first occurring 
interaction system.  
  
With the passing of time, and in close relationship with the formation of higher 
level operators, local parts of the universe change organisation and become 
identifiable as subsets with specific properties. The first subsystems that develop 
in the universe are concentrations of matter, parts of which further develop into 
primordial galaxies. Within such galactic concentrations of matter, gravity causes 
the atom nuclei that have formed to aggregate locally and form primordial solar 
systems. As a next step stars and planets may form. As soon as cells are 
formed on a planet, this planet changes from a chemosystem to an ecosystem. 
Subsequently, when memons arise on a planet, this development can be 
regarded as changing the planet into a ‘memosystem’. 
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Finally, the operator hierarchy demands that the hierarchy of elements in an 
operator’s interior be dealt with independently. In abiotic operators, such as 
atom nuclei, atoms and molecules, the internal differentiation directly results 
from interactions based on condensation (from hadrons to nuclei, from nuclei 
and electrons to atoms, and from atoms to molecules). For organic operators 
Turchin (1977) has formulated the law of the branching growth of the 
penultimate level. This law states that '...after the formation, through variation 
and selection, of a control system C, controlling a number of subsystems Si, the 
Si will tend to multiply and differentiate’. This law explicitly recognises that only 
after the formation of a mechanism controlling the subsystems Si is there a 
context that allows the variety of the subsystems to increase. Accordingly, 
nature has had neither a context nor the means to develop organelles before 
cells or to develop organs and tissues before multicellular organisms. For this 
reason, including sub-systems such as organelles, tissues, organs and organ 
systems in the conventional ecological hierarchy of systems is highly confusing. 
Unification based on a periodic table of periodic tables 
The most well-known periodic table is the periodic table of the elements. 
Mendeleev introduced this tabular display of the chemical elements in 1869. It 
organised the reactivity of atoms and indicated a number of missing elements. 
Mendeleev’s discovery was so important that his table is still used as a basic 
tool in chemistry.  
 
But chemistry is not unique when it comes to periodic tables. Various periodic 
tables of fundamental importance exist for other disciplines. Probably the most 
well-known is the ‘standard model’ used in particle physics. It categorizes the 
major classes of fundamental particles as either force carrying particles (bosons) 
or matter particles (fermions). The fermions are subsequently divided into 
leptons or quarks, both of which are partitioned over three groups of increasing 
mass. 
 
Another fundamental periodic table used in particle physics is the ‘eightfold way’. 
This table is used to organise the many ways by which quarks can combine into 
hadrons. Hadrons consisting of two quarks are called mesons while those made 
up of three quarks are called baryons, and a separate table exists for each of 
these types. The eightfold way was developed by Gell-Mann and Nishijima and 
received important contributions from Ne'eman and Zweig (Gell-Man and 
Neeman 1964).  
Furthermore, two tables can be considered the fundaments of Mendeleev’s 
periodic table: the ‘nucleotide chart’ and the charts showing which sets of 
electron shells are to be expected in relation to a given number of protons.  
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Finally, and even though it may be a bit unusual to regard this arrangement as a 
periodic table, there are also good grounds to include the ‘‘tree of life” in this 
overview of tabular presentations. The only difference with the other tables is 
that the tree of life also includes descent, a property that has no meaning in the 
other periodic tables discussed so far. In all other aspects, the tree of life has 
similar properties of creating a unique and meaningful overview of all basal 
types of operators, which enter the scheme as species. 
 
Every single periodic table discussed above is central to its proper field of 
science. But the tables are not connected. The operator theory, however, shows 
that it is possible to connect the separate tables by focusing on the types of 
elements in every table. If this is done, the operator hierarchy can be used as a 
‘periodic table for periodic tables’ to organise the elements of the existing 
periodic tables.  
 
As Table 8.1 shows, the inventory of periodic tables offered a periodic table for 
almost every complexity level in the operator hierarchy. The inventory 
furthermore indicated the following gaps for which no periodic tables were found: 
the quark-gluon hypercycles, the quark confinement, the molecules, the 
autocatalytic sets, the cellular membranes, the cyclic CALM networks and the 
sensory interfaces. With the exception of the molecules, which may not have a 
periodic table because of the almost unlimited number of combinations that can 
be made from the various atom species, all the gaps involve hypercyclic sets 
and interfaces. One may now suggest that it is generally impossible to create 
periodic tables for hypercyclic sets or for interfaces, but this assumption is at 
least partially contradicted by the nucleotide chart and the classification of 
potential electron shells. A reason for the absence of tables for hypercyclic sets 
may be that the number of possible configurations is so large that it is impossible 
to classify them, in the same way that it is hard to classify molecular 
configurations. Such ideas, however, need to be worked out in more detail. 
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Table 8.1. Using the operator hierarchy for organising the periodic tables that exist for 
different types of operators. Shading indicates system types that are operators. 
System type in operator hierarchy Organisation in specific ‘periodic table’ 
fundamental particles standard model 
quark-gluon hypercycle ?? 
quark confinement ?? 
hadrons eightfold way 
nuclear hypercycle nucleotide chart 
electron shell types of shells 
atoms periodic table of the elements 
molecules ?? 
autocatalytic sets ?? 
cellular membrane ?? 
cells tree of life: prokaryotes 
eukaryote cells tree of life: eukaryotes 
prokaryote multicellulars tree of life: prokaryote multicellulars 
eukaryote multicellulars tree of life: eukaryote multicellulars 
cyclic CALM networks ?? 
sensors (perceptive and activating) ?? 
memons (hardwired) tree of life and technical hardwired memons 
memons (softwired) future tree of technical life 
Unification based on organic evolution: the artesian well that 
is powered by cellular autocatalysis 
Calvin (1987) describes evolution as a ‘river that flows uphill’. Dawkins (1996) 
refers to it as a process that is ‘climbing mount improbable’. Neither of these 
metaphors suggests the need for a force to realise the process. To clearly 
indicate that a driving force is needed to make water flow against gravity or to 
make evolution climb a mountain, the metaphor of an artesian well will be used. 
In an artesian well, the groundwater pressure makes the water flow naturally 
towards the surface allowing it to ‘defy’ gravity. But what exactly is the pressure 
that makes evolution flow towards increasing complexity, seemingly ‘against’ 
thermodynamic laws? As Russell (1960) and Pross (2003) have indicated, this 
pressure is a special form of the explosive, brutal power of autocatalysis. Taking 
Pross’s insight as a basis, the following text places evolution in a thermodynamic 
perspective and invokes the operator hierarchy when appropriate.  
 
Long ago Malthus (1798) and Verhulst (1838) realised that population growth 
leads to density dependent stresses. Darwin (1859) subsequently developed the 
idea that this stress, in combination with reproduction and heritability of parental 
properties, causes reproductive disadvantage of the least adapted individuals. 
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However, Darwin and contemporaries had no clear idea about what could cause 
the organisation of organisms. The laws of thermodynamics that were known at 
that time seemingly indicated that systems could not increase their organisation 
(Carnot, 1824; Clausius, 1865). A bit later, Bergson (1911) wrote about life: 
 
Incapable of stopping the course of material changes downward (the second law 
of thermodynamics), it succeeds in retarding it …Now what do these explosions 
(photosynthetic reactions) represent, if not a storing up of the solar energy, the 
degradation of which energy is thus provisionally suspended on some of the 
points (the plants) where it was being poured forth? 
 
Later, ideas about non-equilibrium thermodynamics (Schrödinger, 1944; 
Prigogine, 1984) and hypercyclic catalysis (Eigen, 1979) offered the ingredients 
for a better explanation. Non-equilibrium thermodynamics solved the problem 
that growth and reproduction seemed to violate the laws of thermodynamics. 
What was new in open thermodynamic systems was the idea that the 
degradation of an external free energy gradient could power the dynamics 
required for self-organisation. For example, when a bathtub is unplugged, the 
self-organisation of the vortex is powered by the degradation of the potential 
energy stored in the height difference between the water in the tub and the drain 
at the bottom. But although non-equilibrium thermodynamics offered a general 
solution for the powering of self-organisation, it did not indicate what specific 
driving force powered evolution.  
 
To analyse the processes that drive Darwinian evolution in more detail, evolution 
will be analysed as the combination of two processes: one process explaining 
the functioning of organisms, from single cells to animals, and the other process 
explaining selection. The functioning of unicellular organisms requires self-
organisation and a membrane. Self-organisation is powered by transforming 
external energy gradients into work. As will be discussed presently, the operator 
hierarchy indicates that the organism receives the storage of heritable 
information for free as long as it uses hypercyclic autocatalysis as the basis for 
its energetics. The membrane is required to ensure that the information and 
other processes become individualised. The mechanisms behind selection 
depend on the capacity to produce offspring that receive variable heritable 
information, and on selective interactions affecting the phenotypes of the 
offspring differentially.  
 
The basal self-organisation process responsible for the existence of organisms 
is autocatalysis. Autocatalysis in its basic form is the process in which a certain 
catalytic chemical, say A, transforms a substrate, which then leads to the 
production of A. Given sufficient substrate, autocatalysis leads to the doubling of 
catalyst molecules with every transformation step, from A, to 2A, 4A, etc. This 
process is referred to as exponential increase. The potential power of 
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exponential increase can be derived from the three dynamic states an 
autocatalytic process may attain (e.g., Lifson 1987; Dittrich and Speroni di 
Fenizio 2007): (1) when the influx of substrate is too low, the system decays; (2) 
when the inflow of substrate is high enough to let the autocatalytic production of 
catalysts equal their decay rate, the system is in (dynamic) balance; and (3) 
when there is a rich influx of substrate, the positive feedback causes a chain 
reaction that will let the process grow exponentially. While systems with 
decaying or balanced dynamics will go unnoticed, systems with exponential 
growth potentially possess the brutal force of an explosion.  
 
The explosive power of autocatalysis is not sufficient to explain Darwinian 
evolution because autocatalysis lacks heritable information. The coupling of 
autocatalysis and information requires an additional step. In its simplest form this 
second step requires the coupling of two catalytic reaction cycles based on the 
molecules A and B in a second-order cycle in which A transforms substrate to B 
and B transforms substrate to A. The resulting reaction cycle is fully driven by an 
external free energy gradient and is a simplified form of Eigen’s ‘catalytic 
hypercycle’ (Eigen, 1979). Eigen, who focuses on enzymatic reactions, has 
published various studies about the stability and thermodynamics of hypercyclic 
catalysis. In a catalytic hypercycle, every individual catalytic molecule can be 
regarded as carrying information for the overall process. The capacity of 
hypercycles to carry information has recently been discussed by Silvestre and 
Fontanari (2008). The hypercycle thus combines the explosive force of 
autocatalysis with the information function of the separate catalytic molecules.  
 
Hypercyclic catalysis unleashes enormous powers while creating an informed 
process. However, these properties are still insufficient to cause evolution 
because the process does not yet include a spatial mediating boundary that 
allows the components to become a unit of selection. Without a boundary, the 
catalysts of an autocatalytic hypercycle float freely in the pre-biotic ‘soup’ and 
cannot be assigned to a specific group. They can dilute or mix freely with other 
sets. To end up with units that selection can act on, a physical system limit is 
required. This can be added quite easily as a fatty acid membrane. Vesicles 
naturally form by condensation in a watery solution containing fatty acids 
(Oparin, 1957; Claessens et al., 2007; Fanelli, 2008; Hernández-Zapata et al., 
2009) and the process is well understood from the aspect of thermodynamics. 
The combination of a membrane with autocatalysis now defines the first primitive 
cell. In one of the more recent studies on the emergence of the first cells, Martin 
and Russel (2003) have discussed the simultaneous formation of autocatalysis 
and membranes based on the chemical reactions in pre-biotic submarine 
hydrothermal vents of volcanic origin. 
 
Once primitive cells were produced, it was a relatively small step toward 
multiplication and heritability of information. Given a constant supply of substrate 
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molecules, autocatalysis automatically increased concentrations of the catalytic 
molecules in a cell. It also potentially produced fatty acids enlarging the 
membranous envelope. Increasing cell volume and envelope size will destabilise 
the cell structure and stimulate division, and the contents will then more or less 
be randomly distributed over the two ‘offspring’. When this occurs, cell-based 
autocatalysis powers the motor of primitive cellular reproduction and only 
selective interactions have to be added before evolution occurs. 
 
Despite their primitive state, the above cell-based reproduction and heritability 
immediately force the water in the artesian evolution well to flow upward. The 
reason is that cell-based cyclic autocatalysis implies the production of numerous 
individuals, that the individuals show interactions and that interactions are most 
detrimental for weak performers, which Darwin referred to as the ‘less well 
endowed’. The latter processes result in selective interactions that scaffold the 
development of increasingly complex building plans (at least on average). 
Selective interactions, as used here, are not limited to competitive interactions 
but also include strategies based on cooperation.  
 
Information, first in the form of the set of autocatalytic molecules and later in the 
form of RNA/DNA, plays an important role in evolution. A fundamental aspect of 
information is that it is hard to avoid random changes during its use and/or 
reproduction. As a consequence, the information in organisms naturally tends to 
change over generations. A negative result of this uncontrolled change is that 
offspring may suffer a lethal accumulation of deleterious mutations. This kind of 
mortality is referred to as Muller’s ratchet (the name is derived from the random 
occurrence of deleterious mutations as discussed by Hermann Joseph Muller, 
1890-1967). A positive result of this change is that every once in a while a given 
mutation will positively affect an organism’s fitness. As long as the production of 
original types and mutants that fit equally well or better to their environment 
outweighs deleterious mutations, evolution will continue. The potential for 
genetic evolution has convincingly been demonstrated in experiments that 
investigated how the genetic material of viruses adapted over generations when 
it was subjected to different chemical stresses (Mills et al., 1967; Spiegelman, 
1971).  
  
The constant emergence and spread of favourable mutations unpredictably 
changes the ecosystem. To maintain one’s fitness, units of selection must 
continuously adapt. The continuous need for adaptation has been simulated by 
Schneppen and Bak (Bak 1996) who in a group of competing species replaced 
the least fit species by one that is more fit (Bak, 1996). Their model showed that 
the resulting dynamics are inherently unpredictable. This was concluded from 
the fact that when plotting the number of species involved in one extinction event 
against the frequencies of such events, their model showed the fractal 
characteristic of a power law distribution. Such a power law accorded well with 
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the distribution of species’ extinctions in the archaeological records, as van 
Valen (1973) observed. After changing the original Schneppen-Bak model to be 
more realistic, for example, by including genetic adaptation and random 
disturbances caused by meteorite impacts, the model was proven robust and 
relevant for the evolutionary process.  
 
During evolution, selection acts not only in the direction of the capacity to evolve 
but also of the capacity to evolve evolvability (e.g., Wagner, 1996; Wagner and 
Altenberg, 1996). Once evolution has started, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
stop the process because selection will favour organisms that can exploit 
formerly inaccessible free energy gradients. Every new pathway implies a new 
kind of ‘fuel’ powering new autocatalytic processes and increasing the size of 
and/or the pressure under evolution’s artesian well. Examples of switches 
towards new and larger free energy gradients are those from physico-chemical 
energy to solar energy (the development of photosynthesis), from physico-
chemical energy to biochemical energy (the development of 
predation/herbivory), from anaerobic pathways to the use of oxygen (yielding a 
twenty-fold increase in available energy), from the exploitation of living biomass 
to the use of fossil biochemical energy, etc. Other examples are (1) the switch 
from depending on diffusion for energy transport to active transportation of 
energy-rich substrates through the cell and (2) the symbiosis with 
endosymbionts, generating energy throughout the cell.  
 
From the above switches, the switch from physico-chemical energy to 
biochemical energy has especially affected the evolutionary process because 
the biomass of the early organisms suddenly became a degradable free energy 
gradient. Exploiting this gradient, viruses, parasites and consumers attacked the 
organisms. These attacks reduced the densities, which, in turn, increased 
growth rates. The chisel of selection was sharpened when indirect competition 
for abiotic resources was supplemented by organothrophic interactions. 
Afterwards, selective forces showed diversification towards searching for and 
digesting biotic resources and towards developing survival strategies to avoid 
becoming a resource.  
Unification based on a general concept for evolution 
Darwin’s theory refers to evolution as a combination of two processes: (1) the 
production of numerous offspring with different combinations of heritable 
properties, and (2) the selecting away of individuals that are less well endowed; 
that is, in comparison to nearby organisms, their competitive and/or cooperative 
properties fit less well to the demands of the abiotic and biotic environment. The 
focus on these processes has linked the evolutionary process to heredity. In 
actuality, however, evolution requires nothing more than repeating a process 
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that combines the production of variation (a diversification step) with selection in 
relation to certain criteria (a selection step) (Fig. 8.7). As has been indicated by 
Popper (1972, 1999) and Campbell (1960, 1990) repeated diversification and 
selection steps offer a general basis for evolution of organisms. But the 
implications of diversification and selection may reach further, because these 
concepts are not limited to organisms.  
 
 
Figure 8.7. This figure illustrates the generalisation of the evolution concept Both the 
evolution of particles and the evolution of organisms can be regarded as consisting of 
steps combining the production of variation (diversification) and selection. 
 
The production of variation may be based on genes but may also be based on 
abiotic particles or computer organisms. For example, when two fundamental 
particles meet, they may integrate and split again, or they may exchange a third 
particle, such that after the process, two new particle types are formed. And 
when a technical memon copies its brain structure through computer code, 
incidental or deliberate errors in the process may produce variation.  
 
The selection process, too, is not limited to organisms. In Darwinian evolution, 
selection may occur at many points, including when two organisms choose each 
other as mates, when semen search for an egg cell, when an embryo develops 
in a uterus, when offspring are born and have to persuade their parents to feed 
them, etc. (Fig. 8.7). In particle evolution, selection depends on whether particles 
recombine and whether they produce new particles that are stable. 
 
When examining evolution in the above way, the difference between Darwinian 
evolution and the evolution of particles fades and the principle of evolution 
becomes visible in its most basic and general form, which is based on 
diversification and selection. Of course, to apply this basic form to a given level 
in the operator hierarchy, the specifics of the diversification processes and the 
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selection processes that are typical for the selected operators and environment 
need to be filled in. 
Unification based on unifying concepts 
The above paragraphs have highlighted many grand unifying concepts in 
science and have shown how the operator hierarchy may contribute to these 
fields. The examples that were discussed represent a limited selection of the 
many larger and smaller unifying concepts that exist. To discuss all these in a 
single paper would detract from the major goal of this study: to analyse 
relationships between unifying concepts and to discuss the potential contribution 
of the operator hierarchy.  
 
To analyse relationships between several unifying concepts while preventing 
endless elaboration, it was decided to create a cross-table at a high level of 
abstraction. On one axis the table shows an inventory of unifying concepts and 
on the other their relevance at different levels of the operator hierarchy. It was 
also decided to construct not one, but two cross-tables: one for unifying 
concepts relating to operators and one for unifying concepts relating to 
interaction systems (the systems that consist of operators but are not operators). 
In addition, it was decided to sort the unifying concepts a priori according to the 
four dimensions of the DICE approach (Displacement, Information, Construction 
and Energy, Jagers op Akkerhuis, 2008), such that unifying concepts dealing 
with similar subjects were gathered into these four classes. The outcome of 
these activities is shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Undoubtedly, these two tables 
are not complete and the a priori assignment of a given unifying principle to one 
of DICE’s four classes or the a priori assignment as being most important for 
operators or interaction systems may be disputed because many principles 
relate to more than one subject. It is furthermore recognised that some unifying 
concepts have a narrow scope, for example, the Pauli principle, while other 
principles, for example, the concept of evolution, could have been split up into a 
whole range of related unifying concepts, such as the selfish gene, the moving 
fitness landscape, game theory, etc. In relation to the latter remark, it has been 
attempted to combine a priori smaller concepts into overarching concepts. 
Concepts were separated if at least one aspect was important enough to justify 
this decision. Due to these considerations, Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 should be 
considered explorative tools for identifying interesting trends. 
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Table 8.2. This cross-table shows an inventory of unifying concepts ranked according to the operator hierarchy.  
Main subject Related subjects (it concerns states or dynamics within operators)
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Thermodynamics 
(energy)
Relativity, matter-energy x
Thermodynamic laws x x x x x x x x x x
Autocatalytic physiology, resource dominance, energetic demands x x x x x x
Resource allocation and trade-offs, DEB-model x x x x x x
Desire based activity and flows x x
Construction FNP closure defining the operator types x x x x x x x x x x
Functional limits irt levels of resources or (abiotic) stressors (Eyring, von 
Liebig, Paracelsus). Niche concept
x x x x x x x x x x
Selforganization and selforganized criticality x x x x x x x x x x
Particle-wave duality x (x)
Schroedinger wave functions for electron shell x x
L-systems, gnomons (internal/external addition), fractals x x x x x x (x)
Constructal law x x x x x
Growth and development, allometrics x x x x x x
Life cycle during one generation (ontogeny and life stages), fitness, trade-offs x x x x x x
Information Genes, genetic basis of ontology, of bodyplan, of phenotypic plasticity 
(response curves)
x x x x x x
Immune/self-other x x x x x x
Genetic basis of neural network: mental traits, nature (instead of nurture) x x
Neural based behavior, reflexes, memory, intelligence, consciousness, mental 
health, psychology, phychiatry, welbeing, satisfaction and brain-body-
sensors interaction
x x
Memes (x) x
Displacement/dynamics Zwitter-ion x
Turing patterns inside operators x x x x x (x)
Transportation inside organisms x x x x x (x)  
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Table 8.3. This cross-table shows an inventory of unifying concepts in science and the range of 
interaction systems to which the unifying concept apply. The interaction systems are arranged in order of 
the most complex operator in the system. 
Main subject Related subjects
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Thermodynamics 
(energy)
Temperature dependence of interactions
x x x x (x) (x) (x) (x) (x) (x)
Thermodynamics of overall systems or flows x x x x x x x x x x
Construction Grand Unification Theory (Theory of Everything) x (x)
Relativity, space-time x (x)
Electromagnetism x x x x
Physical chemistry x x (x) (x) (x) (x) (x)
Gravity x x x x x x x x x x
Constructal law, patterning giving high access to flows (including interaction 
chains, such as foodchain), pseudo-fractal constrution. x x x x x x x x x x
Selforganization and selforganized criticality (Pareto-Zipf-Mandelbroth, 
pseudo-fractal distributions) x x x x x x x x x x
Alternative stable states/critical transitions x x x x x x x x x x
Biochemistry x x x x x x (x)
Biotope x x x x x x
Information Pauli principle x x  
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Table 8.3: Continued 
Main subject Related subjects
f
u
n
d
a
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
h
a
d
r
o
n
s
a
t
o
m
 
n
u
c
l
e
i
 
a
n
d
 
a
t
o
m
s
m
o
l
e
c
u
l
e
s
(
p
r
o
k
a
r
y
o
t
e
)
 
c
e
l
l
s
e
u
k
a
r
y
o
t
e
 
c
e
l
l
s
m
u
l
t
i
c
e
l
l
u
l
a
r
 
p
r
o
k
a
r
y
o
t
e
m
u
l
t
i
c
e
l
l
u
l
a
r
 
e
u
k
a
r
y
o
t
e
m
e
m
o
n
 
(
h
a
r
d
w
i
r
e
d
)
m
e
m
o
n
 
(
s
o
f
t
w
i
r
e
d
)
Information Pauli principle x x
Evolution A (diversification via production, followed by selection) x x x x
Evolution B irt moving fitness landschape ((selfish-)genes, diversification, 
reproduction (sex, populations), epigenetics, units of evolution, role neutral 
mutations, genotype-phenotype, defectors, game theory)
x x x x (x)
Group-against-group selection x x x x x x
Habitat x x x x x x
Stress ecology: targets,buffering and plasticity (phenotypic, population and 
community adaptation (PICT)) x x x x (x) (x)
Disease syndrome (viral, bacterial, multicellular causal agent) x x x x x (x)
Social behavior: nurture, altruism, communication, moral, economy, politics, 
culture, science x x
Lamarckian inheritance (x) x
Evolution of memons (meme-to-network) x
Displacement/dynamics Quantum tunneling x (x)
Logistic map, Mandelbrot set, Julia set (stability, periodicity, chaos, 
bifurcations) (x) (x) (x) x x x x x x x
Turing patterns and waves x x x x x x (x)
Spatial occurrencce of organism interactions, neutral theory of biogeography
x x x x x x
Transportation (moving, phoresy, goods) x x x x x x
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The inventory of unifying concepts in Tables 8.2 and Table 8.3 suggests two 
major trends. The first trend is that only a few concepts apply to many different 
levels of organisation and, in this sense, are truly unifying. One explanation for 
this lies in the fact that most theories mainly apply to either operators or 
interaction systems. Another explanation is that even within the separate lists of 
Table 8.2 and of Table 8.3, few theories can be found that apply to all different 
operators or to all different interaction systems.   
 
Combining the information of both tables, the following unifying concepts are 
relevant for all material systems:  
• Gravity impacts all systems. 
• Thermodynamic laws have to be obeyed by all processes in systems 
(although minute disobediences due to chance effects are possible). 
• The stability of all systems is limited to within a certain range of 
environmental conditions.  
• Self-organisation and the constructal law connect thermodynamics with the 
formation of structural patterns. 
• The concept of first-next possible closure allows the recognition of the 
operators and the operator hierarchy, hereby offering a “periodic table for 
periodic tables”.  
• If systems show dynamics, these may show various patterns, such as 
alternative stable states, fractal behaviour or shifts between stable, periodic 
and chaotic behaviour. 
 
The second trend that is suggested by the inventory is the divergence between 
non-dissipative or dissipative systems. Of course, there is a good reason for this: 
a dissipative organisation of an operator is intimately linked to properties that 
allow it to organise itself while using an external energy gradient. Examples of 
such properties are autocatalysis, a membrane, heritable information, growth, 
demand for food or energy, etc. More detailed subdivisions can be recognised 
for all levels of the operator hierarchy because every new emergent property of 
an operator introduces new properties. For example, memic closure introduces 
reflexes, learning and behaviour based on mental representations. 
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Discussion 
The operator hierarchy contributes in different ways to scientific integration. 
Firstly, it allows the structuring of various fields of scientific theory by invoking 
the strict ranking of the operator hierarchy. Secondly, it establishes connections 
between other unifying concepts. The structuring capacity of the operator 
hierarchy results from using first-next possible closure, which allows a strict 
ranking of the operators. A strict ranking means that an operator cannot be 
included or excluded without disturbing the entire logic of the operator hierarchy. 
If a theory possesses such strictness, this can be regarded as a special kind of 
beauty. For example, Einstein said the following about his general theory of 
relativity that offered a strict framework for dealing with gravity, space-time and 
matter-energy: “The chief attraction of this theory lies in its logical completeness. 
If a single one of the conclusions drawn from it proves wrong, it must be given 
up; to modify it without destroying the whole structure seems to be impossible 
(from Weinberg: 1992). But while the relativity theory offers an abstract and 
quantitative framework for dealing with matter, energy, forces and space, the 
operator hierarchy focuses on complementary aspects by offering an abstract 
and qualitative framework for organising matter. That the operator hierarchy 
deals with qualitative aspects should not be considered a flaw of the theory, but 
its strength, because it addresses a blind spot in the scientific literature.  
 
The general analysis of structural hierarchy is not a fashionable topic in science. 
Firstly, people may not think about a unifying ranking because they consider 
particles, such as hadrons, atoms and molecules, as incomparable with 
organisms. Secondly, people may have difficulty identifying a general ranking 
rule. When looking at the mechanisms, they look differently at every level. Only 
the use of first-next possible closure offers a principle that can be used across 
levels. Thirdly, people may consider it wrong to focus primarily on the operators 
because the universe is full of interaction systems, such as galaxies, stars, 
planets and at least one ecosystem. However, the operator hierarchy cannot be 
created or even recognised as long as interaction systems are considered to be 
part of its ranking. Fourthly, Teilhard de Chardin’s early work dealing with a 
general ranking was confounded with religious statements. This may have led 
certain people to reject his early steps towards a general theory altogether. 
Finally, the focus of science on quantification and equations has drawn the 
attention away from structural analysis, which uses completely different 
concepts of quantity. These and other aspects may have contributed to the 
absence of the operator hierarchy in any form from the scientific debate.  
 
As was discussed in this study, the operator hierarchy contributes in various 
ways to such fundamental topics as a cosmic timeline, an ecological hierarchy, a 
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periodic table for periodic tables, an organic evolution and an analysis of the 
scope of unifying concepts. The operator hierarchy adds to these topics a 
unique focus on the structural complexity of systems. This focus enables the 
logical integration of distant scientific domains. These achievements support the 
conclusion that the operator theory deserves a prominent role in science.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General discussion and conclusions 
”Der Philosoph ist nicht Bürger einer Denkgemeinde. 
Das ist, was ihn zum Philosophen macht.”  
(Ludwig Wittgenstein) 
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Introduction 
The goal of this thesis was to contribute to unification in science by searching for 
rules that guide the development of structural complexity in the universe and that 
improve the analysis of hierarchical organisation in biology, ecology and system 
science.  The major result of pursuing the above goal has been the discovery of 
the operator hierarchy. Various individual aspects of the operator hierarchy have 
been discussed in the above chapters. To place the conceptual framework of the 
operator hierarchy and its applications in a broad context, I will attempt to 
answer the following five questions: (1) what kinds of novel theoretical 
developments have accompanied the elaboration of the operator hierarchy, (2) 
what impacts may the operator theory have on science, (3) what aspects of the 
operator theory require discussion because of potential weaknesses, (4) how 
can the operator theory be evaluated, and (5) what routes are open for future 
development.  
What is new? 
Three principles are absolutely fundamental to the development of the operator 
theory. The first is the reduction of the complexity of the hierarchy problem to its 
minimum. The second is the identification of three major dimensions for 
analysing hierarchy. The third is the definition of first-next possible closure and 
its use as a tool to identify and to rank subsequent operators. To discover 
whether these principles can be considered new developments, they will be 
individually discussed in relation to existing theory. 
 
Although biologists generally focus on details of a system’s organisation, 
physicists quite generally solve problems by reducing the observed complexity 
to a minimum. The following citation from Bak (1996) presents an instructive 
caricature of the difference in attitude between biologists and physicists:  
 
Thus, how would we physicists make a suitable model of, say, 
biological evolution? The biologist might argue that since there is 
sexual reproduction in nature, a theory of evolution must necessarily 
include sex. The physicist would argue that there was biology before 
there was sex, so we don’t have to deal with that. The biologist might 
point out that there are organisms with many cells, so we must explain 
how multicellular organisms developed. The physicist argues that 
there are also single-cell organisms, so we can throw multicellularity 
out! The biologist argues that most life is based on DNA, so that 
should be understood. The physicist emphasizes that there is simpler 
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life based on RNA, so we don’t have to deal with DNA. He might even 
argue that there must have been a simpler reproductive chemistry 
before RNA, so that we don’t have to deal with that either, and so on. 
The trick is to stop the process before we throw out the baby with the 
bathwater.  
 
That the concept of evolution can be reduced to a minimum shows the 
magnificence of the one-line programme developed by Harvey in 1996 (Harvey, 
2001, 2009). The programme effectively mimics evolution, including rank 
selection, demes, recombination (via horizontal transmission), mutation and 
elitism:  
 
for (t=0;t<T;t++) for (W=(e(A=P*r())>e(B=(A+1+D*r())%P)?A:B), 
L=(W==A?B:A),i=0;i<L;i++) if ((r=r())<R+M) g[L][i]=(r<R?g[W][i]:g[L][i]^1); 
 
Where: t = tournaments, T = max number of tournaments, W = Winner, L = 
Loser, e(i) is a problem-specific evaluation function returning fitness of ith 
member of population, g[j][i] is an array giving the ith gene of the jth member of 
population, A, B are members chosen for a tournament, to be labelled W(inner), 
L(oser) according to which is fitter, r() is a (pseudo-)random number 
0.0<=r()<1.0, P is population size, D is deme-size, R is Recombination rate, M is 
Mutation rate. 
 
Although the importance of the caricature presented by Bak and the minimalist 
model for a biological evolution process designed by Harvey are beyond 
discussion, the venom of simplification is in the tail because –as was stated 
above- the process should be stopped just in time to prevent the essence of the 
problem from being flushed down the drain. It is precisely in relation to this 
aspect that the use of first-next possible closure in the operator hierarchy does 
represent a major theoretical development; first-next possible closure indicates 
the line separating the situation in which the baby is saved from that in which it is 
being flushed down the drain. First-next possible closure indicates exactly the 
theoretical minimum complexity that is required to form a next level operator. It 
does this for all levels in the operator hierarchy, hereby guiding several 
situations where the trick is to stop the process of simplification just in time. 
 
The difficulty of stopping the simplification process at the right moment is 
illustrated by the common belief that if we understood the origin of life, i.e., the 
origin of the first cell, we would solve the long standing problem of the definition 
of life. As Jagers op Akkerhuis (2009, in press) has shown, focusing on the first 
cells implies that the reduction process has been carried too far. The reason is 
that the most detailed insights into a cell’s properties are vastly insufficient to 
define even the minimum aspects of all the other complexity levels of life, such 
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as eukaryotic life, multicellular life, memic life and, in the future, technical memic 
life. Using cells as a basis for a definition of life, especially technical life, is 
problematic because technical life does not even consist of cells. In the past the 
simplification process went wrong because it was continued to the simplest 
operator (the cell) and not to the simplest organisation that is typical for every 
type of living operator. As a result, all the properties that were typical for the 
organisation of complex organisms were lost during the simplification process, 
and this loss made it impossible to define life in a general way. 
 
The second major principle advocated by the operator hierarchy was that 
organisation should be analysed on the basis of three dimensions for hierarchy. 
In principle, this realisation is not new. Around 1940 the idea had been 
discussed that when we analyse a system that controls several elements  this 
system may itself be controlled by another system that resides ‘above’ it 
(Feibleman 1954). There are many examples of this three-level approach, for 
example, Koestler’s Holon (Koestler, 1967) and Jaros and Cloete’s Biomatrix 
(Jaros and Cloete, 1987). It is quite interesting that in many publications such 
three-level approaches to systems were placed one after another, such that a 
given system with its elements became itself an element in a larger system, etc. 
The resulting hierarchy had the effect of guiding the reader’s thoughts towards a 
chain of interlocked systems. As a consequence, the initially independent three 
levels have now become hostage of a one-dimensional hierarchy. The operator 
hierarchy differs on this point because it recognises that hierarchies in these 
three levels (interior of a system, the system, and the world) point in different 
directions and that for this reason they are independent dimensions for 
hierarchy. According to this new perspective, one can analyse hierarchy in the 
internal organisation of a system, one can analyse the organisational differences 
between systems, or one can analyse how interactions between systems create 
hierarchy. Thus, even though the basal three levels of the classical system 
theory are retained, the operator theory recognises them as independent 
directions for hierarchy and not as levels.  
 
Finally, the use of first-next possible closure in the operator hierarchy seems to 
be a truly original theoretical development. Except for Teilhard de Chardin’s 
contribution (Teilhard de Chardin, 1969), no publications have been found 
dealing with first-next possible closure or related topics referring to “first-next”.  
What are the impacts? 
The operator theory was developed to solve problems with the integration of 
toxicant effects at various levels of ecological organisation. Initially, the 
integration was based on the well-known ‘ecological hierarchy’, for example, 
from atoms to molecule, organelle, cell, tissue, organ, organism, population, 
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community and ecosystem, planet, solar system, galaxy and universe. But this 
hierarchy proved to be conceptually inconsistent and insufficient. Because no 
alternative was found in the literature, the only solution was to try to develop a 
new ecological hierarchy. This resulted in the discovery of the operator 
hierarchy. Later, it appeared that the logic of the operator hierarchy could be 
applied to solve many other problems that had their origin in the inconsistent use 
of hierarchy. Most notably, the operator hierarchy was applied to rearranging the 
classical ecology hierarchy. By using the operator theory, the original linear 
ranking of elements in this hierarchy could be transformed into three separate 
rankings: one for the hierarchies in interaction systems, one for the hierarchy of 
the operators and one for hierarchies in the internal organisation of the 
operators.  
 
Furthermore, the operator hierarchy has a fundamental application in arranging 
a happy marriage between the particle concept used in physics and chemistry 
and the organism concept used in biology and ecology. Based on the operator 
hierarchy, the two concepts were united in a single ranking in which the word 
‘operator’ was used as a common concept. Integrating all operators in one 
ranking also changes the way in which a particle is defined. Although the 
classical concept of a particle concentrates on minute physical entities (for 
example, see Falkenburg’s review, 1993) one must now consider that the 
particle concept can be broadened to the operator concept and that demands for 
first-next possible closure should be part of a definition of physical and chemical 
particles. 
 
Because it ranks abiotic and biotic operators, the operator hierarchy can also be 
applied as a periodic table of periodic tables because for every operator -- and 
for some interfaces or pre-operator hypercyclic sets -- a corresponding periodic 
table exists for the classification of all the known operators at that complexity 
level. In this way, the operator hierarchy connects the standard model for 
fundamental particles, the eightfold way for hadrons, the periodic table of the 
elements and the tree of life.  
 
Another application of the operator hierarchy was the further development of 
complexity layers in the tree of life. In its most basal representation, the tree of 
life presents the historical divergence of species. Quite frequently, the time axis 
is supplemented with information about whether the organisms are prokaryotic, 
eukaryotic or multicellular. The operator hierarchy now suggests adding two 
other classes: multicellular prokaryotes (e.g., blue-green algae) and memons. 
The major advantage of introducing memons is that brains are no longer 
regarded as just another organ that can be found in multicellular organisms but 
as a different level of organisation altogether. The recognition of a level of 
memic organisation also has the advantage of fully merging neurobiology and 
technical intelligence.  
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The operator hierarchy also offers an interesting solution to the definition of life 
problem. Earlier attempts at a definition frequently focused on the origin of life, 
for example, on the properties that were typical for the minimum organisation of 
the most primitive prokaryote cell. The operator hierarchy indicates however, 
that minimum organisation is not typical for prokaryotes but exists at many 
levels, including those of the eukaryotes, the multicellulars, and the memons. 
Accordingly, a definition of life cannot be complete if it does not consider the 
different minimum organisations at all these levels. Using the ranking of the 
different operator types offered by the operator hierarchy, life is defined as 
matter with the construction of operators under the limitation that the operators 
should at least show the cellular operator’s complexity. By focusing on operators 
and their minimal construction properties, the operator-based definition also 
solves problems with facultative aspects that plague many other definitions. For 
example, frozen cells are still life, according to the operator-based definition, 
even though they do not show physiology, behaviour, etc. Similarly, reproduction 
and growth are no longer requirements for life, although the production of 
offspring is, of course, required for evolution! Another implication of the operator-
based definition is that technical memons must be regarded as life because it is 
irrelevant, for example, whether the structure of hardwired memons is based on 
organic cells or on technical devices. 
 
A field of theory where the operator hierarchy has also been applied is that of 
astrobiology and extraterrestrial life. If it is assumed that the operator hierarchy 
correctly describes all the first-next possible closures that are possible in our 
universe, then the same operators will be formed anywhere in the universe for 
as long as ambient conditions allow this to happen. This assumption is 
supported by observations showing that atoms and molecules also exist in 
distant galaxies. Similarly, life, as defined by the operator hierarchy, may exist in 
the universe on other planets than Earth.  
 
Yet another application of the operator hierarchy is that it offers a structured way 
to reason about the construction of future operators and hence about the future 
of evolution and, in particular, artificial intelligence (AI). Even when the outcome 
may be the same, using the operator hierarchy gives predictions a better basis 
than what is offered by observing trends in the robotic industry. Of course, the 
extrapolation of the operator hierarchy holds only as long as the sequence of the 
operators and their secondary structure are interpreted correctly. Under these 
assumptions, the extrapolation of the operator hierarchy can be used to predict 
the closures of a range of future operators. Although the operator hierarchy may 
well offer the only method science has ever had to predict future particles, the 
result remains, of course, an extrapolation and is burdened with various 
uncertainties. The most important uncertainty is related to how a closure 
dimension should be interpreted at a higher level. For example, the distance 
between multiatomarity and multicellularity is already enormous, but the distance 
 General discussion and conclusions 205 
 
between multicellularity and multimemicity is even larger. Moreover, where it is 
already difficult to predict details of multicellularity as long as only bacteria are 
known, it will be much more difficult to predict details of multimemic life if the 
only known memons are animals. Of course, the smaller the predicted steps 
forward, the more likely it will be that a prediction is correct. The smallest step 
that can be predicted using the operator hierarchy is that from the hardwired 
memon (animals with ‘brains’, including human beings) to the softwired memon 
(a technical life form with modelled brains). The operator hierarchy predicts that 
a memic architecture is required if technical devices should show the emergent 
properties typical for memons, such as learning, association, creativity, 
intelligence, thinking and consciousness. These properties are all graded 
properties that increase in close correlation with the complexity of the neural 
network (e.g., size, connectivity, managing of weights of neural connections, 
hierarchy of feedback loops, etc.). In addition, a neural network has the 
advantage of efficiency because it does not have to store all past perceptions in 
files whose content has to endlessly increase over time with every experience 
(Baxter and Browne, 2009). Instead, a neural network stores new information by 
fine-tuning the structuring of one and the same network. 
 
The operator hierarchy could furthermore be applied in the field of artificial 
intelligence to redefine the meme concept. The classical meme concept was 
introduced by Dawkins (1989). Dawkins defines the meme as a concept that 
“conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission or a unit of imitation”. The 
meme has a deliberate association with the gene concept that represents the 
unit of heritable transmission. However, there is no proper parallel between the 
two concepts. Genes are material structures that code for organism properties. 
Memes are concepts of cultural transmission without a clear structural basis. 
The operator hierarchy suggests that the meme concept can be given a 
structural basis, if memes are defined as the coding that in technical memons 
(the softwired memons) contains the information about the number of neurons, 
their connections and the strength of these connections (Jagers op Akkerhuis, 
2001). 
 
The operator theory also offers a context for discussing the arrow of complexity 
hypothesis. On the arrow of complexity hypothesis, Bedau (2009) states the 
following:  
 
We can distinguish three things: (i) a trend, which is simply a 
directional change in some variable; (ii) a robust regularity, which is 
a generic or non-accidental trend and which can be thought of as a 
statistical “law” of nature; and (iii) a mechanism which explains how 
a trend (whether accidental or robust) is produced. Now we can 
formulate the arrow of complexity hypothesis—the hypothesis that 
evolution inherently creates increasingly complex adaptive 
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organisations as life forms. Note that the hypothesis is about the 
increasing complexity of the most complex forms of life, not of all 
life forms. The hypothesis concerns not mere complexity but 
adaptive complexity. The arrow hypothesis should be understood 
as a robust regularity that has exceptions, and it holds for evolving 
systems only given certain constraints. 
 
Assuming that both a trend and a robust regularity require a mechanism that 
explains their occurrence, confirmation of the arrow of complexity hypothesis 
requires an explanatory mechanism that, in a robust and regular way, increases 
the complexity of the most complex life forms. Demonstrating such a mechanism 
implies proof of the evolutionary advantages of complexity and a yardstick to 
measure it. The operator hierarchy solves the last problem by offering a strict 
yardstick as the number of closures a system shows and the elaborateness of a 
closure when present. Accordingly, plants are more complex than protozoa and 
single-celled blue-green algae are more complex than Pseudomonas bacteria.  
 
An indirect proof for the evolutionary advantage of complexity can be derived 
from the fact that no system can organise itself in contradiction to the laws of 
thermodynamics. Accordingly, the fact that high complexity memic operators 
exist on Earth implies that complexity must have advantages that outweigh the 
costs. Other approaches to prove the advantage of high complexity may involve, 
for example, the economy and the competitive power of three-dimensional 
multicellular shapes compared to those of single-celled organisms. However, if it 
is assumed that the operator hierarchy correctly indicates the only closure 
situations that are possible, this assumption implies a fixed direction for the 
arrow of complexity because any evolution process either comes to a halt or 
proceeds along the pathway of the operator hierarchy.  
What are potential weaknesses? 
The operator hierarchy was constructed with great care. Every step in the 
hierarchy was checked to confirm if no other layer could be added or if a layer 
could be made superfluous. In addition, the internal logic of the operator 
hierarchy based on closure dimensions and complexity layers acts as a control 
mechanism because it leaves little freedom for manipulation. Its applications 
show that the idea is compatible with a whole range of other scientific ideas that 
could be supplemented or improved by relating them to the operator hierarchy. 
 
Despite these positive aspects, it is important to remain critical and to 
continuously search for ways to falsify or improve the theory. The aim of this 
chapter is therefore to critically discuss various aspects of the operator hierarchy 
that may lead to questions or that require further research.  
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First of all, it must be said that the operator hierarchy has a strict and logical 
structure but that there is no clear explanation for the fact that every primary 
operator adds a new closure dimension. Although this may have something to 
do with the increasing conformational richness of every next hypercyclic 
configuration lying at the basis of every primary operator, it is still unclear how 
this mechanism works. It is easier to explain the observation that every primary 
operator shows transitions that recreate every existing closure dimension. The 
reason for this is that the transition cannot be made in another way (e.g., from 
quark to hadron, from atom to molecule) or that all possible pathways are in 
principle explored (e.g., from prokaryote unicellular to eukaryotic unicellular to 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic multicellular).  
 
Secondly, the operator hierarchy is based on hypothetical closures that 
represent the least complex configurations. Consequently, the closures that 
figure in the operator hierarchy will generally have no parallels in real life. Even 
the simplest bacterial cell will most likely require more than two catalysts to 
perform autocatalysis while maintaining the cell membrane. This artefact results 
from the intention to minimise complexity in order to gain more insight into what 
are the essential aspects of every transition in the hierarchy. 
 
Thirdly, it can be suggested that “”there are more things in heaven and earth, 
Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (William Shakespeare, Hamlet: 
Act 1. Scene V). In fact, this is a most interesting criticism. From science fiction 
stories, astrology programmes on television, biblical assumptions about 
resurrection and life after death, fairytales, ghost stories and the general 
scientific message that many things are still waiting to be discovered, most 
people are convinced that there is still much we do not know. The operator 
hierarchy offers a scientific way to discuss this point of view. The hierarchy’s 
logic implies that the space for potential novelty is rather limited. The reason is 
that the operator hierarchy ranks all the operator types that have occurred since 
the beginning of the universe from the fundamental particles to the memons. 
Furthermore, for all operator types, science has created and continues to create 
increasingly detailed insight into what forms the operators may take, how they 
interact with their environment and what they may transform into (when they 
can). Moreover, assuming that the operator hierarchy ranks all possibilities for 
first-next possible closure, no other types of operators can exist elsewhere in the 
universe. Accordingly, the space that is left for truly unexplainable things has 
become small indeed. That the space for unexplainable things is limited has also 
been convincingly advocated by ‘t Hoofd (2000). Of course, a reasoning like that 
given above is not complete without indicating that science can say little about 
things that it has not measured or cannot measure. How much space is left for 
new discoveries depends in the end on whether a natural limit exists to the 
number of phenomena that can exist in our universe at the different levels of 
organisation and as the result of all possible interactions between elements. 
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Fourthly, it may be argued that the danger of a scientific Procrustusian bed is 
lurking in the operator hierarchy. As an old Greek story goes, Procrustus was a 
blacksmith who invited people to sleep in his house. To a tall person he offered 
a small bed, and while the person slept, Procrustus hammered off his guest’s 
extremities that extended beyond the bed. Similarly, a short person was offered 
a large bed, and Procrustus stretched his body by hammering on it until it fit the 
bed. In the context of debunking the operator theory, it is a legitimate question 
whether the notion of a rough blueprint of the operator hierarchy has not been a 
reason for formulating definitions that  are fine-tuned to confirm the theory while 
a more general application of the principles would have led to a different 
outcome. This is an unlikely scenario because the definitions that describe the 
operator hierarchy were constructed so that the mechanisms involved are as 
general as possible to avoid manipulating definitions towards specific situations. 
Furthermore, any set of definitions that has been adapted to a Procrustusian bed 
will fail to fit with other approaches that are free of such limitations. In this sense 
it can be regarded as positive circumstantial evidence that the operator 
hierarchy has led to useful applications in various scientific fields (e.g., 
ecological hierarchy, definition of life). 
 
Fifthly, it must be concluded that the operator hierarchy offers no information 
about the average time that is required to reach any next level in the operator 
hierarchy. For this reason, the operator hierarchy lacks direct associations with 
time-related topics, such as evolutionary acceleration; it has a strict focus on 
structural transitions. The absence of time is not a unique property of the 
operator hierarchy. Time is not quantified in either thermodynamics or Darwinian 
evolution. But even though the operator hierarchy gives no information on this 
point, there are several reasons why an evolutionary process may speed up 
over time. 
 
a.  Development acceleration  
If elements remain in the system once they have been formed, this will 
increase the possibilities for novel interactions. If we now postulate an 
evolutionary rate as the chance per time that new elements are formed, this 
rate will actually represent acceleration because the evolutionary rate creates 
new elements on the basis of the cumulated number of elements formed. The 
combination of both processes implies that the evolutionary rate (dimension 
time-1) transforms into an evolutionary acceleration (dimension time-2).  
b.  Modularity and hierarchy   
Assuming a system of k building block elements that shows a hierarchical 
structure with many layers, and assuming that on average s components 
have to combine to form the elements of any next level in the hierarchy and 
take the same time to do so, it can be deduced that the time for the evolution 
of the whole system is proportional to the logarithm to base s of k. Given any 
system that is structured in this way, the time required to develop from a 
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system with 1 element to a system with 1000 elements would be the same as 
for a system of 1000 elements to reach the size of a million elements (see 
also Simon, 1962).  
c.  The evolution of evolvability   
Organisms are selected for a combination of complexity and efficiency that 
combines resource dominance strategies that, in a given environment, yield 
the highest increase in resource dominance. The organisms success in these 
combined efforts, e.g., their evolutionary success, can be measured either in 
terms of their present resource dominance or in terms of the increase and the 
acceleration hereof. A focus on these different rates is of marked importance; 
those that are the best now may soon lose to those that slowly improve and 
both strategies will be beaten in the long term by units that can increase their 
improvement rate. Early papers on the importance of the evolution of 
evolvability have been published by Wagner (1996). 
d.  The use of larger energy gradients in combination with increased efficiency 
This aspect selectively applies to living operators. To maintain their 
organisation, organisms need energy. If there is a large quantity of energy 
available, the organism can afford a larger organisation. For this reason, 
increasing complexity requires increasing efficiency and/or an increase in 
access to energy gradients. In this sense, the changes from litho-chemical 
metabolism to photosynthesis, to the consumption and digestion of organic 
material from other organisms, to fossil fuel, nuclear energy and solar energy 
can be regarded as innovations that have sustained and/or accelerated the 
evolution process.  
e. The evolution of concepts 
Once the level of memons has been reached, new discoveries can be 
learned and/or documented. In this way, knowledge can be disseminated 
(also without reproduction) and be used to create new tools to further 
increase the rate of new discoveries and the development of knowledge. This 
acceleration mechanism must be considered the cause of the knowledge 
explosion crises.   
 
Integrating the above and possibly other processes, Kurzweil (1999) has 
proposed the “law of time and chaos”, as follows: ‘In a process, the interval 
between salient events (that is, events that change the nature of the process, or 
significantly affect the future of the process) expands or contracts along with the 
amount of chaos’. Clearly, ‘time’ in this viewpoint is relative to the frequency of 
salient events. From this general viewpoint, two laws that are more specific can 
be derived, depending on whether one  considers increasingly chaotic systems 
or increasingly ordered systems. For increasingly chaotic systems, like the 
overall universe, the ‘negative’ version of the above law – ‘The law of increasing 
chaos’ -- reads as follows: ‘As chaos exponentially increases, time exponentially 
slows down; that is, the time interval between salient events grows longer as 
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time passes’. This fits well to the processes that can be observed in the overall 
universe, where most salient events, such as the formation of matter, occurred 
in the first seconds of the universe’s existence. The ‘positive’ version of the 
above law – ‘The law of accelerating returns’-- on the other hand, can be 
formulated as follows: ‘As order exponentially increases, time exponentially 
speeds up; that is, the time interval between salient events grows shorter as 
time passes’. The latter fits well with the acceleration of evolution observed in 
local spots of the universe where initial self-organisation processes (e.g., 
chemistry, autocatalysis) lead to increasingly rapid self-organisation (e.g., cells, 
multicellulars, memons, etc.). Together these two laws describe that in the 
universe, the overall processes increase chaos and slow time, whilst in some 
local systems order has increased and continues to produce more order in an 
increasingly rapid way.  
 
The law of time and chaos uses the word ‘salient’ events. I consider this 
formulation in perfect harmony with the operator theory because the operator 
hierarchy describes the occurrence of specific emergent properties that lead to 
the construction of new operators. The transitions leading from one operator to 
the next typically signify the most important ‘salient’ events in the universe. 
 
Of course, the above examples of acceleration are simplified generalisations 
that could suffer from various disturbances. For example, certain newly formed 
elements may negatively affect the formation of new elements by disrupting the 
system. Moreover, adding higher level elements may block certain types of 
interactions with lower levels, hereby reducing the number of interactive 
combinations. It may also be argued that at any moment in evolution, the 
possibility of forming new elements from the prevailing elements has simply 
been zero (e.g., there is no life on the moon), which makes the evolutionary rate 
drop to zero. Yet, the long array of system evolution from quarks to neural 
networks shows that, at least in our part of the universe, a fatal blocking of the 
process has not yet occurred.  
 
Sixthly, the question arises whether the operator theory represents a falsifiable 
construction, a construction in which experiments can be designed to prove or 
disprove the theory. The operator theory is, however, not a quantitative theory. It 
deals with the recognition and ranking of system configurations resulting from 
self-organisation processes. Is it possible to falsify such an approach? In this 
respect the following points may be considered to test the theory: (1) Is the 
ranking strict? (2) Is the second-order ranking by closure dimensions consistent? 
(3) Do any of the proposed transitions contradict thermodynamic laws? (4) Can 
the ranking be used to predict gaps? Although nothing indicates that the 
operator theory would violate the first three of these aspects, it is scientifically 
desirable to search for ways that can prove or disprove these aspects in a 
definite way. A difficulty with respect to the fourth point is that the theory cannot, 
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in principle, show gaps because it is designed as a strict ranking. If there were 
gaps, this would immediately require another ranking. The prediction of gaps is 
therefore limited to future operators that are not yet included in the ranking. Only 
the future will tell whether the predictions based on the operator hierarchy are 
correct. 
 
From the above points it can be concluded that certain aspects of the operator 
theory need to be further developed. The identification of operators showing the 
same closure dimension would especially profit from a less intuitive conceptual 
methodology. On the other hand, no aspects have been found where the 
operator hierarchy can easily be proven wrong or insufficient.  
How can the operator theory be evaluated? 
When it comes to judging the value of the operator theory, certain evaluation 
criteria are needed. In a review of theories for worldview comparison, Vidal 
(2009) offers a set of three objective criteria to evaluate and compare 
worldviews: (1) the theory should exhibit internal and systemic consistency, (2) 
the theory should fit with all natural sciences, and (3) the theory should address 
and adequately resolve worldview questions. Vidal mentions the following 
worldview questions in his paper: What is? Where does it all come from? Where 
are we going? What is good and what is evil? How should we act? What is true 
and what is false?  
 
Vidal’s criteria offer guidance to objectively discuss the operator theory’s value 
(Vidal 2009). First of all, the theory should exhibit internal end systemic 
consistency. In this respect, it may be judged as positive that all steps in the 
operator hierarchy are based on first-next possible closures and that a set of 
coherent definitions was used for its creation. A further indication for a strong 
internal consistency comes from the fact that no single operator can be taken 
from or added to the operator hierarchy without destroying the entire framework. 
Secondly, the operator hierarchy should fit all natural sciences. It should be 
stressed that the use of sound scientific criteria has always been the number 
one criterion for constructing the operator theory. All transitions and all system 
types have been checked – as much as possible -- for being based on testable 
scientific concepts. Thirdly, the theory should address and adequately resolve 
worldview questions. Although I am not sure whether other people might 
suggest additional worldview questions, the operator theory addresses at least 
three of Vidal’s questions. The question of “What is?” is addressed by the 
operator hierarchy, because the hierarchy hypothesizes that all structures in the 
universe are based on one of the system types in the operator hierarchy 
(including the pre-operator hypercyclic sets and the interfaces). While unifying 
theories such as the grand unification theory in physics address particles and 
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forces at one level of organisation, the operator hierarchy addresses particles at 
all levels of organisation. As it addresses more levels, the operator hierarchy can 
be used to suggest an answer to the questions of “What is life?” and “What is 
death?”. The question “Where does it all come from?” is partially addressed by 
the long sequence of operators illustrating the major organising principles that 
allowed the successive system types to come into being. Finally, the operator 
hierarchy offers a unique possibility to answer the question of “Where are we 
going?” because it predicts the major structural aspects of future operators, from 
which information can be gained about their interactive properties and thus, how 
they might become players in the world that we still consider ours. In fact, the 
operator theory can also be considered to address the question of “What is true 
and what is false?” because it has helped improve various definitions, including 
the definition of a particle, life, the organism, death and ecological hierarchy.  
Future development 
I am convinced that the most promising routes for future development lie in 
finding explanations for the second-order structure of the operator hierarchy. 
Insights into this structure will test the validity of the operator hierarchy. If the 
operator hierarchy’s basic structure can be consolidated and our understanding 
deepened, I see three exciting routes for future development. The first is to 
increase insight into the lowest levels of organisation. The second is to apply the 
operator hierarchy’s structure to solving long standing problems related to 
hierarchical organisation. The third is to increase both the detail and the reach of 
predictions of future operators. 
In conclusion 
Originally, the search for order that is described in this thesis started with an 
integration problem in ecotoxicology. But the direction of the project changed 
when the first ideas about the operator hierarchy emerged; it suddenly became 
possible to pursue the much broader goal of contributing to the unification in 
science by searching for rules that guide the development of structural 
complexity in the universe. As was demonstrated in the different chapters of this 
thesis, the operator hierarchy holds a central position in the organisation of 
matter. The strict ranking of the operators based on first-next possible closure 
offers a basis for several important applications, including the definition of life, 
the restructuring of the classical ecological hierarchy, the prediction of future 
operators and the offering of a scientific integration tool in the form of a periodic 
table for periodic tables. In this way, the operator hierarchy improved the 
analysis of organisation in biology, ecology and system science. Given its 
central position in natural organisation and its broad range of fundamental 
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applications, the operator hierarchy can be regarded as a unique step forward 
towards Von Bertalanffy’s dream of a ‘general theory of hierarchic order’ (Von 
Bertalanffy, 1968) . 
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Summary 
 
“To confine our attention to terrestrial matters would be to limit the human spirit.” 
(Stephen Hawking) 
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It has been estimated that more discoveries have been made in the past 30 
years than in the rest of human history. This explosion of knowledge has caused 
a crisis in science that is accompanied by overspecialisation and 
compartmentalisation. Scientists face the challenge of overcoming this crisis by 
constructing comprehensive and integrating concepts. This thesis presents a 
new method for creating bridges between disciplines and fighting the knowledge 
explosion crisis. 
 
 
In human history various theories have been developed that aim at creating 
coherence in the phenomena observed in the world. An ancient approach is that 
of the Ouroboros, the snake swallowing its tail. This symbol represents the 
continuity and eternity of life and the world. Later, in his Scala Naturae, the 
Greek philosopher and naturalist Aristotle ranked natural phenomena by 
decreasing perfection, from spiritual and divine beings to man, animals, plants 
and finally rocks and formless matter. Aristotle’s vision is also referred to as the 
Great Chain of Being. The Great Chain markedly influenced medieval 
Christianity, and, in turn, this chain influenced several well-known philosophers 
such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz.  
 
A current, comprehensive approach to the organisation of nature is Big History. 
Big History ranks all systems and processes by their occurrence in cosmic 
history. The approach rests on the scientific theory that the early universe was 
as small as a fundamental particle and obtained its present size after an 
explosive expansion: the Big Bang. Although the question about the universe’s 
origin remains unanswered, the Big Bang theory is firmly supported by modern 
particle physics and cosmological observations. 
 
Sometimes old structuring attempts are given a new interpretation, such as the 
Ouroboros in Figure 1. The left half of the figure shows how science has gained 
access to increasingly small systems, from large animals and plants, to 
individual cells, molecules, atoms, nuclear particles and finally quarks. The right 
half of the figure shows the scope of scientific research broadening towards 
increasingly large systems, from ecosystems, through planets, to solar systems, 
galaxies and finally the entire universe. When presented in this way, specific 
properties of the universe at large, such as the background radiation and its 
expansion in all directions, are connected with the universe’s initial state. As the 
Ouroboros picture suggests, where the enormous and the miniscule meet, the 
search for organisation in nature seems to swallow its tail.  
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Figure 1. This figure shows the historical expansion of scientific domains in the direction 
of the smallest systems and in the direction of the largest systems. GUT = grand unifying 
theory, Z and W indicate fundamental force carrying particles that are responsible for the 
weak nuclear force, DM = dark matter, cm = centimetre. 
Evolution beyond Darwin 
Despite all efforts aimed at unification in science, a general theoretical 
framework connecting the many fields of science has yet to be found. Many 
regard the lack of such a framework as a major deficit because it reduces our 
abilities to counteract current centrifugal trends in the knowledge explosion. This 
thesis aims to tackle this problem by systematically exploring unifying principles 
in science that may allow us to connect various scientific domains such as 
particle physics and evolution.  
 
Darwin’s theory of evolution offers a good starting point to explain how this 
thesis has approached the goal of developing unifying concepts. Darwin stated 
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that selection acts against offspring that are less well adapted to their 
environment. A white butterfly living in an ecosystem full of dark volcanic rocks is 
not well adapted to its environment because predatory birds can easily spot it. 
Consequently, it will suffer more predation than its darker relatives. As the genes 
of the dark parents code for dark offspring, the percentage of dark butterflies will 
increase with every generation. This example shows that the theory of evolution 
uses two processes. Firstly, the parents produce offspring with unique 
combinations of heritable properties and then the environment selects against 
less well-performing individuals.  
 
Butterflies and other organisms are not the only things that evolve. Particles 
evolve, too. Of course, the evolution of particles does not involve heritable 
variation. However, if particles collide, the product may be a new particle or a 
range of new particles. Just like reproduction, such processes produce new 
variation, and the particles that are produced also experience selection. For 
example, the hot gaseous environment of a star continuously produces various 
atomic “species”, while only a few of these are stable in the hot environment. We 
may regard this as a form of evolution where the process of diversification is 
based on production instead of on reproduction.  
 
Productive and reproductive evolution processes became active at different 
moments in cosmic history. The early universe had only physical particles and 
only production could create diversity that selection could act on. Much later, the 
emergence of organisms introduced the possibility of reproductive creation of 
diversity.  
 
The difference between the productive and the reproductive production of 
diversity coincides with the conceptual separation of physics and biology. To 
close this gap, this thesis suggests using a general definition of evolution based 
on diversification (the production of variation) and selection, and the modification 
of these aspects by circumstances. In relation to given contexts, diversification 
can relate to the chemical production of variation, to organic reproduction and, in 
the future, to the technical construction of offspring. Similarly, selection can 
change in relation to the system types that are considered. This approach allows 
the evolution concept to be applied to all operators in the universe, from 
fundamental particles through living organisms to future robotic life forms.  
Levels of complexity 
The difference between evolution based on production and reproduction is, 
however, not the only reason why the fields of physics and biology seem to 
resist integration. There is another barrier. In physics, researchers usually have 
a clear picture in mind when referring to levels of complexity, such as nuclear 
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particles, atoms and molecules. The formation of these particles is generally 
attributed to condensation reactions and not to evolution. In biology, Darwin’s 
theory of evolution is broadly accepted, but this theory ignores he complexity 
levels of organisms.  
 
Darwin knew, of course, that bacteria, protozoa, plants and fungi, and animals 
existed. But he did not need the differences in complexity between these groups 
to define what was later coined the “struggle for life” and “survival of the fittest”. 
Although genetics has contributed much to the understanding of evolutionary 
mechanisms, its development has not helped much with understanding the 
complexity levels of organisms, with the exception of the difference between 
organisms without or with mitochondrial genes.  
 
That it pays no attention to structural complexity represents a serious flaw in 
Darwin’s theory. Because of this flaw, the theory of evolution cannot answer an 
apparently simple question such as “Is it possible to predict what the next step in 
the evolution process will be?” It also cannot answer a question such as “Are 
endosymbiontic/eukaryotic cells the only logical successors of bacteria?” To 
answer these questions requires a comprehensive theory that accounts for 
structural complexity and its levels. 
Dimensions for hierarchy 
Levels in the organisation of nature are frequently represented as a sequence of 
increasingly complex system types. The literature contains many examples of 
such sequences. Generally, these sequences exhibit marked similarity to the 
following example: atom, molecule, organelle, cell, tissue, organ, organism, 
population, community, ecosystem, planet, solar system, galaxy and universe 
(Fig. 2). What is very interesting about these kinds of hierarchies is that, at face 
value, they seem useful tools for organising complexity, whereas on closer 
consideration it is easy to show that they are actually based on an inconsequent 
use of hierarchy rules. 
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Figure 2. A typical example of the much 
used ranking of complexity generally 
indicated as ‘ecological hierarchy’ 
 
To solve problems with existing approaches, Figure 3 introduces a new vision to 
analyse hierarchy in nature. It is based on three fundamental directions: (1) the 
hierarchy from a particle to a system of interacting particles, (2) the hierarchy 
ranking particles of different complexity, and (3) the hierarchy in the interior of a 
particle. This thesis proposes that these three directions represent three 
dimensions for hierarchy. 
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Figure 3. The figure represents the three fundamental dimensions for hierarchy in the 
organisation of nature Upward pointing arrows indicate increasing complexity in systems 
of interacting particles. Arrows pointing to the right indicate how lower level organisms 
create higher level organisms. Downward pointing arrows indicate increasing complexity 
in the internal organisation of an organism. 
 
The idea that there are three dimensions for hierarchy in nature is illustrated in 
Figure 3. For simplicity reasons, the figure is deliberately limited to prokaryotic 
cells and eukaryotic cells. Based on the same principle, the figure can be 
extended in the direction of fundamental particles and in the direction of more 
complex organisms. The figure shows that it is important to use dimensions in a 
systemic manner. It is, in principle, not allowed to switch between dimensions 
when analysing hierarchy. In relation to the latter rule, Figure 4 shows what an 
ecological ranking looks like that respects the three dimensions for hierarchy. 
The left column of this figure shows that local areas in the universe display an 
ongoing development and differentiation from vague aggregations of matter, to 
galaxies, solar systems, planets and ecosystems. On the opposite side, the right 
column illustrates how hierarchy can be analysed in the interior of a particle. The 
column in the centre shows that specific forms of aggregation or the formation of 
internal structures can give rise to more complex particles. 
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Figure 4. Ranking of systems that accounts for three dimensions for ecological hierarchy  
Towards a strict ranking 
The particle hierarchy in the central column of Figure 4 forms the core of the 
theory discussed in this thesis. In this hierarchy, every step results from a self-
organisation process. This self-organisation automatically causes a new cyclic 
process (a functional aspect) and a new circular shape (a structural aspect). A 
concept generally used in system science to indicate cyclic interactions is 
‘closure’. As the result of the functional and structural closure, the interactions 
form a new unit.  
 
The theory in this thesis now focuses on situations in nature in which a next 
particle type and associated closures are realised as the first possibility nature 
allows. This logic was named the principle of ‘first-next possible closure’. The 
use of first-next possible closure allows the creation of a strict hierarchy that is 
based on self-organisation steps, a property that is fundamental to the theory 
presented in this thesis. Whereas most theories apply a rather loose and 
intuitive classification of stages or levels of complexity, our objective is to 
develop a systematic version that explains why the next level was both possible 
and inevitable. 
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The definition of first-next possible closure allowed the identification of all 
systems in the universe that comply with this demand. These systems form a 
highly special and strictly hierarchical subset of all the systems in the universe. 
This subset includes the quarks and hadrons, the atoms, the molecules, the 
prokaryotic cells, the eukaryotic cells, the multicellulars and the animals. 
Searching for a logical name for all the systems in this subset, I realised that, 
due to their closures, these systems can be considered as individual operational 
units. This was the reason why I named them ‘operators’. Thus, by first-next 
possible closure, an operator type at one particular level of complexity 
transforms to an operator type at the next level.  
 
The introduction of the operator concept can be regarded as a major tool for 
bringing physics and biology closer by bridging the gap between abiotic and 
living systems; the operator concept shows that both spheres of existence are 
ultimately guided by the same organising principles such that, at a high level of 
abstraction, both physics and biology are studying the same kind of systems: the 
operators. The word operator has various meanings in other contexts, such as 
mathematics and the operation of machinery. In the context of the theory 
proposed in this thesis, the concept always refers to the system types that are 
related to each other by first-next possible closures.  
 
The dark line in Figure 5 shows how subsequent first-next possible closures 
connect all the operators. This hierarchical organisation has been named the 
“operator hierarchy” and represents an important result of the present study. In 
comparison to other approaches to hierarchy in nature, the operator hierarchy 
possesses the special property that it is strict; that is, it is impossible to delete a 
single operator from the scheme or add one to it without destroying the 
scheme’s entire logic. Another aspect that is unique to the operator hierarchy is 
that it introduces a new name for animals: memons. This adaptation is needed 
to distinguish between the organisms that do and the organisms that do not 
show neural network structure. Accordingly, a human being is an organism and 
a memon, but a plant is only an organism. The concept of the memon is also 
more practical than the concept of an animal when it comes to classifying future 
intelligent technical beings.  
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Figure 5. The evolution of the operators 
The dark line shows the historical pathway by which first-next possible closures created 
the operators. The gray columns indicate systems resulting from first-next possible 
closure that are not operators. Explanation of abbreviations: SAE ('Structural Auto 
Evolution’) = the property of an operator to autonomously evolve the structure that carries 
its information. SCI (‘Structural Copying of Information’) = the property of an operator to 
autonomously copy its information (genes, learned knowledge) by simply copying part of 
its structure. HMI (Hypercycle Mediating interface) = a closure creates an interface that 
mediates the functioning of the hypercycle. Multi-state = operator showing closure 
between multiple units of exactly one lower closure level. Hypercycle = closure based on 
emergent, second-order recurrent interactions. Interface = closure creating an emergent 
limit to an operator. CALM (Categorizing And Learning Module) = a minimum neural 
memory. 
A new natural order that connects scientific disciplines 
The goal of this thesis was to systematically explore unifying principles in 
science that may allow us to connect various scientific domains such as particle 
physics and evolution. How does the operator hierarchy contribute to this goal? 
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As an answer to this question, I have summarised the ways in which the 
operator hierarchy can be applied to various scientific integration topics:  
• The operator hierarchy allows ecological hierarchies to be improved by taking 
into account the following three dimensions for hierarchy: (1) the hierarchy of 
the operators, (2) the internal organisation of the operators, and (3) the 
interactions between operators, giving rise to hierarchy in large systems of 
interacting operators. Uncontrolled mixing of these three aspects disturbs the 
logic of any hierarchical ranking. 
• Conventional definitions of Darwinian evolution are based on heredity, 
reproductive diversification, and selection. The operator hierarchy now adds 
levels of complexity to this list of aspects that are relevant to evolution. 
• The operator hierarchy offers a periodic table to which other periodic tables 
can be linked, such as the periodic table of the elements, the standard model, 
the eightfold way of the hadrons, and the tree of life. 
• The operator theory offers a completely new viewpoint for defining life, the 
organism and death. Life was defined as matter with the operator structure 
and an equal or even higher complexity than that of the cellular operator. In a 
strict sense, an organism can be defined as an operator that agrees with the 
definition of life. Death occurs when irreversible deterioration causes the loss 
of the level of closure that is typical for the organism. 
• If the operator hypothesis correctly predicts that the possibilities for 
constructing all operators are guided by closure as a fundamental rule for 
organising matter, the operator hierarchy would be valid in the entire 
universe. If this is the case, extraterrestrial life will show the same 
fundamental closures as life on Earth. Of course, the actual size, shape, 
physiology, molecular construction, colour, etc. may differ. 
• First-next possible closures may form and disintegrate. Given the existence 
of a long sequence of operators, closure must represent a thermodynamically 
favourable situation. Consequently, the arrow of complexity moves towards 
complex operators, unless ambient conditions block the process. 
• The operator hierarchy offers a framework that, possibly for the first time in 
scientific history, allows essential construction-properties of future operators 
to be predicted. The operator theory predicts that technical memons are the 
next step in operator evolution. The use of the operator hierarchy gives much 
more weight to the resulting predictions than can be given to extrapolations 
based on existing trends in technological development. In addition, the 
operator hierarchy opens up possibilities to look much further ahead. 
• The operator hierarchy offers a structured scheme for discussing the things 
between heaven and earth that are known to science and to speculate about 
the possibilities for things still undiscovered. 
• Because a memic architecture represents just another operator in the 
sequence of the operator hierarchy, there are no scientific reasons for 
considering human beings as some kind of final stage in evolution or as a 
crown on a reputed creation. 
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• The operator theory indicates that it may be practical to introduce a novel 
interpretation of the meme concept. A  meme currently stands for a cultural 
replicator without any structural parallel with the gene, which stands for a 
molecular replicator. By creating a meme concept that refers to the neural 
network structure of a memon, the analogy can be improved. A structural 
meme would take the form of a code-string coding for the number of neurons 
in a network, the connections of these neurons and the inhibitory or excitatory 
strengths of the connections. The new meme could actually code for all the 
knowledge in a given neural network and would reintroduce Lamarckian 
inheritance. 
The operator theory: a new approach? 
The operator theory is an innovative approach, but it is not an entirely new 
concept. Around 1950, the French palaeontologist, philosopher and Jesuit Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin was working in the same direction. His attempt aimed at 
integrating system theory with Christianity. In his work Teilhard de Chardin 
distinguished the systems that are ‘formed’ and ‘centered’ from all the other 
systems that do not show these properties. He was convinced that only the 
formed and centred systems were relevant in creating an evolutionary hierarchy. 
Teilhard de Chardin’s work is not generally accepted in the scientific community. 
One reason for this may be that several important organising principles that 
could have supported his approach still had yet to be discovered. Another 
reason may be Teilhard de Chardin’s prediction of the unification of man and 
God, called Point Omega, as a final level in the hierarchy.  
 
The concepts of structural and functional closure and the use of operators in the 
present approach show connections with the work of Teilhard de Chardin. The 
operator theory extends the approach, however, with modern self-organisation 
theory, with the concept of first-next possible closure and with the recognition of 
the secondary structure of the operator hierarchy. In contrast to Teilhard de 
Chardin’s work, the operator hierarchy strongly suggests that the evolution of the 
operators has no end.  
 
A detailed approach describing the evolution of particles and organisms 
comparable to the operator hierarchy was not found in the literature. Because 
this viewpoint is new, many of its aspects are still open to further research. I 
consider it especially interesting and rewarding to increase our understanding of 
the rules defining the operator hierarchy’s internal structure (Fig.5). Now that the 
operator hierarchy offers a fundament for understanding the evolution of the 
operators, the next challenging goal is to predict future operators as accurately 
and as far ahead as possible.  
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Samenvatting 
“When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty.  
I think only how to solve the problem.  
But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong.”  
(Buckminster Fuller)  
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De laatste dertig jaar zijn meer ontdekkingen gedaan dan in alle eeuwen 
daarvoor. Deze kennisexplosie heeft geleid tot een crisis in de wetenschap. De 
afstand tussen verschillende disciplines neemt toe en het onderlinge begrip 
neemt af omdat wetenschappers zich steeds meer zijn gaan specialiseren. Dit 
proefschrift biedt een nieuw raamwerk dat samenhang creëert tussen 
wetenschapsdisciplines en zo deze kenniscrisis te lijf kan gaan. 
 
Door de eeuwen heen zijn verschillende theorieën ontwikkeld die zich richten op 
het ordenen van fenomenen in de ons omringende wereld. Een voorbeeld uit de 
verre oudheid is de Ouroboros, de slang die zijn eigen staart verzwelgt. Deze 
slang was het symbool van de continuïteit en de eeuwigheid van het leven en de 
wereld. Later, in zijn Scala Naturae stelde de Griekse filosoof Aristoteles een 
indeling voor van de natuur op basis van afnemende perfectie, namelijk de 
heilige en bovennatuurlijke zaken, mensen, dieren, planten en levenloze dingen. 
Deze theorie speelt ook een rol in het middeleeuwse christendom en is terug te 
vinden in het werk van bekende filosofen uit de gouden eeuw, zoals Descartes, 
Spinoza en Leibniz.  
 
Een recent voorbeeld van een ordening van de natuur is Big History. Big History 
streeft naar een omvattende weergave van de ontwikkelingen in het heelal sinds 
het allereerste begin. Het gaat ervan uit dat het vroege heelal zo klein was als 
een fundamenteel deeltje en dat het tot zijn huidige grootte is uitgedijd na een 
explosieve beginfase: de oerknal. Zowel de moderne deeltjesfysica als de 
kosmologie leveren onderbouwing aan de oerknaltheorie.  
 
Soms wordt aan oude symbolen van ordening een nieuwe inhoud gegeven, 
bijvoorbeeld aan de Ouroboros in Figuur 1. Hier is aan de ene kant 
weergegeven hoe de wetenschap inzicht heeft gekregen in steeds kleinere 
systemen (van dieren, naar cellen, naar moleculen, atomen en quarks) terwijl ze 
aan de andere kant steeds grotere systemen is gaan onderzoeken (van 
ecosystemen, via planeten naar sterrenstelsels en uiteindelijk het hele heelal). 
Deze manier van presentatie verbindt enkele bijzondere eigenschappen van het 
heelal in zijn geheel, zoals de reststraling van de oerknal en de uitdijing in alle 
richtingen, met de begintoestand van een mini-heelal, die de oorsprong was van 
deze eigenschappen. Hierdoor lijkt het of het onderzoek naar de kosmische 
ordening in zijn eigen staart bijt zoals bij de Ouroboros. 
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Figuur 1: Historische uitbreiding van de reikwijdte van wetenschapsvelden in de richting 
van steeds kleinere en steeds grotere systemen. GUT = grote unificerende theorie, DM = 
donkere materie, Z en W staan voor twee fundamentele deeltjes die verantwoordelijk zijn 
voor de zwakke kernkracht, cm = centimeter.  
Darwin als startpunt 
Ondanks al deze pogingen tot ordening is het nog niet gelukt om een algemeen 
geaccepteerd raamwerk te ontwikkelen dat alle wetenschappelijke disciplines 
met elkaar verbindt. Dit wordt vooral in de systeemkunde en de filosofie als een 
gemis ervaren. Dit proefschrift beschrijft een nieuw ordenend principe met als 
doel daarmee bruggen te kunnen bouwen tussen de verschillende wetenschaps-
velden.  
 
Bij het realiseren van dit doel is de evolutietheorie van Darwin als startpunt 
genomen. Darwin stelt dat de natuur selecteert op nakomelingen die zijn 
aangepast aan hun omgeving. Een witte vlinder die leeft in een omgeving met 
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veel donkere rotsen, is slecht aangepast en vogels zullen hem snel herkennen. 
De witte vlinder wordt eerder opgegeten dan zijn donkere soortgenoten. Op 
deze wijze selecteert een donkere omgeving op donkere vlinders. Deze zullen 
vervolgens via hun genen de donkere kleur doorgeven aan hun jongen en 
generatie na generatie zal het percentage donkere individuen toenemen. Dit 
voorbeeld laat zien dat de evolutie gebruik maakt van twee processen. Eerst 
produceren ouders nakomelingen met een unieke mix van overerfbare 
eigenschappen en vervolgens selecteert de omgeving in het nadeel van de 
slechtst presterende individuen.  
 
Vlinders en andere organismen zijn niet de enige zaken die evolueren. Ook 
deeltjes evolueren. Natuurlijk is er bij deeltjes geen sprake van erfelijke variatie. 
Maar als deeltjes samensmelten en soms weer opsplitsen zijn niet alle ontstane 
deeltjes gelijk aan de oorspronkelijke deeltjes. Er ontstaan nieuwe varianten. En 
ook deeltjes staan bloot aan selectie. Bijvoorbeeld in de hete gassen van een 
ster worden voortdurend verschillende atoomkernen geproduceerd, terwijl 
slechts sommige typen atoomkernen stabiel zijn in dit hete milieu. Ook hier is 
sprake van evolutie, maar hierbij is de variatie in gevormde deeltjes het resultaat 
van productie en niet van reproductie zoals bij de vlinders.  
 
Deze twee vormen van evolutie hebben op verschillende momenten hun intrede 
gedaan in het heelal. Eerst waren er alleen fysische deeltjes, zoals atomen en 
moleculen en was productieve evolutie de enige mogelijkheid. Pas veel later 
werd reproductieve evolutie mogelijk, namelijk nadat organismen met erfelijke 
eigenschappen waren ontstaan. 
 
Het verschil tussen evolutie op basis van productie en reproductie valt samen 
met de scheiding tussen de fysica en de biologie. Om deze kloof te dichten, gaat 
dit proefschrift uit van een algemene definitie van evolutie die de productie van 
variatie combineert met selectie. De productie van variatie is breed toepasbaar 
en kan opeenvolgend het resultaat zijn van chemische productie, van 
biologische reproductie en zelfs, in de toekomst, van technische constructie van 
nakomelingen. Het begrip selectie is eveneens bruikbaar in zowel de fysica als 
in de biologie. 
Niveaus in complexiteit 
Het verschil tussen productieve en reproductieve evolutie is niet de enige 
hinderpaal die in de weg staat bij integratie van fysische en biologische 
wetenschapsvelden. Er is nog een barrière. In de fysica heeft men een helder 
beeld van niveaus van complexiteit, zoals kerndeeltjes, atomen en moleculen. 
Voor het ontstaan van deze niveaus denkt men gewoonlijk niet aan een 
evolutieproces. In de biologie is de evolutietheorie van Darwin algemeen 
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geaccepteerd, maar deze besteedt echter geen aandacht aan de complexiteit 
van organismen.  
 
Darwin kende zeer zeker de verschillen tussen bacteriën, protozoën, 
meercelligen zoals planten en schimmels, en dieren. Maar hij had de verschillen 
in complexiteit tussen deze groepen niet nodig om het mechanisme van 
‘struggle for life’ en ‘survival of the fittest’ te bedenken. Diepgaande genetische 
experimenten om de evolutietheorie van Darwin te onderbouwen hebben 
evenmin bijgedragen aan een beter inzicht in niveaus van structurele 
complexiteit.  
 
Dit nu blijkt een tekortkoming van Darwin’s theorie. De evolutietheorie kan 
namelijk in zijn huidige vorm geen antwoord geven op de simpele vraag 
“Kunnen we de volgende stap in de evolutie voorspellen?” Ook andere vragen 
zoals: “Zijn in de evolutie eukaryote cellen de enige logische opvolgers van 
bacteriën, of zijn er andere mogelijkheden?” kunnen niet worden beantwoord. 
Voor het oplossen van dergelijke fundamentele problemen is een theorie nodig 
die inzicht geeft in het ontstaan van verschillende niveaus van organisatie in de 
natuur. 
Dimensies voor hiërarchie 
Het ontstaan van organisatieniveaus wordt vaak weergegeven als een 
hiërarchische volgorde van systemen. De literatuur geeft hiervan talrijke 
voorbeelden. De gepresenteerde opeenvolgingen van systemen zijn op het 
eerste gezicht heel logisch, zoals atoom, molecuul, organel, cel, weefsel, 
orgaan, organisme, populatie, gemeenschap, ecosysteem, planeet, 
zonnestelsel, sterrenstelsel, heelal ( figuur 2). Een dergelijke benadering van de 
hiërarchie in de natuur heeft breed opgang gedaan in de exacte 
wetenschappen. Echter, bij nadere bestudering blijkt deze hiërarchie niet 
consequent.  
 
In Figuur 3 wordt een nieuwe benadering geïntroduceerd voor het analyseren 
van hiërarchie in de natuur op basis van drie fundamentele richtingen. Ten 
eerste bestaat er een hiërarchie die loopt van individuele deeltjes naar groepen 
van deeltjes. Ten tweede bestaat er een hiërarchie die loopt van fysische 
deeltjes naar organismen. Ten derde bestaat er een hiërarchie die de interne 
organisatie van de deeltjes ordent. Dit proefschrift stelt de term dimensies voor 
voor deze drie manieren van ordening.  
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Figuur 2. Een typische weergave van de veel 
gebruikte ordening van complexiteit die meestal 
wordt aangeduid als de ecologische hiërarchie.  
 
In het voorbeeld van Figuur 3 staan alleen bacteriën en eukaryote cellen, maar 
het is niet moeilijk om dit schema uit te breiden in de richting van fysische 
deeltjes en in de richting van meer complexe organismen. Het voorbeeld in 
figuur 3 laat ook zien dat het na de keuze voor het volgen van hierarchie in een 
bepaalde dimensie niet mogelijk is om naar hierarchie in een andere dimensie 
over te stappen. Deze manier van denken is gebruikt om Fig. 2 zo aan te 
passen dat de nieuwe ordening wel rekening houdt met hiërarchische 
dimensies. Het resultaat staat in Fig. 4. De linker kolom laat zien dat in het 
heelal steeds deelgebieden ontstaan met toenemende differentiatie, te beginnen 
met sterrenstelsels, gevolgd door zonnestelsels, zonnen, planeten en 
ecosystemen. In de rechter kolom is voor enkele deeltjes aangegeven hoe de 
complexiteit toeneemt door interne differentiatie. De middelste kolom toont dat 
samenwerking of interne differentiatie de basis kan vormen voor een toename 
van complexiteit van fysische deeltjes tot complexe organismen. 
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Figuur 3. Drie fundamentele richtingen voor hiërarchie in de natuur. Pijlen naar boven 
wijzen van organismen naar toenemende complexiteit in ecosystemen. Pijlen naar rechts 
wijzen in de richting van organismen met toenemende complexiteit. Pijlen naar beneden 
wijzen in de richting van hiërarchie in de interne organisatie van organismen. 
 
 
Figuur 4 Een herschikking van de systemen in een ecologische hiërarchie waarbij is 
uitgegaan van drie dimensies.  
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Figure 5. De evolutie van de operatoren. De donkere lijn volgt het historische pad 
waarlangs door middel van first-next possible closures de opeenvolgende operatoren zijn 
gevormd. De systemen in de grijze kolommen zijn wel het gevolg van eerstvolgende 
mogelijke closure, maar zijn strikt genomen geen operatoren omdat ze alleen een 
cyclisch proces of een cyclische structuur (de ‘interface’) vertegenwoordigen en niet een 
combinatie van beide.  
 
Verklaring van afkortingen Fig. 5:  
SAE (Structural Auto Evolution) - de eigenschap dat een operator zelfstandig het deel van zijn structuur 
dat de informatie bevat, kan evolueren 
 SCI (Structural Copying of Information) - de eigenschap dat een operator zelfstandig de in zijn 
hypercyclus vastgelegde informatie kan kopiëren door eenvoudigweg hiervan de structuur te kopiëren. 
Deze informatie is vastgelegd in de elementen van de katalytische hypercyclus of in de neurale 
hypercyclus. 
Hypercycle - de first-next possible closure die is gebaseerd op cirkels bestaande uit cyclische processen  
Interface - een first-next possible closure die een nieuwe ruimtelijke grens creëert.  
CALM (Categorizing And Learning Module) - een minimale eenheid voor neuraal geheugen. 
HMI (Hypercycle Mediating interface) - een first-next possible closure veroorzaakt een interface die 
selectief interacties afschermt tussen de hypercyclus en de buitenwereld. 
 Multi-state - een operator gebaseerd op structurele en functionele first-next possible closure op basis 
van operatoren van een closure-niveau lager. 
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Een strikte rangorde 
De hiërarchie van deeltjes in de middelste kolom van Figuur 4 vormt de basis 
voor de theorie in dit proefschrift. In deze hiërarchie is in iedere volgende stap 
een zelforganisatieproces te herkennen. Deze zelforganisatie leidt automatisch 
tot een nieuw cyclisch proces en een nieuwe cyclische vorm. Door het sluiten 
van deze cirkels ontstaat een nieuwe eenheid. Een kringvorm van dergelijke 
interacties wordt in de systeemkunde algemeen aangeduid met het begrip 
‘closure’, wat daarom ook in de hier ontwikkelde theorie is gebruikt. Closure 
betekent in het Engels afronding of geslotenheid.  
 
De theorie in dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op situaties in de natuur waar een 
nieuw type deeltje en daaraan verbonden volgende closure automatisch wordt 
gerealiseerd als de eerstvolgende mogelijkheid die de natuur toelaat. Deze 
opeenvolging van twee deeltjes wordt hier aangeduid als ‘ first-next possible 
closure’ (eerstvolgende mogelijke closure). Het gebruik van dit begrip maakt een 
strikte ordening mogelijk en is daarom onmisbaar voor de hier uiteengezette 
theorie. Het kijken naar de combinatie van gesloten processen en gesloten 
vormen in combinatie met het principe van first-next possible closure leidt er toe 
dat slechts één bijzondere groep systemen in het heelal aan dit principe voldoet. 
Al deze systemen blijken via de eis van first-next possible closure met elkaar te 
zijn verbonden in een grote afstammingsboom en vormen daarmee een strikt 
hiërarchische deelverzameling van alle systemen in het heelal. Deze 
deelverzameling omvat de fundamentele deeltjes, de hadronen, de atomen, de 
moleculen, de prokaryote cellen, de eukaryote cellen, de pro- en eukaryote 
meercelligen en de dieren.  
 
Ieder element van deze verzameling is op basis van zijn closures van de 
omgeving te onderscheiden als een individuele operationele eenheid. Dit is de 
reden dat de verzameling van alle elementen in de hiërarchie in dit proefschrift 
de naam ‘operatoren’ heeft gekregen. 
 
De introductie van het concept operator biedt een belangrijke bijdrage aan het 
samenbrengen van verschillende natuurwetenschapsgebieden. Het blijkt 
namelijk dat in al deze wetenschapsgebieden een zelfde type bouwsteen, deze 
zogenaamde operator, de basis vormt van de onderzochte systemen. Hiermee 
krijgt het begrip operator een extra betekenis naast bestaande betekenissen in 
het Engels, zoals een wiskundige bewerking of iemand die een apparaat 
bedient, bijvoorbeeld een telefonist(e).  
 
In Figuur 5 is met een donkere lijn de familiestamboom van de opeenvolgende 
operatoren aangegeven. Deze hiërarchische ordening van alle operatoren is de 
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‘operatorhiërarchie’ genoemd en is het resultaat van deze studie. De 
operatorhiërarchie heeft, in tegenstelling tot alle eerder ontwikkelde 
hiërarchische benaderingen van de natuur, de bijzondere eigenschap dat het 
niet mogelijk is om één operator aan de hiërarchie toe te voegen of er uit te 
breken zonder dat de hele structuur uiteen valt. Wat ook nieuw is aan de 
operatorhiërarchie is dat de groep dieren een nieuwe naam heeft gekregen, 
namelijk ‘memon’ (meervoud memons). Deze aanpassing maakt een helder 
onderscheid mogelijk tussen organismen zonder en organismen met neuraal 
netwerk. Zo is de mens bijvoorbeeld een organisme en een memon, terwijl een 
plant alleen een organisme is. Bovendien is het woord memon in de toekomst 
ook te gebruiken voor levende wezens die zijn gebaseerd op technische neurale 
netwerken (de robot-achtige systemen of ook wel ‘technische memons’). 
Nieuwe ordening verenigt disciplines 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om ordenende principes in de 
natuurwetenschappen te vinden en deze toe te passen bij het bouwen van 
bruggen tussen de disciplines. Hier volgt een beschrijving van de fundamentele 
bijdragen die de operatortheorie kan leveren aan een brede integratie van de 
exacte wetenschappen. 
• De operatortheorie maakt het mogelijk om bestaande ecologische 
hiërarchieën te verbeteren door rekening te houden met drie aspecten: de 
hiërarchie van de operatoren, de interne organisatie van operatoren en 
interacties tussen operatoren (zie Fig. 4). Het gemengd toepassen van deze 
drie aspecten in hiërarchische benaderingen verstoort de logica daarvan.  
• Gangbare definities van Darwiniaanse evolutie zijn sterk gefocused op 
erfelijkheid, reproductieve diversificatie en selectie. De operatortheorie maakt 
het mogelijk om de complexiteit van organismen toe te voegen aan de 
evolutietheorie.  
• De operatortheorie biedt een periodiek systeem voor de koppeling van alle 
andere periodieke systemen (voor zover deze betrekking hebben op 
operatoren). 
• De operatortheorie biedt een nieuwe context voor het definiëren van leven. 
Leven kan worden gedefinieerd als materie met de structuur van een 
operator en met de minimale complexiteit van de (prokaryote) cellulaire 
operator. Als consequentie hiervan zal ook de definitie van een organisme 
als volgt moeten worden aangepast. Een organisme is een operator die 
voldoet aan de definitie van leven. Sterfte treedt op als een irreversibel 
vervalproces dat de organisatie van een organisme aantast, leidt tot het 
verlies van de voor dit organisme kenmerkende meest complexe first-next 
possible closure. 
• Als mag worden aangenomen dat het principe van first-next possible closure 
algemene geldigheid heeft in heel het heelal, dan moeten buitenaardse 
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levensvormen op dezelfde first-next possible closures zijn gebaseerd als het 
leven op aarde. 
• De operatorhiërarchie laat zien dat first-next possible closures kunnen 
worden gevormd en ook weer uiteen kunnen vallen. De lange keten van 
operatoren toont daarnaast aan dat het optreden van zelf-organisatie in de 
vorm van first-next possible closure in thermodynamisch opzicht een 
gunstige toestand moet zijn. Dit betekent dat de ontwikkelingen daarom altijd 
voort zullen snellen in de richting van de volgende operator, tenzij locale 
omstandigheden het zelforganizatieproces niet faciliteren. 
• De operatorhiërarchie biedt een nieuw raamwerk dat gerichte voorspellingen 
mogelijk maakt van essentiële constructie-eigenschappen van toekomstige 
operatoren. De operatortheorie voorspelt dat memons gebaseerd op 
technische neurale netwerken de volgende stap vormen in de evolutie van de 
operatoren. Onderbouwing door middel van de operatorhiërarchie geeft aan 
een voorspelling een veel zwaarder gewicht dan aan extrapolaties gebaseerd 
op bestaande trends in de ontwikkeling van robots. Bovendien kan op basis 
van de operatorhiërarchie veel verder vooruit worden gekeken. 
• De operatorhiërarchie biedt een raamwerk om op een gestructureerde 
manier de discussie te voeren of er meer is tussen hemel en aarde dan waar 
de wetenschap zicht op heeft door aan te geven waar onbekende zaken zich 
met grote waarschijnlijkheid niet bevinden. 
• Omdat de memon gewoon een willekeurige operator in de operatorhiërarchie 
is, zijn er geen wetenschappelijke redenen om mensen te beschouwen als 
het eindpunt van de evolutie of als een kroon op een vermoede schepping. 
• De operatortheorie laat zien, dat het wenselijk is om het begrip ‘meem’ voor 
een idee in een informatiedrager zoals de hersenen (de “meme” senu 
Dawkins) en daaraan verwante culturele replicatoren (melodieën, text, etc.) 
aan te vullen met een extra interpretatie die wél een structurele parallel 
vertoont met het begrip gen (Engels: gene). Dit kan door de meem ook te 
laten verwijzen naar de structuur van het neurale netwerk van een memon. 
Een meem krijgt dan de vorm van een serie codes die weergeeft welke 
neuronen worden verbonden, welke verbindingen er bestaan tussen de 
neuronen en welke sterkte de verbindingen hebben. In principe kan met een 
dergelijke meem en de bijbehorende interface alle kennis van een memon 
worden overgebracht op eventuele nakomelingen. 
De volgende uitdaging 
De operatorhiërarchie is een sterk vernieuwende theorie, maar desondanks niet 
een volledig nieuwe benadering. De Franse paleontoloog, filosoof en Jezuïet 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin heeft halverwege de vorige eeuw een serieuze 
poging ondernomen in dezelfde richting. Hij was op zoek naar een methode om 
het christelijk geloof in overeenstemming te brengen met de evolutietheorie. In 
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zijn benadering maakte hij onderscheid tussen enerzijds systemen die hij 
‘gevormd’ en ‘gecentreerd’ noemde en anderzijds alle systemen zonder deze 
eigenschappen. De aanduidingen ‘gevormd’ en ‘gecentreerd’ vertonen veel 
gelijkenis met de structurele en functionele closures die bepalend zijn voor 
operatoren. Teilhard de Chardin was er sterk van overtuigd dat alleen het 
ordenen van gevormde en gecentreerde systemen inzicht in de evolutie kon 
opleveren. Hoe bewonderenswaardig ook, de theorie van Teilhad de Chardin 
was te weinig onderbouwd om wetenschappelijk geaccepteerd te worden. 
Bovendien werd zijn benadering door onderzoekers gewantrouwd omdat zijn 
hiërarchie eindigde met de eenwording van de mensheid met god in het 
zogenaamde punt omega. De operator theorie gebruikt kernen uit het 
gedachtegoed van Teilhard de Chardin en breidt deze uit met moderne inzichten 
en een gedetailleerde systeemkundige onderbouwing. Bovendien maakt de 
operatortheorie aannemelijk dat de evolutie van operatoren juist geen vast 
eindpunt heeft. 
 
Omdat de operatortheorie nieuw is, zijn er nog veel uitdagingen om deze theorie 
verder te verfijnen. Eerst en voor alles is het noodzakelijk om de regels die de 
basis vormen voor de kolommen in Figuur 5 beter te leren begrijpen. Een beter 
begrip van deze regels zal het namelijk mogelijk maken om voorspellingen over 
de volgende stadia in de evolutie aan te scherpen en op basis hiervan 
nauwkeuriger uitspraken te doen over toekomstige operatoren. Dit zal 
wetenschappers en filosofen nieuwe mogelijkheden bieden om op verkenning te 
gaan in een domein waarvan men tot voor kort dacht dat het ontoegankelijk was 
voor een natuurwetenschappelijke benadering: de toekomst van de evolutie. 
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The evolution of an idea 
The operator hierarchy started developing while I was working as a postdoc at 
the Vrije Universiteit from September 1992 to August 1993 after my PhD in 
ecotoxicology. The project was initiated by the “Netherlands Integrated Soil 
Research Programme” and involved writing an integration study of 21 PhD 
projects on soil pollution. The project started with writing fact sheets for all 21 
projects. Based on this and other information, a proposal for theoretic integration 
entitled “Ecotoxicology across the levels of ecological organisation” was sent to 
the advisory committee in mid-1993.  This draft already hinted at using 
dimensions as an organising principle, stating that “all stress on ecological 
systems is a combination of the effects on the creation and destruction of 
‘matter’ and ‘information’ in systems”. Around this time Bas Kooijman allowed 
me to read a first draft of his book “Dynamic energy budgets in biological 
systems”. Near the end of 1993, the project’s advisory committee received a 
second draft report. Later that year I read Kauffman’s book “The Origins of 
Order”, and the basic idea for the operator hierarchy was born during the winter 
of 1993-1994. Developing the operator hierarchy required studying many new 
things ranging from quarks to neural networks, which took a while. Around this 
time Bart Happel introduced me to the astonishing world of technical, modular, 
recurrent neural networks and the fractal inner space they show. Figure 1 shows 
one of the first drawings of the operator hierarchy and illustrates just how much 
work had yet to be done.  
 
 
Figure 1. This figure illustrates one of the first drawings of the operator hierarchy (spring 
1994). Note that every level shows the same number of elements. 
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In August 1994, a final report on the integration project was sent to the advisory 
committee with the title “Application of a hierarchical concept of ecosystem 
organisation in ecotoxicology”. The report included a part about the dynamic 
balance of toxicants in organisms and a part about targets, buffering and 
plasticity and the processes of assessment, diagnosis and prognosis. The 
advisory committee responded with disappointment because they had hoped for 
indications of “What is an acceptable toxin level?”. Instead, the report dealt with: 
When, Why, How, Related to what, and even So What? The report introduced 
the basic ideas of the ‘operator’ and ‘closure’: “Using closure of operations as a 
borderline between two hierarchical levels in the information evolution, the 
organisation shows four levels: the sub-atomary level, the level of atoms and 
molecules, the organic level, and the level of the consciousness”. Importantly, it 
was concluded that “… the repeating of an evolutionary pattern within the 
hierarchical levels appeared to be so eminent, that we have given the resulting 
hierarchy a central position in this study”. It was a great help to discuss the 
operator hierarchy with Cajo ter Braak in January 1995. His comments included 
a list of 92 suggestions and questions in the manuscript’s margins. By this time, 
the operator hierarchy had evolved into the scheme in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The operator hierarchy as it looked in January 1995. The numbers in circles 
refer to Cajo ter Braak’s remarks. Note that the scheme now assumes a variable number 
of steps per level, but that complexity increase is still linear within levels. 
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In 1996, while working at NERI (Denmark,) I submitted the Lego-bricks paper. 
After two years it was sent back unreviewed. Klaus Skovbo Jensen then 
introduced me to Eigen’s hypercycles. In 1997, I was inspired by Lars Witting 
who kindly gave me a draft of his book “A General Theory of Evolution”. In 1998, 
Hans Løkke gave me the green light for three months of writing time to restyle 
the ecotoxicology manuscript. But after these months of hard work -- during 
which I stayed in a NERI guesthouse -- it appeared that I had again 
underestimated the complexity and quantity of the work. In 1999, the paper 
about the Lego bricks was published in World Futures, the journal of general 
evolution. And later that year, a new job came along at Alterra as the head of the 
functional biodiversity team.  
 
During the last months of 2001, Diedel Kornet introduced me to her idea of “slots 
in state space” and gave me an interesting scheme of the natural levels 
including elementary particles, atoms, molecules, free-living cells, multicellular 
organisms and interbreeding communities. This scheme also contained the 
principle of internal organisation. In 2001, the Acta Biotheoretica paper was 
published. The prediction of future operators then awoke the media’s warm 
interest because of the question: “Will robots dominate humanity?” This resulted 
in a range of interviews for local and national newspapers and for radio and 
television. Suddenly, living in two worlds proved too complex. I decided to create 
more time for the operator hierarchy. This proved a fruitful strategy. The 
Analysing Hierarchy paper was published in Biological Reviews in 2008. In 
2009, the ‘definition of life paper’ was accepted by Foundations of Science (to be 
published in 2010). In June 2009, Rolf Hoekstra invited me to a meeting in his 
office with Eörs Szathmáry. After a short presentation of the operator hierarchy’s 
major ideas, Eörs made two very valuable comments. As far as he knew, the 
idea of first-next possible closure was a unique approach. He also indicated that 
using only interactions as a basis for first-next possible closure in the ‘three 
dimensions picture’ was presumably too restrictive. This was a wise remark. I 
immediately adapted the figure. Based on the accepted publications, I 
considered the possibility of a PhD. When speaking to Nico van Straalen about 
this plan, he advised me to contact Hub Zwart of the Radboud University 
Nijmegen. This resulted in a very pleasant contact and two month of writing time 
to finalise the project.  
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Glossary 
“Accurate definitions improve the precision and communication of science. 
Sloppy definitions lead to the development of sloppy theory.  
A lack of definitions leads to no science at all.”  
(Gerard Jagers op Akkerhuis). 
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The operator theory represents a new point of view. This implies that a number 
of new concepts had to be introduced and defined. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of the logic of the operator theory certain existing concepts were 
re-evaluated and sometimes had to be re-defined. Additionally, there exist 
various concepts in science that play a more general role in the context of the 
operator hierarchy and for which it is useful to have a short description at hand. 
For all these reasons it was considered appropriate to offer the readers of this 
thesis an overview of concepts that play an important role in the context of the 
operator theory. 
 
Analogy: Analogy implies a mapping of knowledge from one domain (the base) 
to another (the target) such that a system of relations that holds among the base 
objects also holds among the target objects (Gentner & Jeziorski 1993) 
 
Building block: I sometimes use the word 'building block' or 'unit systems' for 
indicating the particles that in the operator hierarchy are named operators. I 
always have in mind a system in which the elements create a physical and 
functional unity on the basis of first-next possible closures.  
 
Catalytic hypercycle: see Hypercycle 
 
Closure: In the context of the operator hierarchy, closure relates to a state of 
matter that is the result of a self-organisation process and that shows a closed 
topology with respect to structure, process or the combination of both. Closure 
as a state shows a close association with underlying mechanisms because it 
also is used to refer to the closing process producing the closed state.  
 
Closure level: In the context of the operator hierarchy, every first-next possible 
closure adds one closure level.  
 
Closure, structural and functional: Functional closure is defined as a closed 
cycle of processes that does not cause a physical mediating layer. Specific 
forms of functional closure are the catalytic reactions involved in an autocatalytic 
set, the pion exchange between protons and neutrons in the atom nucleus and 
the plasma strands connecting the cells of multicellulars. In contrast, the 
definition of structural closure demands that interactions create a physically 
closed topology. In the operator hierarchy, the focus is on a special form of 
structural closure, namely the structural closure that creates a physical boundary 
mediating a contained, first-next possible, hypercyclic process. Specific 
examples of structural closure in the operator hierarchy are the electron shell 
around the atom nucleus, the cell membrane of a single cell, and the connected 
cell membranes of multicellular organisms and the sensory interface of the 
memon. 
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Closure dimension: A closure dimension focuses on similarity in structural 
closure, functional closure or, when present, a combination of both. The naming 
of a closure dimension is directed after the most complex organisational property 
of the system as allowed by structural or functional closure or, when possible, 
the combination of both. The following closure dimensions are acknowledged in 
the operator hierarchy: 1. the interface dimension, introduced by the 
fundamental particles, 2. the hypercyclic dimension, introduced by the quark-
gluon plasma, 3. the multi-state dimension, introduced by the hadrons, 4. the 
hypercycle mediating interface dimension (HMI), introduced by the atoms, 5. the 
structural copying of information dimension (SCI), introduced by the cell, 6. the 
structural auto-evolution dimension, introduced by the hardwired memon  
 
Complexity (functional): I regard as the functional complexity of an entity 'all 
forms of internal or external interactive processes that are supported by the 
internal organisation of the entity’. Both a large, badly organised structure and a 
minute, well-integrated structure may allow an entity to show the same functional 
complexity.  
 
Complexity: Complexity is a concept that refers to our inability to give a 
straightforward description of the properties of an entity. Complexity relates to 
the number and inter-relatedness of the elements of an entity and to the patterns 
and sub-patterns in its states and dynamics.  
 
Complexity of a closure dimension: The complexity of a closure dimension is 
based on the number of major transitions that were required to construct it. 
According to the operator theory, the complexities of the closure dimensions that 
are known to exist are: 1 for the fundamental particles, 2 for the first-next 
possible closure creating hypercyclic interaction systems, 3 for the hadrons, 4 
for the atoms, 5 for the cell and 6 for the memon. 
 
Complexity of operators: The operator hierarchy measures the complexity of 
an operator by means of the number of first-next possible closure levels that 
underlie its construction. 
 
Confinement: Confinement binds quarks in hadrons in a condensation-like 
process. It is the result of the strong force, also called the color force, which is 
conveyed by the exchange of gluons between quarks. At higher 
temperatures/energies the quarks become increasingly heavy and the 
confinement relatively weaker, which is referred to as the asymptotic freedom of 
the quarks. 
 
Corrupt hierarchy: If, in any hierarchy, one or more steps/layers do not comply 
with the hierarchy rule used for creating the ranking, I consider this a corrupt 
hierarchy. For example the hierarchy 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 ... is corrupt in relation to the 
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rule that for every N, the next element in the ranking must be exactly N+1 (it 
lacks the 3). For the same reason the ranking 1, 2, 3, 3.2457, 4 ... is a corrupt 
hierarchy (the 3.2457 is superfluous). 
 
Dissipative system: The organisation of a dissipative system results from 
selforganisation processes caused by the degradation of free energy gradients 
in the environment. Examples of dissipative systems are waves (degrading wind 
energy), whirlwinds (degrading a pressure gradient in the atmosphere) and 
organisms (degrading a chemical and/or radiation energy gradient). As a 
thermodynamic equilibrium implies a random distribution of elements and 
interactions, the organisation of elements in a dissipative system is regarded as 
to be 'far from equilibrium'. Dissipative systems do not contradict with the laws of 
thermodynamics, because any increase in organisation inside a dissipative 
system (which implies a decrease in entropy) is driven by a free energy gradient 
and causes at least as much entropy in the system as is lost during the 
organisation process. 
 
Efficiency: I regard efficiency as the lowest resource use, when two processes 
are compared leading to a functionally equivalent product or achieving a 
functionally equivalent goal. 
 
Elementary closure: An elementary closure represents the lowest complexity 
realisation of its type with respect to the system’s structure, process, or when 
possible, the combination of both. Elaboration and repetition of the same closure 
type does not affect the elementary closure.  
 
Elementary particle: In physics, the concepts of elementary particles and 
fundamental forces are used to indicate matter particles and force carrying 
particles of the standard model, respectively. The operator hierarchy suggests 
that one may also regard all operators as elementary particles with respect to 
their highest level first-next possible closure. Defined this way, only the particles 
of the standard model are truly elementary (which I prefer to consider 
fundamental) in the sense that they presumably show no substructure of smaller 
particles. 
 
Emergent property: An emergent property is a group-property that results from 
interactions between entities that individually do not show this property. For 
example water flow and waves are emergent properties of interacting water 
molecules (a single molecule cannot form a wave). Used in this general way, 
emergent properties arise from almost any interaction between separate 
elements. 
 
Entropy: Entropy is the opposite of free energy. Because in a closed system the 
average free energy can never increase, the entropy can only increase. An 
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increase in entropy corresponds with the natural pathway of systems from a high 
to a low energy state. Examples are the reaction of chemicals to low energy 
products, the transformation of light to heat, the falling of particles in a 
gravitational or electric field and the change of a system towards the state that 
shows the highest number of possible microstates. For closed systems 
Boltzmann has shown that the chance on a decrease in entropy becomes 
infinitesimally small for systems consisting of many elements. It is an important 
aspect of nature that in local parts of open systems entropy may decrease, the 
local system becoming more organised. This does not violate the laws of 
thermodynamics, as long as the entropy decrease in the local system is driven 
by a free energy gradient.  
 
Evolution: Any process based on the following aspects: 1. the production of 
entities the structure of which differs from that of their precessors (productive 
diversification), and 2. structure-dependent performance of the entities causing a 
gradient in their evolutionary success (the cause of selection). Evolutionary 
dynamics can be observed at all levels of the operator hierarchy (e.g. 
elementary particles, prions and viruses, organisms, technical memons) but also 
things that are not operators may show evolution, e.g. strings of computer code, 
bee colonies, or neuron states produced in relation to the invention and weighing 
of different scenarios in a decision making process. The evolution of neuron 
states precedes that of tools (cars, windmills and the like) with which it co-
evolves. 
 
Evolutionary success: Evolutionary success is a measure that depends on the 
relative performance of entities with respect to: 1. the stability of their internal 
organisation, 2. the stability of their functioning in interactions with other entities 
and/or forces, 3. their capacity for productive diversification, which in relation to 
operators ultimately includes the capacity to produce the following first-next 
possible closure. Without the latter, evolution cannot proceed towards higher 
level operators.  
The evolutionary success of dissipative systems, such as living beings, is related 
to the relative success with respect to resource dominance, when compared to 
other systems that take part in the process. The longer an organism exists and 
the better it functions (which may include reproduction), the more resources it 
(and its offspring) will use/dominate. Organisms which at a given moment are 
the best resource dominators, may rapidly lose from others which get slowly 
better over time, whilst both strategies will be beaten by organisms that can 
increase the rate of their improvement, especially if they can increase the 
acceleration of this rate. Strength in competition as well as strength in 
cooperation may increase evolutionary success. The duration of observations 
determines which of the above aspects of evolutionary success can be 
observed. 
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A higher evolutionary success not necessarily implies a more complex structure. 
For example, in dynamic environments with a high random mortality, simple, 
rapidly reproducing entities will prevail. 
 
Exhaustive closure: To assist in identifying the new type of elementary closure, 
I suggest identifying the ‘exhaustive closure’ in the system at the one lower 
closure level. A system shows exhaustive closure, if there is no remaining 
potential for elaborating the structural and dynamic aspects of the elementary 
closure type, because any further development will cause the construction of a 
new elementary closure type. While the elementary closure of the system 
remains the same, the state of exhaustive closure allows for a new functionality. 
 
First-next possible closure: First-next possible closure is defined as follows: 
given any system A that shows first-next possible closure, the next first-next 
possible closure creates the least complex system type above A that shows a 
new type of elementary closure based on A and, when required, any highest 
level system type possible below A that shows first-next possible closure. This 
definition is inherently recursive because a system showing first-next possible 
closure produces a more complex system showing first-next possible closure. 
Because a first-next possible closure is always built from systems showing a 
preceding first-next possible closure, the recursive definition does not lead to 
logical loops. 
 
Force: A force is the result of an interaction. For example the repulsion between 
electrons (electromagnetism) is caused by the interaction of two electrons by 
means of the exchange of virtual photons. Likewise, the exchange of gluons 
causes the attractive force between quarks. In principle the equating of force 
and interaction works al all levels of the operator hierarchy. For example the 
interaction between a predator and its prey can be regarded as a ‘predation 
force’.  
 
Fundamental particle: A physical particle that shows no substructure of smaller 
particles. In the operator hierarchy: the system showing the lowest level first-
next possible closure (see also elementary particle). 
 
Hardwiring: This concept is used to describe a neural architecture that is based 
on physical 'wires' between neurons, for example in the shape of dendrites. The 
difference with 'softwiring' is that softwired connections between neurons do not 
exist as physical wires, but as entries in computer memory telling which neuron 
is connected to which other neurons and what is the strength of the connection. 
 
Hierarchy: Hierarchy assumes a ranking of entities. Formally, elements in a 
hierarchy meet the following two demands (Simon 1973): Irreflexivity: A can 
never hold a hierarchical position below itself. Transitivity or non-transitivity: if A 
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has a lower hierarchical position than B, and B has a lower position than C, then 
A does have, or does not have a lower position than C. From irreflexivity and 
(non-)transitivity follows Antisymmetry: if A has a lower hierarchical position than 
B, then B cannot hold a lower position than A. An example of a transitive 
hierarchical relationship is: A is ancestor of B, B is ancestor of C. In this case A 
is also ancestor of C. An example of a non-transitive hierarchy is: A is a child of 
B, B is a child of C. In this case A is not a child of C. 
 
Bottom-up hierarchies arise when the behaviour of lower level elements 
integrates them in larger assemblies (e.g. when atoms create a molecule). Top-
down hierarchies may have different origins, for example 1. when social 
agreements define a top figure (marshal/manager) and allow it to direct groups 
of (now) lower level figures (soldiers/workers) or 2. when after the formation of a 
functional unit, internal differentiation leads to internal hierarchies of functional 
relationships (see also 'Penultimate level').  
 
Hierarchical layer: Operators and pre-operator interaction systems that are 
based on the same primary system and do not yet represent the next major 
transition, are regarded as to belong to the same hierarchical layer. 
 
Hypercycle: The use of this concept in the literature generally refers to the 
enzymatic hypercycle as discussed by Eigen and Schuster (1977). With respect 
to the operator hierarchy, the concept is used for any second order cyclic 
process that is related to a first-next possible closure. 
 
Information and complexity: Information has a structural and a semantic 
aspect. The structural aspect relates to the number of elements and the different 
states they can code for (e.g. Shannon 1948). The semantic aspect relates to 
the interpretation of a coding. In principle, there is no limit to the semantic 
complexity of a message, because even a simple coding may relate to a highly 
complex interpretation. The functional elements of a coding (the ‘bites’, 
'characters', 'genes', 'symbols', etc.) normally show an intermediate complexity. 
Too low complexity would allow too little differences between the elements. Too 
high complexity would make the coding/decoding difficult.  
 
Intelligence: In the context of the operator theory intelligence is an emergent 
property brought about by the functioning of an operator with a complex enough 
memic architecture. Intelligence is associated with the autonomous capacities to 
observe, learn, make internal representations, predict, evaluate and act. 
Intelligence requires sensors for contacting the world and a neural network for 
creating internal multiple-channel representations, the latter offering a natural 
source for association and creativity. Intelligence shows a gradual increase with 
increasing neural complexity. For intentional behaviour, the representations 
must be available for the evaluation of which actions are most effective for 
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reaching the mental concept of a certain goal. Intelligence, therefore, has much 
to do with the art of choosing appropriate aspects for evaluation in multi-factorial 
problems. 
 
Interaction: An interaction is an event that involves at least two entities and 
causes a change in one or more parameters of both systems. This excludes as 
interactions all events in which one element remains unchanged. For example, if 
someone listens to a radio program, this seems an interaction between the 
person speaking on the radio and you. But the person speaking is not affected in 
this process, and therefore it is not an interaction according to the above 
definition.  
 
Interaction system: An interaction system consists of interacting operators but 
lacks the closure(s) that would allow it to be regarded as an operator. The world 
is swarming with interaction systems, including footballs, stars, cars, water, 
populations, society, companies, etc. Of course also operators consist of 
interacting elements. Yet, like Orwell made his pigs advocate that 'all animals 
are equal, but some are more equal than others', I advocate that all systems are 
interaction systems, but that the operators show such special interactions, that it 
is wise to regard them as 'more equal than others'. Accordingly I assign them to 
a special subset. Although they play an important role in the operator hierarchy, 
the pre-operator hypercyclic sets and interfaces are not operators, but 
interaction systems.  
 
Life; as a state of matter: Life is a concept that relates to all matter that shows 
the construction of operators, and that has the minimum complexity of the 
cellular operator. Subsets of living entities can be defined as autocatalytic life 
(uni- and multicellular plants, fungi, sponges, protozoa, etc.) or memic life 
(including all memic operators, regardless whether they are based on a cellular 
or a technical construction).  
 
Life; meaning of: The meaning of life is in the first place a personal subject. 
Besides this, the operator theory offers two general ways of thinking about the 
meaning of life. The first meaning is associated with the functioning of organisms 
as individual operators. Every organism has to stay alive and memic organisms 
additionally care about their daily satisfaction. Survival is a quite objective 
criterion. The validation of daily satisfaction depends on the individual judgment 
of what is 'satisfying'. The second meaning of life is associated with the 
contribution of all operators to evolution. On the one hand, this implies an 
involuntary act. Whatever you do, you are always part of the large process that 
is driven by entropy production. On the other hand, increasing insight in the 
overall structure of evolution may have the implication that a person decides to 
realise a directed contribution to evolution, for example by constructing a 
technical memon 
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Living: Living can be defined as the dynamic activity of systems that comply 
with the definition of life. A bacterium, for example, may or may not be living, 
depending on whether it is active or frozen/dried. 
 
Major transition: Any first-next possible closure creating a primary system is 
regarded as a major transition (not to be confused with the major evolutionary 
transitions of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995a, 1995b) 
 
Meme: Dawkins (The selfish gene, 1976) defines the meme as: '... new 
replicators, which I called memes to distinguish them from genes, can propagate 
themselves from brain to brain, from brain to book, from book to brain, from 
brain to computer, from computer to computer.' Dawkins' memes are not 
structural analogues of genes, because any pattern of replicable information in 
brains, books, etc. could be a meme, whilst not any pattern of replicable 
information in cells is regarded a gene. To solve this, I propose the use of 
different meme concepts: 1. Abstract meme (A-meme): abstractions 
communicated between memons (melodies, stories, and theories), 2. Physical 
memes (P-meme): physical models of thoughts (written language, artwork, 
buildings), 3. Functional meme (F-meme): the actual neural network, or part of it, 
harboring information, 4. Coding meme (C-meme): C-memes code for neural 
network architecture just as genes code for catalytic molecules.  
 
Minor transition: Any first-next possible closure creating a system that shows 
an already existing closure dimension, is regarded a minor transition. 
 
Model: I regard as a model any entity that represents another entity. This may 
involve mental models that represent parts of our environment, scaled physical 
models that represent larger or smaller physical or mental originals, and 
simulation models that represent aspects of real world systems. 
 
Modularity: Modularity refers to the construction of larger systems from small 
functional and/or structural subassemblies or 'modules'. Herbert Simon 
illustrated the evolutionary merits of modularity in the parable of the 
watchmakers Tempus and Hora, making watches consisting of 1000 parts each. 
Tempus made his watches bit by bit. When disturbed, he had to redo the entire 
assembling process. Hora put his watches together from subassemblies of 10 
parts each. 10 subassemblies were put together in a larger subassembly and 10 
larger subassemblies constituted the whole watch. Hence, when Hora was 
disturbed he only lost the specific subassembly-job he was involved in. Simon 
calculated that if customers disturbed Hora and Tempus on average once in 
hundred assembly operations, Tempus would need about four thousand times 
longer to assemble a watch. 
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Natural systems: I regard as natural systems all elements of the universe of 
which the physical existence allows us to interact with it and describe static 
and/or dynamic properties (qualities and quantities) in a consistent way. 
More/better measurements should lead to an increasing detail of our 
representation of the system. Kragh (Aktuel Naturvidenskab 1999) has said this 
in the following way. 'It is difficult to understand, how measurements of important 
scientific parameters normally can become more and more precise, and how 
knowledge shows a general consolidation and refining, if these measurements 
and knowledge do not concern something that really exists in nature'. In the 
context of the operator theory, natural systems include the neural configuration 
and neural dynamics that 'carry' a thought, for example of the number pi, but do 
not include the word 'thoughts' or the number ‘pi’. 
 
Operator: An operator is defined as a system type that shows first-next possible 
closure with a closure dimension of at least 3. This implies that operators can 
also be defined as those systems showing first-next possible closure that are not 
pre-operator interaction systems. The set of the operators unifies all particles, 
irrespective whether these are physical particles or organisms. All operators that 
are currently known to exist are: the hadron, the atom, the molecule, the 
(bacterial) cell, the eukaryote cell, the bacterial and eukaryote multicellular and 
the neural network organism, called the ‘memon’ in the operator hierarchy.  
 
Operator hierarchy: The operator hierarchy is the structuring of all operators 
and pre-operator interaction systems on the basis of first-next possible closure 
and closure dimensions. 
 
Operator hypothesis: The operator hypothesis states that the fundamental 
limitations imposed by first-next possible closure act as a strict mould for particle 
evolution.  
 
Operator theory: The operator theory is the theoretical framework that offers 
the context for the operator hierarchy and the operator hypothesis. 
 
Penultimate level (Law of the branching growth of the …): This law by 
Turchin (1977) states that: '...after the formation, through variation and selection, 
of a control system C, controlling a number of subsystems Si, the Si will tend to 
multiply and differentiate. The reason is that only after the formation of a 
mechanism controlling the Si it becomes useful to increase the variety of the Si. 
 
Pre-operator interaction systems: Systems, caused by first-next possible 
closure, that selectively create an interface or a 2nd order cyclic interaction (the 
‘hypercycle’) as closure dimension, are called pre-operator interaction systems. 
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Primary system: A system showing a new closure dimension is regarded a 
primary system.  
 
Quanta of evolution: Quantification normally involves simple variables such as 
length, weight, color (wavelength), etc. A more complex variable to quantify is 
the evolutionary complexity of a system, for which quanta of evolution have been 
proposed (Turchin 1995, Heylighen, Joslyn and Turchin 1995). The operator 
hierarchy uses first-next possible closure steps for creating a strict system of 
quanta of organisation.  
 
Recursion of definition: A definition is recursive if it explains some entities Xn 
in terms of X. The operator hierarchy is recursively defined, because lower level 
operators are used to define higher level operators. Note that a recursive 
definition does not suffer from a logical loop. 
 
Resource: A resource is something a living operator needs to enable certain 
aspects of its existence. 
 
Resource dominance: Resource dominance is defined as the capacity of 
organisms to gain dominance over resources. There are different aspects of 
resource dominance that are of evolutionary importance. First, there is the 
amount of resources that an organism can dominate by degrading them. After 
degradation they are no longer available for other organisms. Second, there are 
resources that an organism may dominate, without that it uses them. Again they 
are no longer available for other organisms. There exist various resource 
dominance strategies by which an operator can increase its evolutionary 
success.  
 
Softwiring: In softwired memons, the neural network is based on computer files 
that keep track of the neurons involved, the interactions they show with other 
neurons, and the types and connection strengths of the interactions. 
 
System: The system concept relates to entities which can be endowed group-
wise functionality because of past, present or future interactions and/or 
relationships. The entities that by their relationships define the group are 
considered as the elements of the system. The system concept applies to the 
universe or a subset of it (the latter including mental states and via these, all 
aspects of our imagination). Frequently, the entities and their interactions are 
chosen in such a way that they define, include or relate to some kind of physical 
system limit.  
 
System type of closed systems: Two systems that are created by the same 
first-next possible closure are considered to be of the same system type. 
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Tool: In the context of the operator hierarchy I define as a tool 'any idea or 
physical object that a memic operator may use to help it manipulating the world 
to its liking'. Consequently there are mental tools, such as mathematics, and 
physical tools, such as a stick, a hammer, a car, a house, a factory and a 
computer. It is interesting to realise that the operator hierarchy predicts that the 
next level memons are not based on cells but on technical hardware. 
Consequently, the process of reproduction (giving birth), that is so important for 
the evolution of organisms based on one or more cells, will be replaced by the 
process of producing an 'offspring-tool'. 
 
Topology: Topology studies qualitative aspects of geometrical structures. In 
stead of asking how big a certain thing is, it focuses on other aspects, such as: 
does it have any holes in it; is it connected together, or can it be separated into 
parts. 
 
Transition: If a system changes from state A to state B this can be regarded as 
a transition of the system between these states. For any particular transition the 
property that is going to be looked at as well as the states that can be 
recognised have to be defined. 
 
Type: A type is used as a grouping of entities according to a common property. 
Using types of types leads to the creation of a type-hierarchy in which lower-
level types show properties that are grouped into higher-level types. For 
example the higher-plant-type and the animal-type can be grouped within the 
multicellular-organism-type. Frequently used types in relation to the operator 
hierarchy are: 1. process type: a comparable aspect that can be recognised in 
the dynamics of different entities. 2. System type (general): the type of a system 
is defined by comparable aspects with respect to a. the rules involved in the 
selection of elements, b. the properties defining the elements and c. the 
relationships that may exist between the elements, and 3. Closure type: a 
closure type is defined by the presence of comparable aspects with respect to 
the type of elements and the type of mechanisms causing the closure.  
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